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Preface
This report presents the methodology for evaluating flight readiness developed by
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) under NASA RTOP 553-02-01 sponsored by the
Office of Space Flight (OSF), NASA Headquarters. This methodology was developed
as a part of the Certification Process Assessment task initiated by OSF due to concern
about criteria for certifying flight readiness of the Space Shuttle propulsion system.
An early phase of this work included an extensive review of certification and failure
risk assessment approaches used by the aerospace industry and government
agencies. Based on the findings of this review,1 further work was focused on defining,
developing, and demonstrating an improved technical approach for failure risk
assessment that can incorporate information from both test experience and engineer-
ing analysis to obtain a quantitative failure risk estimate. This approach, called
Probabilistic Failure Assessment (PFA), is of particular value when information
relevant to failure prediction, including test experience and knowledge of parameters
used in engineering analyses of failure phenomena, is expensive or difficult to acquire.
Under such constraints, a quantitative evaluation of failure risk based on the informa-
tion available from both engineering analysis and operating experience is needed to
make effective risk management decisions and utilize financial resources efficiently.
The PFA methodology is applicable to failure modes that can be characterized by
analytical or empirical modeling of failure phenomena and is especially useful when
models or information used in analysis are uncertain or approximate. PFA can be
applied at any time in the design, development, or operational phases of a program
to quantitatively estimate failure risk based on the information available at the time of
the risk assessment and can be used to evaluate and rank alternative measures to
control risk, thereby enabling the more effective allocation of limited financial
resources.
The work documented in this report was carried out by a multidisciplinary team of
JPL technical personnel, which was managed by N. R. Moore. This team was
composed of individuals with expertise in statistics, systems modeling, and engineer-
ing analysis. D. H. Ebbeler formulated and structured the statistical methodology and
directed its implementation. L. E. Newlin formulated and implemented probabilistic
engineering models and implemented the statistical methodology. S. Sutharshana
1 See [3] of Section 1.0 references.
iii
formulated probabilistic engineering analysis methods and models. M. Creager 2
made major contributions to defining and formulating the probabilistic modeling
approach and engineering analysis procedures used in this work. Present or former
JPL personnel who made substantial contributions in early phases of this work include
D. L. Schwartz, W. E. Edmiston, and L. J. Grondalski. D. Goode and J. Ramsay
typeset the manuscript, including graphics, using computerized desktop publishing
methods, and E. Reinig edited the manuscript.
In developing the PFA methodology, the JPL team interacted with aerospace
system manufacturers, the Marshall Space Flight Center, and the Lewis Research
Center. Individuals of these organizations generously shared information and spent
significant amounts of time with the JPL team. In particular, Rocketdyne, Canoga
Park, California, and Pratt & Whitney, West Palm Beach, Florida, collaborated in
performing the application examples given herein. In addition, technical comments
on certification approaches and failure modeling were provided by the above-listed
organizations and by General Electric, Cincinnati, Ohio; the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration; and the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base.
The PFA methodology, examples of its application to spaceflight components, and
computer software used to implement PFA are documented in the three volumes of
this report. Volume I documents the PFA methodology and the application examples,
including the rationale for PFA and the analysis procedures used in the examples.
Volume II contains user's guides and flowcharts for the computer software used to
implement PFA in the application examples. Volume III presents the structure and
listings of the computer programs.
2 Currently of Structural Integrity Engineering, Chatsworth, CA.
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Abstract
An improved methodology for quantitatively evaluating failure risk of spaceflight
systems to assess flight readiness and identify risk control measures is presented.
This methodology, called Probabilistic Failure Assessment (PFA), combines operating
experience from tests and flights with engineering analysis to estimate failure risk.
The PFA methodology is of particular value when information on which to base an
assessment of failure risk, including test experience and knowledge of parameters
used in engineering analyses of failure phenomena, is expensive or difficult to acquire.
The PFA methodology is a prescribed statistical structure in which engineering
analysis models that characterize failure phenomena are used conjointly with uncer-
tainties about analysis parameters and/or modeling accuracy to estimate failure
probability distributions for specific failure modes. These distributions can then be
modified, by means of statistical procedures of the PFA methodology, to reflect any
test or flight experience. Conventional engineering analysis models currently
employed for design or failure prediction are used in this methodology.
The PFA methodology can be applied at any time in the design, development, or
operational phases of a program to quantitatively estimate failure risk based on the
information available at the time failure risk is assessed. Sensitivity analyses con-
ducted as a part of PFA can be used to evaluate and rank such alternative measures
to control risk as design changes, testing, or inspections, thereby enabling limited
program resources to be allocated more effectively.
PFA is generally applicable to failure modes that can be characterized by analytical
or empirical models of failure phenomena and is especially useful when models or
information used in analysis are uncertain or approximate. Such failure modes
include, but are not limited to, fatigue, flaw propagation, rupture, degradation and
wear, and malfunction of mechanical or electrical systems.
It is often not feasible to acquire enough test experience to establish high reliability
at high confidence for spaceflight systems. Moreover, the results of conventionally
performed engineering analyses of failure modes can be subject to serious
misinterpretation when uncertain or approximate information is used to establish
analysis parameters and calibrate the accuracy of analysis models. Under these
conditions, a quantitative evaluation of failure risk based on the information available
from both test or flight experience and engineering analysis is needed to make
effective risk management decisions.
vi
This report describes the PFAmethodology and presents examples of its applica-
tion. Conventional approaches to failure risk evaluation for spaceflight systems are
discussed, and the rationale for the approach taken in the PFA methodology is
presented. The statistical methods, engineering models, and computer software
used in fatigue failure mode applications are thoroughly documented.
vii
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Section 1.1
Flight Readiness Assessment
1.1.1 The Flight Readiness Assessment Problem
The occurrence of critical failures during the service life of such spaceflight systems
as the Space Shuttle and planetary spacecraft must be established as extremely
unlikely before missions are flown. The expectation of reliable operation over the
service life of spaceflight systems typically has been established by a judgmental
evaluation of limited test experience and deterministic engineering analysis, as
discussed for the Space Shuttle in [1], [2], and [3]. It is rarely feasible to acquire
enough test experience to establish high reliability at high confidence for spaceflight
hardware, and deterministic analyses to predict failures can become arbitrary and
subject to serious misinterpretation when information used to establish analysis
parameters and to calibrate the accuracy of analysis models is not based on
sufficiently extensive experience. The assessment and management of failure risk of
spaceflight systems can be improved by using a risk assessment approach that can
quantitatively incorporate information from both operating experience and engineer-
ing analysis. A discussion of the need for improved approaches for characterizing
and managing failure risk, including comments on the approach presented in this
report, is given in [2].
Operating experience and engineering analysis are the two fundamental informa-
tion sources on which any assessment of failure risk is based. For certain failure
modes of spaceflight systems, directly applicable experience is sparse or does not
exist; testing sufficient to establish high reliability is infeasible; consistently conserva-
tive engineering analyses result in unacceptable designs or service limits; and analysis
parameters and/or models are too uncertain for less conservative deterministic
analyses to be credible. Under these conditions, a quantitative assessment of failure
risk that incorporates all of the available information is required in order to make
effective risk management decisions.
The approach advocated in this report for assessing and managing failure risk uses
engineering analyses and operating experience in a statistical structure in which
uncertainties about the prediction or characterization of failure are quantitatively
treated. The probabilistic analysis to characterize failure risk is carried out with the
information available at the time of the analysis. This analysis can be performed with
any amount of information at any time in the design, development, qualification/cer-
tification, or operational phases of a spaceflight project. The results of such a
probabilistic analysis provides a quantitative measure of failure risk that is warranted
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by what is known about a failure mode. In addition, the types of information having
the largest impact in controlling failure risk can be identified and ranked.
This approach can be applied to any failure mode that can be described by
analytical models of the failure phenomena, even when such models areuncertain or
approximate. Such failure modes include,but are not limitedto, fatigue, flaw propaga-
tion, burst or rupture, degradation andwear phenomena,and malfunction of mechani-
cal or electrical systems. Examples of the application of this approach to high cycle
fatigue and low cycle fatigue failure modes are presented in the following sections of
this report. The application examplesdocumented in this report are listed in Section
1.4. Additional applications will be presented in subsequent reports.
Fatigue, crack growth, and degradation are examples of damage accumulation
failure modes wherein failure is a consequence of the cumulation of aging effects
produced by repeated exposure to operating conditions or by environmental
parameters which vary cyclically. In contrast, event consequent failure modes are
those in which failure is independent of the extent of previous exposure to operating
conditions; instead, failure is a consequence of an event such as applied stress
exceeding ultimate strength.
Failure prediction for event consequent failure modes is usually much less uncertain
than for damage accumulation failure modes. Moreover, it is often feasible to conduct
testing programs to establish low failure probability with high confidence for event
consequent failure modes, while such test programs are seldom feasible for damage
accumulation failure modes [4]. As a result, the probabilistic analysis approach and
methods presented in this report are most useful for damage accumulation failure
modes when failure prediction by analysis is significantly uncertain and testing to
demonstrate high service life reliability with high confidence is not feasible. Service
life reliability is the probability of surviving the required service life without a failure.
Probabilistic analyses can yield particularly beneficial results for a subset of the
critical failure modes identified by means of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
(FMEA) or other systematic procedures to identify and screen failure modes. Many
of the failure modes identified by an FMEA can be shown to be extremely unlikely by
means other than detailed probabilistic analyses. A probabilistic assessment of failure
risk is appropriate for certain critical failure modes of components whose failure
margins are of concern. That concern usually arises because analytical models for
failure phenomena and/or information upon which to base failure prediction are
uncertain. Under such circumstances, the probabilistic approach presented here can
be used to more effectively organize and interpret the information available to
characterize the likelihood of failure during service and evaluate such alternatives for
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controlling failure risk as design changes, inspections, or tests to characterize
environments, thereby enabling the more efficient use of limited financial resources.
In the following sections of this introduction, the limitations of conventional ap-
proaches to flight readiness or failurerisk assessment arediscussed, the probabilistic
approach to failure risk assessment taken here is presented, and a description of the
organization and contents of the remainder of this report is given.
1.1.2 Conventional Approaches to Flight Readiness Assessment
The flight readiness assessment process by which the expectation of reliable
mission operation is established is referred to as certification or qualification. More
definitively, certification of a system intended for use in a specific application is the
process by which confidence is established that the system will perform as expected
over a specified range of environmental and operating conditions. Certification of
spaceflight systems has been typically based on a limited amount of testing of flight
configuration systems considered in conjunction with deterministic engineering
analysis. The deterministic engineering analysis may incorporate information from
measurements of governing physical parameters taken during development testing.
Approaches that have been used in certifying aerospace propulsion systems, includ-
ing those of the Federal Aviation Administration and the U. S. Air Force, are discussed
in [3].
1.1.2.1 Testing to Establish Flight Readiness
The value of test experience in establishing low failure probability with high con-
fidence for flight configuration systems is limited because testing is typically halted
before failures are thought to be likely to occur. Failures during testing are avoided
because the occurrence of critical structural failures of spaceflight systems can result
in the loss of costly hardware and damage to expensive test facilities. The availability
of failure experience for flight hardware is further diminished because failure modes
discovered during development and testing are corrected by design changes which
are intended to render their occurrence highly unlikely during subsequent mission
operation. Consequently, test experience for spaceflight systems typically does not
include failure data for flight configuration hardware, but instead consists of tests
which are suspended before failures occur, i.e., "zero-failure" tests. Testing to
establish flight readiness is discussed further in Appendix 1.A.
The exclusive use of zero-failure tests to establish with high confidence that failure
risk is very low typically implies that an extremely extensive set of test data is required.
For example, suppose that each mission simulation test can be treated as an identical
independent trial with constant probability of failure p, so that the number of failures
is Binomially distributed. The upper confidence limit for p at confidence level C is
defined by
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where n is the total number of zero-failure mission simulation tests and Pu is the upper
confidence limit for p. Reliability R at a service life M is the probability of survival to
M. For the Binomial failure distribution with M expressed as a number of missions,
reliability is
R = (1 -pu) M
Thus we have
n / M = ln (1- C) /InR
In order to have even 50% confidence that the probability of failure is no larger than
1/1000, 693M mission simulation tests without failure would have to be conducted.
Analogously, if failures are characterized by a Weibull distribution
R = exp [-(M/,1_ 1
If there are N zero-failure tests of duration
for r/at confidence level C is defined by
71, T2, ..., TN, the lower confidence limit
I _ (Ti/*l_] expI-N(T/_I_Iexp - i = 1 =
where r/ and/3 are the Weibull location and
T = Ti Thus we have
i=1
T/M= [In(1 -C)/NInR 11/'8
=1 -C
shape parameters, respectively, and
(1-1)
If the N zero-failure tests consist of testing N units for the same number of missions,
then the duration of each of those unit tests is T missions, the service life is M missions,
and the total test experience is NT missions.
Suppose two units are tested for the same number of missions. In Figure 1-1, the
plot of Equation 1-1 under that constraint shows reliability at 95% confidence as a
function of the ratio of unit test duration to service life T / M for/_ = 1 and/_ = 2. For
complex systems subject to multiple active failure modes, approximating the distribu-
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Figure 1-1 Reliability Demonstrated by Zero-Failure Operating
Experience for N = 2 at 95% Confidence
tion of system failures by a Weibull distribution with/_ = 1 is more plausible than with
/_ = 2. The system failure distribution problem is discussed in [5] (Section 4.8) and
[6] (Chapter 1.12). Figure 1-1 shows that, to establish a reliability of .999, at 95%
confidence, T/M = 1498 for,8 = 1 and T/M = 39 for/_ = 2. Thus for/_ = 1 the unit
test duration must be 1498M missions and for/_ = 2 the unit test duration must be
39M missions. For example, if the desired service life for a reusable system is 7
missions, then with/_ = 1 the unit test duration required to establish a reliability of .999
at 95% confidence is T = 7 x 1498 = 10,486 missions.
The service life reliability that is demonstrated by accumulated operating experience
on several reusable spaceflight components is presented in Appendix 1.A. In the
absence of relevant failure data, it is not possible to estimate the shape parameter/_
of the Weibull distribution. Consequently, the value of that unknown/_ must be
considered exogenous to the statistical analysis in order to calculate the service life
reliability that is demonstrated by a component's zero-failure operating history. The
figures given in Appendix 1.A show the effect of,8 on the service life limit below which
service life reliability can be stated to be no less than a specified value. For example,
given accumulated operating experience of 337,175 seconds for the component of
Figure 1-6 in Appendix 1.A, the service life limit for .999 service life reliability at 95%
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confidence shown is about seven missions for ,8 = 3 and about three missions for
,8 = 2. Values of,8 between I and 3.5 are common for Weibull distributions for fatigue
failures. Zero-failure testing is also discussed in [6] (Chapter 5).
When the data set consists of nonfaUure operating experience, it is possible to avoid
an exogenous specification of,8 by using the approach developed in [7]. Using this
approach a service life limit can be derived for a specified value of single mission
reliability or service life reliability, contingent on the existence of a "worst-case" value
of,8. For a given nonfailure data set, e.g., that of Figure 1-6, the specified value of
reliability must be below a threshold value in order for the "worst-case" ,8 to exist. At
high confidence, this threshold value of reliability, which may be specified as either
single mission reliability or service life reliability, is too low to be useful as a criterion
for failure risk management.
For example, single mission reliability at 90% confidence must be specified to be
no greater than .9965 in order for a "worst-case" _ to exist for the data set used in
Figure 1-6. If reliability is specified higher than the threshold value, no "worst-case"
value of,8 will exist. The service life limit corresponding to a mission reliability of .995
that can be demonstrated by this approach is about 22 missions. A single mission
reliability no greater than .995 for each of 22 missions is approximately equivalent to
a service life reliability of .95, which implies a demonstrated failure risk of 5% or one
in twenty over the 22 missions. This is an unacceptably high demonstrated failure
risk, but it only illuminates the arbitrariness of this approach because the true failure
risk can be higher or lower (most likely it is very much lower) depending on the actual
values of the parameters of the failure probability distribution. This approach requires
that high demonstrated failure risk be accepted in order to have reasonable service
lifetime limits for components considered to be conservatively designed and for which
there are no indications of problems.
The mathematical results in [7] are consistent with the fact that acceptable service
life reliabilities cannot be demonstrated using a feasible amount of nonfailure data.
The examples given in [7] are inappropriate for applications where failure risk must
be stringently controlled, since they focus either on cases where 50% confidence
levels are acceptable or on single mission reliabilities which are so low that they imply
unacceptable service life reliabilities.
A risk control procedure based only on nonfailure operating experience cannot
establish service lifetime limits that are commensurate with a component's capability.
Such a procedure cannot set appropriately low service lives for components of low
capability nor use a reasonable fraction of the capability of longer life components.
From a feasible amount of nonfailure testing alone, it is not possible to distinguish
between components with low failure risk and components with high failure risk which
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have not yet failed. Relying on nonfailure data alone to establish lifetimelimits results
in ineffective risk control and in hardware replacement costs that are higher than
necessary.
It is usually infeasible to design testing programs for the purpose of demonstrating
high reliabilityat high confidence for flight configuration systems using only nonfailure
operating experience. The primary purposes of a testing program should be: (1) to
reveal failure modes not identified and to provide information to aid in uncovering
analysis oversights or errors; and (2) by means of instrumented tests, to adequately
characterize those parameters which drive the results of an engineering analysis of
failure modes. Useful reliability statements result from probabUisticanalysis which
incorporates all available information, including engineering analysis as well as
operating experience.
1.1.2.2 Deterministic Engineering Analysis
Consistently and verifiably conservative deterministic analyses to predict failure can
provide assurance that the conditions under which a critical failure mode could occur
do not intersect conditions that exist during mission operation. Such analyses are
appropriate for most of the failure modes identified in an FMEA. In that situation, the
deterministic approach serves to establish that the occurrence of the failure mode in
question is extremely unlikely, although no quantitative estimate of the probability of
failure is available from such analyses. When constraints and requirements for
performance, weight, or cost force a departure from consistently conservative deter-
ministic analyses for certain failure modes, worst-case or limiting values for
parameters that govern failure are not always employed.
When worst-case values for the parameters that govern failure cannot be consis-
tently used, deterministic analysis methods are credible only if they are calibrated by
experience that is directly relevant in terms of knowledge of governing parameters,
the stochastic nature of materials behavior, the accuracy of engineering models under
the conditions of application, and the variability of manufacturing processes. Where
there exists an extensive, directly relevant base of experience to guide the selection
of less conservative safety factors and values for governing parameters, deterministic
analyses can provide failure predictions that are generally consistent with the ex-
perience base, although the extent of conservatism is not known. An example of this
is the use of an assumed initial crack size of .05 inches for most structures in the
USAF damage tolerant design criteria [8].
Spaceflight systems are typically subject to some significant number of failure
modes for which important governing parameters may not be well known, e.g.,
knowledge of structural loads or a local environment may be highly uncertain, and
the accuracy of engineering models used to characterize the failure phenomena may
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be in question. When performance, weight, or cost requirements force the use of
new design approaches, advanced materials, or a more severe operating environ-
ment, a suitably extensive experience base is usually not available to calibrate
deterministic analyses to predict failure.
Under the conditions of uncertainty described above, deterministic analyses be-
come arbitrary and can yield results that are subject to serious misinterpretation [1].
In these situations, a formal procedure for quantitatively accounting for risk due to
uncertain knowledge is required if consistent criteria for flight readiness are to be
established. In these cases, the consideration of risk by means of qualitative
judgments based on deterministic analyses of failure modes and limited test ex-
perience can lead to erroneous or ineffective risk management decisions.
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Section 1.2
An Improved Approach to
Flight Readiness Assessment
1.2.1 Failure Risk Assessment
At any time in the design, development, or mission operation of a spaceflight
system, the available information on which to base an assessment of flight readiness
or failure risk comes from two fundamental sources: engineering analysis and
operating experience. Figure 1-2 shows how these two information sources can be
used in a statistical framework to assess failure risk. The statistical framework used
to combine information from engineering analysis with observed operating experience
is a straightforward application of Bayes' Rule and is applied individually to certain
failure modes identified for probabilistic analysis.
Engineering analysis can be used to characterize the conditions under which a
specific failure mode may be expected to occur, e.g., pressure or accumulated time
in service. As illustrated in Figure 1-2, engineering analysis provides information to
establish the prior failure risk distribution which is modified to reflect the available
success/failure data in a Bayesian statistical analysis [9]. Engineering analysis to
predict failure is based on available knowledge of governing parameters, e.g., loads
and material properties, that can be derived from measurements taken during tests
or flights, from analyses to characterize parameter values, from applicable experience
with similar systems, or from laboratory tests. Measurements of such physical
parameters as temperatures or loads used in engineering analysis can be a strong
information source in failure risk assessment.
ENGINEERING
ANALYSIS
PRIOR FAILURE
RISK DISTRIBUTION
BAYESIAN
STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS
FAILURE RISK
DISTRIBUTION
PHYSICAL
PARAMETER
INFORMATION
SUCCESS/FAILURE
DATA
OPERATING EXPERIENCE
Figure 1-2 Information Sources for Failure Risk Assessment
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As shown in Figure 1-2, operating experience consists of parameter information
and success/failure data. Success/failure data can be acquired from development
testing, certification testing, or flight operation. The failure risk distribution resulting
from the combination of the prior distribution and the success/failure data is that which
is warranted by the information available. As additional information regarding govern-
ing physical parameters becomes available it can be incorporated into the engineering
analysis to obtain a revised prior failure risk distribution. Additional information in the
form of success/failure data can be processed by the Bayesian statistical algorithm
to update the failure risk distribution using procedures discussed later in this report.
When the success/failure data for flight configuration hardware consists of some
number of trials with no failures, as is often the case for spaceflight systems, the data
is usually a weak information source for reliability demonstration or failure risk
assessment. In these cases, the failure risk distribution will be predominantly deter-
mined by the prior failure risk distribution of Figure 1-2. Consequently, the prior
distribution based on the engineering analysis must accurately represent the available
information.
Demonstrating high reliability at high confidence is equivalent to making statements
about the extreme left-hand tail of a failure distribution. Nonfailure test data typically
provides very conservative bounding information about location and variability of the
failure distribution. Information about the failure distribution from engineering analysis
can be extremely informative about the distribution's location. Thus, the inclusion of
engineering analysis allows an improved description of the failure distribution, even
with the conservatism about variability implied by uncertainty in engineering analysis
due to sparse information.
1.2.2 The Probabilistic Failure Assessment Methodology
A formal stochastic structure for quantitatively assessing failure risk based on the
available information about certain failure modes identified in an FMEA or other
procedure is shown in Figure 1-3. This stochastic structure is called the Probabilistic
Failure Assessment (PFA) methodology and is an implementation of the statistical
framework of Figure 1-2 in which information from engineering analysis is combined
with success/failure data to obtain a quantitative failure risk estimate and a measure
of its uncertainty as discussed in Section 2.1.1 and in [10]. The available information
pertinent to characterizing specific failure modes is used in the PFA methodology, not
only to estimate the failure risk appropriate to the available information about failure
modes, but also to characterize the sensitivity of failure to additional information about
such parameters as structural loads, operating environment, and materials behavior.
The PFA methodology shown in Figure 1-3 consists of three major steps: prob-
abilistic failure modeling, a Bayesian statistical analysis to consider the success/failure
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Figure 1-3 The Probabilistic Failure Assessment Methodology
data, and a mission analysis in which the failure probability distributions for a number
of relevant failure modes can be aggregated. Probabilistic failure modeling and the
Bayesian statistical analysis are performed for each failure mode identified for
analysis. In the following sections of this report, the steps of the PFA methodology,
with the exception of the mission analysis, are treated in detail. The results of applying
the PFA methodology to a specific failure mode will include the left-hand tail of the
failure probability distribution for that failure mode and a sensitivity analysis for drivers.
Given such failure distributions for some limited number of critical failure modes, there
exist several alternative approaches for aggregating the individual distributions that
are thoroughly treated in the literature. In particular, Monte Carlo methods are
discussed in [6].
The features of the PFA methodology essential to the rational evaluation of failure
risk are: (1) inclusion of information from engineering analysis and operating ex-
perience, (2) analytical modeling of failure phenomena based on mechanics or
physics, (3) representation of the uncertainty about analytical models and their
governing parameters, including uncertainty due to both intrinsic variation and limited
information, and (4) consideration of failure risk over the service life.
Conventional engineering analysis models employed in component design and life
prediction are used in the PFA methodology. Within the PFA structure, uncertainties
due to sparse information about values of analysis parameters and uncertainties
about the accuracy of the analysis models are quantitatively treated. For example, in
addition to the intrinsic variability of materials fatigue life, the uncertainty resulting from
basing a model of fatigue life on a limited amount of test data is treated in the stochastic
materials fatigue life characterization model described in Section 2.1.2 of this report.
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Figure 1-4 The Probabilistic Failure Modeling Procedure
1.2.3 Probabilistic Failure Modeling
The probabilistic failure modeling step of the PFA methodology is shown in greater
detail in Figure 1-4. Here, uncertainties in engineering analysis parameters and
models for the failure mode being analyzed are used in conjunction with a quantitative
model of the failure phenomenon to predict failure probabilistically. Failure models
are derived directly from engineering analyses of failure modes and express a failure
parameter, such as burst pressure or fatigue life, as a function of governing
parameters or drivers. For structural failure modes, drivers include dimensions,
loads, materials characteristics, modeling accuracy, and such environmental
parameters such as local temperatures.
For many failure modes of concern, the failure model of Figure 1-4 involves the
use of several engineering analysis procedures. State-of-the-art engineering models
and analysis procedures used in the aerospace community to analyze failure modes
have evolved through extensive experience. These models and procedures often are
comprised of a series of steps, each of which may be complex. The PFA methodology
can accommodate any engineering model. The accuracy of each engineering model
and procedure is probabilistically characterized and treated as a driver. Charac-
terizations of model accuracy are based on relevant experience with these engineer-
ing models and on specific calibrations of the models.
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By calculating failure risk from an analysis based on a specification of failure models
and drivers which incorporates their uncertainties, the PFA methodology enables the
quantitative assessment of failure risk when failure data applicable to flight configura-
tion hardware is sparse or does not exist.
1.2.4 Driver Characterization
A driver for which uncertainty is to be considered must be characterized by a
probability distribution over the range of values it can assume. That distribution
expresses uncertainty regarding specific driver values within the range of possible
values. A driver probability distribution must represent both intrinsic variability of the
driver and uncertainty due to limited information on which to base the driver charac-
terization.
Stochastic drivers are responsible for the probabilistic character of the PFA
methodology and their probability distributions are specified by using the information
that exists at the time of analysis. Use of the PFA methodology does not imply a need
for more information than would otherwise exist. If driver information is sparse, the
probabilistic characterization of such a driver must reflect that sparseness. If exten-
sive experimental measurements have been performed for a driver, its nominal value
and characterization of its variability can be inferred directly from empirical data.
However, if little or no directly applicable empirical data is available for a driver,
engineering analysis and past experience with similar or related systems are used
instead.
The information on which driver characterization is based can include measure-
ments, related experience, and engineering analysis conducted to bound or charac-
terize the driver. All sources of driver uncertainty must be considered to appropriately
represent risk due to limited information, and driver distributions must meet the
criterion of not overstating the available information. Drivers are fundamental in the
sense that they are observable parameters for which additional information regarding
their values can be obtained if necessary. Such parameters include temperatures,
loads, materials behavior, and calibrations of model accuracy. If uncertainty due to
lack of information on a driver is found to make a significant contribution to failure
risk, then the desirability of acquiring additional driver information can be evaluated.
The need to represent a driver stochastically derives from two fundamental sources:
intrinsic variability and specification error. Specification error refers to such model
misspecification as the inaccurate specification of values of parameters of analytical
models or probability distributions used to characterize such quantities as loads or
fatigue life. The concept of specification error and its mathematical structure are
discussed in [11] (Chapter 1). Specification error can be due to engineering model
inaccuracy or to sparse information about physical parameters. Consider the ex-
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ample of a finite element analysis used to characterize stresses. The finite element
model itself is a source of specification error in the computation of stresses since the
model will not match the hardware precisely. In many cases, loads and material
properties are sources of specification error, in addition to having intrinsic variability.
There are cases where engineers know that a certain load varies very little from flight
to flight or part to part, but they may know the load magnitude only with a large
uncertainty, say within a factor of two or four.
For many stochastic drivers, it is not possible to distinguish between intrinsic
variation and variation due to specification error. In those cases, a stochastic driver
is characterized by the compounded effect of both sources of variation without
attempting to model each source separately. An example of this is the charac-
terization of stress concentration factor presented in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.A.2.3.
Uncertainty in stress concentration factor results from geometric variability induced
by the manufacturing process and from an imperfect translation of geometric
variability into stress concentration factor uncertainty.
Some general guidelines for characterizing stochastic drivers have emerged from
case studies conducted to date. Information is typically provided by engineers
experienced in the characterization of a particular driver. All sources of uncertainty
must be considered, and the information used must be traceable and documented.
Traceability and documentation assure that additional information can be consistently
incorporated into driver distributions as it becomes available. For drivers which have
physical bounds, such as temperature, controlled dimensions, and loads with physi-
cal upper limits, the Beta distribution parameterized with location, shape, and scale
parameters has been successfully used in the application examples of Section 3. If
only bounds are known, a Uniform distribution is appropriate. For a driver such as
turbopump speed whose variation can be thought of as due to the combined influence
of a large number of small independent effects, the Normal distribution is used. Also,
past experience in characterizing a particular driver such as a material property may
suggest the use of a particular distribution, for example, Weibull, Normal, or Lognor-
mal. Characterization of stochastic drivers is discussed in more detail in Sections
2.1.3, 2.3.2, 3.1.3, 3.2.2, 3.3.2, 3.A.2.3, and 3.A.3.3 of this report.
The sparseness of the information typically available for characterizing a stochastic
driver and the existence of significant specification error have often led to the use of
a hyperparametric structure, which has proven useful in characterizing information
provided by experienced engineers. For example, to characterize stress concentra-
tion factor uncertainty in a fatigue analysis example given in this report, engineering
information was used to establish upper and lower bounds on the value for the stress
concentration factor. In order to capture the fact that the most likely value of the stress
concentration factor is not known with certainty, a Beta distribution with a Uniform
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distribution on the location parameter was used. This Uniform distribution is the
hyperdistribution associated with the stress concentration factor uncertainty, and its
parameters are the associated hyperparameters. This driver distribution is given in
Figure 3-18.
1.2.5 Computational Methods
The complexity of failure models and the need for a computational procedure
capable of accuracy have led to the use of Monte Carlo simulation as the principal
computational method in the probabilistic failure modeling step of Figure 1-3. Monte
Carlo simulation is a general method for probabilistic analysis that can be used with
failure models of any complexity. Continually increasing computer power due to
improving hardware and software is steadily expanding the practical application of
such computationally intensive methods as Monte Carlo simulation. Efficient Monte
Carlo techniques can be used to reduce the number of simulation trials for those
problems where computational time would be an issue if direct Monte Carlo simulation
were used.
Alternatives to Monte Carlo simulation methods include FORM/SORM, [12] and
[13], and MVFO/AMVFO, [14] and [15]. These alternatives may fail to give
demonstrably accurate results for realistic problems in which complex failure models
are employed. Alternative computational methods can be used in probabilistic
analyses which employ well-behaved failure models, particularly if the failure criterion
is expressed explicitly in a closed form equation as opposed to a complex multistep
algorithm. A comparison of FORM/SORM with direct Monte Carlo simulation for a
crack growth example is given in [16]. Computational methods are also discussed
in [10].
Certain engineering analysis procedures sometimes employed in failure models,
such as finite-element structural models, may appear to be too computationally
intensive for practical use in a Monte Carlo simulation. However, when such proce-
dures are used in a failure model for PFA, they can be represented as response
surfaces over the range of variation of significant parameters. Response surface
methods are discussed in [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], and [22]. The uncertainties of
engineering analysis procedures and of the response surface representation are
treated as drivers.
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Section 1.3
Implementing the PFA Methodology
In assessing failure risk, sound judgment is required to identify critical failure modes,
to understand their origins and mechanisms, and to guide the implementation of the
probabilistic analysis. This is an important role of FMEA and other qualitative
procedures. The failure models required for meaningful probabilistic analysis must
be developed in concert with a valid interpretation of relevant experience. Adjudging
failure probabilities, even with the most sophisticated methods, does not imply that
the origins, mechanisms, and consequences of known failure modes are understood
and have been properly treated nor that unexpected test observations and indications
of unanticipated failure modes have been pursued until they are understood. An
understanding of the causes and mechanisms by which failures occur is the founda-
tion on which valid failure models must be based.
The necessity for conducting an appropriate amount of testing for spaceflight
systems is not eliminated through the use of the PFA methodology to assess failure
risk. Testing programs, inspections, and careful analysis of experience are essential
because they can reveal failure modes not identified and provide indications of
analysis oversights or errors.
Application of the PFA methodology to a subset of failure modes selected by an
FMEA and other screening procedures will identify failure modes whose risk of
occurrence is unacceptable. Options for corrective action that could be taken to
control risk are shown in Figure 1-5. The PFA methodology produces a risk assess-
ment that is commensurate with the available information. Unacceptable risk could
RISK ESTIMATION
ACCEPTABLE RISK UNACCEPTABLE RISK
ACQUIRE ADDITIONAL LIFE LIMIT PARTS IMPROVE DESIGN AND/OR
INFORMATION AND/OR INCREASE MANUFACTURING QUALITY
• CHARACTERIZE ENVIRONMENT INSPECTION FREQUENCY
• MEASURENERIFY LOADS
• CHARACTERIZE MATERIALS
• VALIDATE MODELS
Figure 1-5 Options for Controlling Failure Risk
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be reduced by changing the design or acquiring additional information to reduce the
uncertainty of dominant drivers.
By conducting sensitivity analyses for selected failure modes with the PFA
methodology, sources of unacceptable failure risk can be identified in terms of the
responsible drivers, and corrective action can be delineated. Design changes,
improvements in manufacturing processes, additional characterization of loads and
environments, validation of analytical models, improved characterization of materials
behavior, and additional testing are among the options for corrective action that can
be quantitatively evaluated by PFA sensitivity analyses. The PFA methodology can
be employed to identify risk sources and evaluate corrective actions during the
design, development, and operational phases of a program, thereby enabling limited
financial resources to be allocated more effectively to control failure risk.
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Section 1.4
Report Organization
This report consists of three volumes in which an improved methodology for
assessing the risk of occurrence of specific failure modes of spaceflight systems is
presented. Volume I presents the PFA methodology and examples of its application
to HCF and LCF failure modes. Volume II consists of the documentation of the
computer software for implementing the methodology in the application examples,
including user's guides and code execution examples. Volume III contains additional
documentation of the software and listings of computer programs.
These three volumes constitute a thorough and comprehensive documentation of
the methods, procedures, and software used in applying the PFA methodology to
four failure modes of the SSME: HCF failure of the HPOTP Main Discharge Duct, HCF
failure of the LPFTP Turbine Drive Duct, HCF Failure of the HPOTP Heat Exchanger
Coil, and LCF failure of the ATD-HPFTP Second Stage Turbine Disk. Abbreviated
presentations of the application of the PFA methodology to the heat exchanger coil
and turbine disk failure modes are given in [23] and [24], respectively. In a report to
follow, the application of the PFA methodology to a flaw growth failure mode, an LCF
failure mode of a turbine blade, and an HCF failure mode of a turbine blade will be
covered in similar detail. A summary of the application of the PFA methodology to a
flaw growth failure mode is presented in [25].
In Section 2.1, the statistical methods used in applying the PFA methodology to
fatigue failure modes are described in detail, including the methods used to stochas-
tically represent materials fatigue life. In Section 2.2, the engineering analysis
procedures used in the driver transformation steps of the application examples are
discussed and the HCF and LCF analysis methods used in the application examples
are described. The results for the four application examples are presented in Section
3. Appendix 3.A gives a detailed description of the application of the analysis
procedures described in Section 2.3 to the heat exchanger coil and turbine disk
examples. The computer software used to implement the PFA methodology for the
application examples is documented in Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7.
An index of topics covered in this report is presented in Tables 1-1 and 1-2. The
report sections wherein a particular topic is discussed are given in the index. Report
sections which discuss the topics generically or with respect to an application example
are listed separately. Sections dealing with the two duct application examples are
listed together. This index enables all the report sections in which a particular topic
is discussed to be located readily.
1 - 21
Table 1-1 Index of Topics Contained in the Report
TOPIC
_,nalysis Procedures
_,pplication Examples
Bayesian Updating
Computational Methods
Damage Modeling
Deterministic Analysis
Driver Distributions
(Probability Distributions for
Governing Parameters)
Driver Transformation
(Stress Analysis)
Duty Cycle Effects
(Mission Duty Cycle)
Failure Mode Identification
Load Characterization
Load History Synthesis
Load Scale Factors
Material Fatigue Life
Characterization
Multiple Failure Locations
APPLICATION
GENERIC HCF LCF
HEAT
DUCTS EXCHANGER TURBINE DISK
2.3 - 3.A.2 3.A.3
1.2.1
1.2.2
2.1.1
2.3.11
4.3
6.5
7.5
1.2.5
2.1.1
2.2.1.4
2.2.2.2
2.A
2.1.3
2.3.2
2.3.4
2.1.5
2.1.3.2
2.1.4
2.3.7
2.3.8
2.A
3.1.3
3.2.2
4.5
6.6
7.7
2.1.2
2.3.6
4.1
6.3
7.3
2.1.6
3.1
2.2.1.4
2.2.1.2
2.2.1.5
3.1.3
3.1.1
3.1.2
2.2.1.2
3.1.1
3.1.2
3.2
3.A.2
2.2.1.4
2.2.1.2
2.2.1.5
3.A.2.2
2.2.1.3
3.2.3
3.A.2.2
2.2.1.2
3.A.2.5
3.A.2.6
3.2.1
3.A.2.4
3.3
3.A.3
2.2.2.2
2.2.2.2
3.A.3.2
2.2.2.2
3.3.3
3.A.3.2
3.3.1
3.A.3.1
3.3.1
3.A.3.4
2.2.2.2
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Table 1-1 Index of Topics Contained in the Report (Cont'd)
TOPIC
Prior Distributions
Probability of Failure Curve
Prior Failure Risk Distribution
Probabilistic Approach
Random Number Generation
GENERIC
1.2.1
1.2.2
2.1.1
2.3.9
2.3.12
4.2
6.4
7.4
1.2
2.1.3.1
4.4
7.6
DUCTS
3.1.5
3.1.7
2.2.1.1
APPLICATION
HCF LCF
HEAT
EXCHANGER
3.2.4
3.A.2.7
3.A.2.9
2.2.1.1
TURBINE DISK
3.3.4
3.A.3.6
3.A.3.8
2.2.2.1
Reliability Demonstration by 1.1.2.1
Testing 1.A
1.2.2 3.1.5 3.2.4 3.3.4
Sensitivity Analysis 1.3 3.1.7 3.A.2.8 3.A.3.7
2.3.10 6.1.4 6.1.11 6.2.4
Software Documentation
5.B 5.1.2 5.1.3 5.2
Flowcharts
- 7.1.1 7.1.2 7.2
Software Documentation
Proqram Listinq/Structure
Software Documentation
User's Guide 6.1.1_.1.7 6.1.8-6.1.14 6.2
Table 1-2
TOPIC
Bayesian Updating
Ducts
Heat Exchanger
Materials Fatigue Life
Characterization
Index of Software Documentation Contained in the
Report
METHODOLOGY
2.1.1
2.2.1
2.2.1
2.1.2
SOFTWARE DOCUMENTATION
FLOWCHARTS
4.3
5.1.2
5.1.3
4.1
USER'S GUIDE
6.5
6.1.1-6.1.7
6.1.8-6.1.14
6.3
STRUCTURE
/LISTING
7.5
7.1.1
7.1.2
7.3
Prior Distributions 2.1.1 4.2 6.4 7.4
Random Number
2.1.3.1 4.4 - 7.6Generation
2.1.4 4.5 6.6 7.7Time History Generation
Turbine Disk 2.2.2 6.25.2 7.2
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Appendix 1.A
The Limitations of Testing for Reliability
Demonstration
Certification of flight readiness of a spaceflight system should encompass an
assessment of the risk of occurrence of critical structural failure modes. The impact
of nonfailure tests and any tests to failure in establishing or contributing to that risk
assessment can be considered for dominant critical failure modes. If all operating
experience for spaceflight systems consists of nonfailures, it will be a weak information
source for demonstrating the extremely high levels of reliability desired. That is
because nonfailure data available for such systems typically provides very conserva-
tive bounding information about the location/variability of the failure distribution.
Demonstrating extremely high levels of desired reliability is equivalent to making
statements about the extreme left-hand tail of the failure distribution. The loca-
tion/variability information available from nonfailures alone is usually inadequate for
demonstrating levels of desired reliability.
Information about the failure distribution from an engineering analysis which avoids
nonconservatisms is typically so extremely informative about location that, even with
the conservatism on variability implied by uncertainty in engineering analysis due to
lack of knowledge, useful probabilistic statements about reliability can be derived. By
avoiding nonconservatisms when engineering analysis is incorporated, the true
reliability will be bounded from below and that bound, typically, will be very much larger
than what can be established by reliability demonstration with feasible nonfailure
testing alone.
In the consideration of tests to failure, it is useful to consider two leading generic
types of failure modes. Failure modes such as high cycle fatigue crack initiation, low
cycle fatigue crack initiation or crack growth to fracture are damage accumulation
failure modes; i.e., failure is a consequence of the cumulation of aging effects
produced by the repeated exposure of a component to operating conditions. In
contrast, a failure mode such as case rupture can be considered to be an event
consequent failure mode; i.e., failure is a consequence of an event such as load
pressure exceeding burst pressure, which is independent of the extent of previous
exposure of a component to operating conditions.
Tests to failure are a much stronger source of information about reliability than
nonfailures if they are a consequence of the failures occurring by intent; i.e., the
failures occur because the operating conditions are consonant with a perceived
significant likelihood of failure. However, spaceflight systems are so expensive that
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test conditions are usually set so that the perceived likelihood of failure is extremely
remote whenever flight configuration hardware is at risk. Any component failure is
then viewed as the result of an anomaly in that perception and corrective actions such
as redesign or procedural changes renders the failure immaterial to reliability
demonstration. For damage accumulation failure modes, the component may be
tested only as part of a system so it is unlikely that operating experience relevant for
reliability demonstration will include failures. For event consequent failure modes, if
the component can be tested meaningfully in isolation without risking system failure,
a small number of failures (typically one) may be relevant to reliability demonstration.
Also, nonfailure tests may be much more informative in this circumstance if test
operating conditions are set so that the perceived likelihood of failure is much higher
than for flight operating conditions.
It is unrealistic to believe that testing programs can be feasibly structured for the
purpose of reliability demonstration using only operating experience. The ability to
make reliability statements of interest will almost always depend on a probabUistic
analysis framework which facilitates the use of all available information sources, in
particular engineering analysis as well as operating experience, as discussed in
Section 1 of this report. The primary purposes of a testing program should be: (1)
to uncover failure modes not analyzed, analysis oversights or errors, and anomalous
conditions; and (2) by means of instrumented test, to accurately characterize those
parameters which drive the results of an engineering analysis of each critical structural
failure mode. Both (1) and (2) are aspects of assuring that engineering analyses are
adequately characterized. Some detailed numerical examples illustrating the limita-
tions of testing for reliability demonstration are presented in [4].
Figures 1-6 through 1-9 illustrate reliability demonstration for reusable SSME
components based on the Weibull probability distribution using Equation 1-1. Values
of/3 between 1 and 3.5 are common for Weibull distributions for fatigue failure modes.
From those figures it can be seen that .9999 reliability is typically demonstrated for a
service life of only 3 to 4 missions and .999 for a service life of only 5 to 8 missions.
We can conclude from these examples that acceptable service life reliability
demonstration is impractical due to the infeasibility of acquiring the required amount
of nonfailure data. As illustrated in Section 3 of this report, the inclusion of knowledge
gained from engineering analysis in risk assessment typically leads to acceptable
service life reliability with respect to failure modes analyzed.
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Appendix 1.B
List of Acronyms
Autoregressive
Alternate Turbopump Development Program- High Pressure Fuel
Turbopump
Boiler Pressure Vessel Code
Finite Element
Fast Fourier Transform
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
First Order Reliability Method/Second Order Reliability Method
Frequency Response
High Cycle Fatigue
Heat Exchanger
High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Low Cycle Fatigue
Low Pressure Fuel Turbopump
Monte Carlo
Material Review Board
Marshall Space Flight Center
Mean Value First Order/Advanced Mean Value First Order
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Probabilistic Failure Assessment
Probabilistic Failure Model
Power Spectral Density
Reduction of Area
Root Mean Square
Random Vibration
Stress/Life
Space Shuttle Main Engine
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Section 2.1
Statistical Analysis
2.1.1 Failure Simulation Statistics
A failure mode specific Monte Carlo simulation is used to generate a set of failure
data. That collection of failure data summarizes the information which engineering
analysis provides us concerning service life with respect to the indicated failure mode.
It is used both by itself and, by means of Bayesian methods, in combination with
component operating history to generate estimates of the probability of occurrence
of specific failure modes.
As currently implemented, for High Cycle Fatigue (HCF) or Low Cycle Fatigue (LCF)
failure modes, the structure of the Monte Carlo simulation is given in Figure 2-1. The
double-loop structure indicated in Figure 2-1 is not an essential part of the simulation.
It has been included in order to facilitate runs of the order Nn = 200,000 which have
been used to validate the use of smaller size single-loop runs, i.e., runs in which all
passes through the calculation procedure include only the outer loop by setting
n = 1. The size of the simulation is user-selected. The required simulation size is a
function of the failure probability at which a life estimate is desired and is also a function
of the precision desired. For applications to date, single-loop runs of size 20,000 have
been sufficient for characterizing component reliability and single-loop runs of size
N TRIALS
...1_ ESTABLISH LIFE t_
DRIVER
DISTRIBUTIONS
WEIBULL PARAMETERS
SELECT VALUES FOR
LIFE DRIVERS
AND FATIGUE UFE
n TRIALS I I
MODEL -=
l MEDIAN
S/N CURVEFOR MATERIAL !
f MATERIALS CHARACTERIZATION
MODEL
I_ • INFORMATION AGGREGATION
• PARAMETER ESTIMATION
• SPECIFIC S/N DATA
• RELATED S/N DATA
• TENSILE TEST DATA
• CONSTRAINTS ON
STATISTICAL
PARAMETERS
ESTIMATE BAYESIAN
PRIOR DISTRIBUTION
PARAMETERS
Figure 2-1 Component Failure Mode Monte Carlo Simulation Structure
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1000 have been sufficient for marginal analysis to assess the importance of individual
life drivers.
Variation in simulated failure data results from two fundamental sources. The first
source of variation is the intrinsic stochastic nature of the physical processes modeled
which produce component failure. The second source of variation is lack of
knowledge regarding the parameters of those physical processes that significantly
affect the failure prediction, the drivers. In general, the nature of the experience-based
judgment used to describe individual drivers does not allow for accurately specifying
those sources of variation separately for all drivers.
In order to assess failure probability based on all the information available, the
left-hand tail distribution of the simulated failures will be represented in an analytical
form which allows for the use of Bayesian updating in order to combine simulation
results with operating experience. The chosen analytical form for the tail distribution
also allows the assurance or confidence with which a reliability statement is made to
be modeled, and that form matches the simulation result that the left-hand tail of the
distribution of simulated failures is approximately linear in log-log space. A set of
assumptions for an analytical form with these attributes is
F (NI4) = 1 - exp (- 4 N/_ (Weibull) (2-1)\ /
f (4)= 1
F (a) exp (- 04) (Gamma)
with p constant.
Operating experience consists of n tests with s failures and n - s successes. Data
is then in the form of s failure times and n - s suspension times, ti. Combining that
data with Equation 2-1 by Bayes' rule yields the updated distribution of 4
(0,)a -1
f (4) = r(a') exp (- 0' 4) (Gamma)
(2-2)
a' = _+S
n
0'=0+ 2 tiE
i=1
[1], p. 399.
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Component reliability is given by
R(NIX) =1 - F(N]4) = exp (-4 N/_) (2-3)
Since 4 is a random variable, variation in 4 translates into variation in reliability as
defined by Equation 2-3. A reliability/assurance pair, (R o, A), defined by
Pr [R (NI4) > R o ] = A (2-4)
is thus equivalent to
Pr [Z<4o] =A (2-5)
where R o = exp (- 4o N/_). If A is specified, 4o and hence R o can be found from
Equation 2-5 since f(4) is known, providing that a procedure for estimating a, 0, and
/_ can be found. There are, of course, an infinity of (R o, A) pairs satisfying Equation
2-4, which are equivalent in the sense that they represent the available information.
For a given assurance, A, either the reliability satisfying Equation 2-4 at each life level
or the life satisfying Equation 2-4 at each level of reliability can be found. The results
are identical.
The procedure for finding a, 0 and/_ follows: from Equation 2-1, we can derive
=. _ (.+ -°
Component reliability is thus given by
The simulated failure times are treated as if each one corresponds to a Weibull failure
with 4 varying over components.The failure time distribution in Equation 2-6 can be
written equivalently as
Y=ln{-In[1 -F(N)]} =In(a)+ In{In[l+N_/0]} (2-8)
which reduces to
Y = In [ F(N) ] = In (a/O) + _ In (N) (2-9)
for sufficiently small N.
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A least squares regression of Y on In(N) can be used to estimate,8 by b. When the
materials data covers a single life region, the data base used should be from a failure
simulation which considers variation in those drivers which reflect the state of
knowledge concerning component capability, e.g., dimensions and materials proper-
ties. It should correspond to the portion of the left-hand tail of the simulated failure
distribution which is approximately linear in log space. For multiple life region
materials data, ,8 should correspond to that associated with the variation in life
resulting from the leftmost life region from which damage is calculated. Imposing the
constraint,8 = b, Equation 2-6 can be written as
y = -In [I - F(N)] =aln [I + Nb/o] (2-I0)
with
aY=ln [1 + Nb/o]
aa
-aN bay_
Using these analytical gradients, a nonlinear least squares fit of Equation 2-10 over
the range of F(N) of interest lets us estimate a by a and 0 by c. Initial guesses for a
and c can be found by choosing c o = N._ol and, supposing that the fitted curve is
near the B.1 value, N.0ol, initializing a at ao = - In .999/In 2. The data base used
should be from a failure simulation which considers variation in all drivers.
Reference
[1] Martz, H. E, and R. A. Waller, Bayesian Reliability Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, 1982.
2.1.2 Materials Fatigue Life Characterization
2.1.2.1 Stress/Life Characterization of Fatigue Failure of Materials
When stress/life test data is available, the knowledge of the fatigue properties of a
component material is represented by uncertainty in the appropriate Stress/Life (S/N)
curve for the material. That uncertainty will be characterized both by an intrinsically
stochastic S/N curve and by uncertainty in S/N curve parameters. In order to represent
the latter uncertainty, the alternatives of using either Uniform or truncated Normal
distributions based on estimates of S/N curve shape parameters are provided.
Information which can be used to characterize the S/N curve will be classified as
follows:
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Necessary Information
• Specific failure data of size N o. The subscript "o" will denote reference to this
data set.
Optional Information
• Related failure data of size Nj, j = 1..... P. The subscript "j" will denote
reference to the jth related data set.
• An upper bound on the coefficient of variation of material fatigue strength
and/or explicit constraints on the shape parameters of the S/N curve.
Specific failure data refers to laboratory data generated by fatigue tests on material
specimens under specifications appropriate for that component, including such
elements as environment, specimen geometry, specimen finish, etc. Related failure
data refers to laboratory data generated by fatigue tests on specimens of the same
material, but under specifications which are in some respect different from those
appropriate for specific failure data. In order for data to be a suitable related data set
for a given life range, it is required that, after transformation to an equivalent zero-mean
alternating stress, the coefficient of variation of fatigue strength and the S/N curve
shape parameters for that life range be the same within the populations from which
the specific and related data are samples.
The methodology developed will be designed for characterizing component
material uncertainty when the specific failure data set is sparse, but it will also
accommodate cases where that data set is extensive.
In formulating an S/N curve model, the empirical phenomenon that the variance of
log life tends to increase as stress decreases must be taken into account. Also, the
intrinsic stochastic character of the S/N curve must be represented in such a way that
the notion of a random fatigue strength has meaning. Since fatigue tests are executed
at fixed nominal stress levels, a sensible interpretation of random fatigue strength
expressed as a stress at a fixed life can be achieved by assuming that there exists
some median S/N curve, and that the appropriate lives for individual tests are derived
from the curves which result from random shifts of the median S/N curve in the log
stress direction. For a physical rationalization of this assumption in terms of sizes of
defects at the origin of the failure see Spindel and Haibach [3] p. 103.
A simple model which encompasses both the notion of random fatigue strength
and increasing variance of log life with decreasing stress is as follows:
S=KjN-1/mj_p j= 1, ...,R (2-11)
vV( o, o)
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W(o) denotes a Weibull probability distribution, and R is the number of life regions
into which the life axis is divided. The S/N curve is linear in the log S/log N space within
each life region. The value of this piecewise linear parameterization as opposed to a
nonlinear parameterization over the entire range of life is that, for the case of sparse
specific data, it facilitates the information aggregation process involved in combining
specific data, related data and other information used to determine the shape of the
median S/N curve.
Equivalently, Equation 2-11 can be rewritten as
N = Aj S -mj ej j= 1, ..., R (2-12)
where Aj = K_ni and ei = _ rni.
The value of _/o is a function of/_o determined by requiring the median S/N curve to
be
MED (SIN) = Ki N -1/mi
which implies that
MED (_PlN) = 1 = r/o (In 2) #o'.
The distribution of sj follows by noting that the cumulative distribution function of
can be written as
ex0E I (2-13)
= 1 - exp
Note also that the distribution of lives given S in Equation 2-12 is no._._tWeibull. For a
fixed value of S, the assumption that _p~ W(-) in Equation 2-11 leads to a Weibull
distribution on lives in Equation 2-12 conditional on Ai, mj,/_o. Since we are also
characterizing uncertainty in A i, m i, and/_o, the unconditional distribution on lives for
a fixed value of S will not be Weibull.
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To the extent that the median S/N curve is concave to the origin in the log S/log N
space, V [ In N IS ] tends to increase as S decreases, since m] will tend to increase
as S decreases.
In Equation 2-11 the coefficient of variation of fatigue strength, C, is approximated
by the scatter in log stress about the mean S/N curve. That can be seen by considering
a Taylor's Series expansion of In S about E(SIN).
In S = In E(SIN) + S - E(SIN) (2-14)
E(SlN)
From Equation 2-14, we have
V(In SIN) = V(SIN) - C 2
E2(SlN) •
(2-15)
C can also be related to the Weibull parameter `8o by observing that, under the
transformation _ = -,80 In (_p/r/o), E(_) = 7 = Euler's constant and V(_) = _2/6,
Johnson and Kotz [2], pp. 266, 277-78. Then Equation 2-11 can be written as
1---INN + u
In S = ki - mj
(2-16)
where
k] = In Kj + In r/o - _'/,8o
1
u =
/'o
with the moment generating function of u given by
Mu(t)=exp (_o) F(l + t/`so)
(2-17)
E[u] = 0, V[u] = _2/6,82 and, by using asymptotic expansions provided by
Abramowitz and Stegun [1], pp. 68, 256, we find that Equation 2-17 can be ap-
proximated by
In Mu(t ) _. -_
(2-18)
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which implies that u ~ N(0, #2/6 ,82 ) approximately. From Equation 2-15 and Equation
2-16, we have
_2 _ C 2
V(In SIN) = V(u) = -_o
(2-19)
nl_ 2
V(InNIS ) = m 2 v(u) = _ ,82 - m_ C 2
Thus, in this model, C is approximately constant and V[In N IS] is proportional to m 2.
This model will be estimated by a two-step procedure. Within each life region we
will characterize uncertainty in the S/N curve shape parameter, m, by combining
specific failure data with related failure data and any constraints on C or m. Then,
conditional on selected values of the shape parameters for all life regions, {mi}, the
specific failure data alone will be used to determine the remaining S/N curve
parameters.
Let x = In S and y = In N. Specific data and related data, after transformation to
an equivalent alternating stress, are combined by life region as follows to produce a
credibility range for C and for m:
First, find S2 from combined data bases for j = 0, 1, ..., P by estimating
yj = yj+ xj + wi = cj + dxj + Cvi (2-20)
where
d = Sxy/Sx 2 andcj = _j - dxj
P
j=0
P Nj
N S_v2 = _ _ _l/ji 2
j=o i=1
Next, find S2 from combined data bases for j = 0, 1,..., P by estimating
A
xj = aj + ,syj + ui = aj +by i + uj (2-21)
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where
b = Sxy/S# and aj = xi - byj
P Ni
,,,,2
.s =E Eu ,.
j =0 i =1
From Equations 2-19, 2-20, and 2-21, we find point estimates of C and m based on
life region-specific information,
A
C = S_ (2-22)
Since u ~ N(0, 0 2) approximately, from Equation 2-18 and Equation 2-19, a 95%
confidence interval for C, Io, can be based on the approximation
N _2 (2-23)
0 2 ~ _2(N)
Pr[ C (N/z 2 (N)I v2 _< C _< _ (N/;_225(N)) v2 ] = .95.\ .975 /
From Equation 2-23, we have
A 2 1/2 1/2
The life region-specific credibility range for C will be called Io. An analogous credibility
range for m is defined by Jo. Since, to an approximation, r_ and S_ are independently
distributed, with
A
m--m
(r,_C__NS_x)_ - N(o,1)
Ns_
m2C 2 X2(N)
we have,
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A
m-m
/. ) "" t(N)
(2-25)
From Equation 2-25, we obtain
Pr -to25(N) _ m _ m+to2s(N) S_
• N_ • Ns_
= .95
so that
Jo - - t°25(N) N v2 , m + t.025(N )
(2-26)
I o provides, for each life region, an interval estimate of C based on fatigue data alone.
Similarly, Jo provides, for each life region, an interval estimate of m based on fatigue
data alone.
If there are explicit constraints on the shape parameters of the S/N curve, they are
of the form
m _< m _< _ (2-27)
Implicit constraints on the shape parameters are provided if an upper bound is
specified for the coefficient of variation of material fatigue strength,
C 2 < Co2 .
From Equations 2-16 and 2-19, with x = In S and y = In N, we derive
$2+ 2 1 =C 2
_Sxy + _Sy 2 < Co2
(2-28)
which can be written as
rn'(Sx_- Co_)+2rnS_+S_<o. (2-29)
Thus, C 2 < C 2 implies constraints on the shape parameters of the S/N curve.
The sign of Sxy should be tested; if Sw is not negative then the data is inadequate
for analysis since this implies life increasing with increasing stress.
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IfS2 = Co2, Equation 2-29 reduces to
m > - S2/2Sxy (2-30)
If S2 < Co2, Equation 2-29 reduces to
> - s_- (s_- s_s_-Co_)
Sx_- c_
(2-31)
If S2 > C 2 with Sx_ - S2(S 2- C 2) >- O, then Equation 2-29 reduces to
- Sx_-(s_-s_sx_- Co_)_ - Sx_+(s_-s_sx_- Co_)_
Sx_ Co_ < rn < Sx_ Co_
(2-32)
IfS 2 > C 2 withS 2 - S2(S 2- C 2) < O, thenthe specificationC2< C 2 is inconsistent
with observed data since the constraint cannot be met by an adjustment to a shape
parameter.
A posterior credibility range for each of the shape parameters is then established
by taking the intersections of the ranges defined by Equations 2-26, 2-27 and
Equations 2-30, 2-31 or 2-32.
Uncertainty in m is incorporated into the S/N failure simulation by forming a
probability distribution on m, _(m). One alternative provided is to use a Uniform
distribution over the posterior credibility range for m. Note that defining the addition
of information in the form of constraints on m and/or C is motivated by the notion that
for N small, the posterior credibility range for rn should be dominated by the
constraints, but that as N increases, it should approach Jo.
The S/N curves obtained by this procedure are required to be concave to the origin
with positive shape parameters, i.e., 0 < m 1 < m 2 <... < m R. To ensure that, we will
impose the additional constraints that the upper bound of the ith posterior credibility
range be no larger than the upper bound of the (i + 1)st and that the lower bound of
the (i + 1)st be no larger than the sampled value of m i, with m 1 > O.
Calculation of the median values of the shape parameters under concavity con-
straints is equivalent to calculating mean values when Uniform distributions are used
to represent shape parameter uncertainty; i.e., MED(mi) = E(mi).
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m 1 ~ U(L1, U1) (2-33)
mi+ 1 ~ U [ max(m/, Li+l), Ui+l I i = 1, ..., a - 1
From Equation 2-33 we derive the recursive relationship
E(ml ) = L 1 + U 1 (2-34)
2
E(mi+l) = max E(mi) + Ut.+1 Li+ l + Ui+ 12 ' 2 i= 1,...,R- 1
The other alternative provided is to represent _(m) as a truncated Normal distribu-
tion derived from a Bayesian analysis of Equation 2-20. Within a given life-region,
suppose V(InNtlnS ) = V(ylx ) = 0 .2 is known. Then, based on the approximate
Normality of w,
]L(m) _ expL 2o.2 (m- t_) 2
This suggests a Bayesian prior on m of the form
P(m)_ exp[_(m-mo) 2] 5>0
2
The posterior density is then N(m., 0.. )
m:_ -
_NS2 +mo _
N SxZ+ 5
2 o2/( N S2 + _)0. , =
Constraints of the form given in Equation 2-27 will always be required for this
representation of _(m) in order to preclude inconsistent extreme values of m, 5 must
also always be specified. 5 = 0 corresponds to a diffuse prior so that sample
information alone determines the posterior distribution. If m o is not user-specified,
m o = r_ and 5 = 0 will be assumed. If 0,2 is not user-specified, 0.2= S2 will be
assumed and the uncertainty associated with that estimate will be ignored for the
purpose of representing _(m).
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Again, the S/N curves obtained using the truncated Normal _:(m) are required to
be concave to the origin. However, it will not be possible to calculate the median S/N
curve analytically.That median curve is estimated by saving the realized values of m
for each life-region from the simulation run and finding the corresponding sample
medians.
Within each life region we establish a value for the S/N curve shape parameter by
a draw from the _(m) for that region. Conditional on this set of shape parameters,
{mi}, j = 1,..., R, we then use the specific failure data to determine the remaining
S/N curve parameters.
In order for the S/N curve to be continuous, we need to impose continuity
constraints at the life region boundaries. The ith life region, Ri, is defined by
R i-{N_Ni_l, i <_N<Ni,i+ 1,i= 1,...,R} (2-35)
with No1 - 0 and NR,R+ 1 =-- oo. The continuity constants are then given by
-1 -1
, mi ,mi+ 1
Ki Ni,i+ 1 = Ki+ 1 Ni,i+ 1 i= 1,...,R- 1
(2-36)
From Equation 2-35, K 2, . . . , KR can be found as a function of K 1.
[1 '1;-1 ; j+l
]--[ -"Ki = K 1 Nj, j+ 1 i = 2, ..., R
j=l
(2-37)
In the ith life region, the S/N curve is defined by Equation 2-11, or equivalently
1
S N r_i = Ki _P i= 1, ..., R
(2-38)
Combining Equations 2-37 and 2-38, we have
1
S N ml =KI_ P N @ R 1
(2-39)
.;!, '},_ ;-1 if+,S N rni ]--[ +
j=l
=KI_ P NERj, i=2,...,R
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The transformation given by Equation 2-39 is of the form X = K 1 _p which lets us
parameterize the SIN curve, conditional on {mi} by
In X = k + u (2-4o)
where
k = In K 1 + In % - ,8-_o
1
u - - y)
with u ~ N (0, C2), approximately.
-1 #°1
Since % =(In2)
#01
YOz
with Ki defined by Equation 2-37 for i = 2, ..., R
Z=lnX=k+u and N o=
Let
R
Z Noi.
i=1
Under this parameterization, the S/N
parameters k and C. But from Equation 2-40, we have point estimates
k^=
A
C = Sz
where
(2-41)
curve is specified by estimating the
(2-42)
2-16
No
2 1Sz - N o - 1 i=
These estimates of k and C are life region independent estimates conditional
on {mi}. Given an estimate of C, we estimate ,80 using the relationship in
Equation 2-19, C 2 = _2/6,82. The S/N curve location parameters {Ki} are then
determined from Equations 2-37 and 2-41.
In addition to life regions with some fatigue data, for HCF applications we may also
need to represent the S/N curve in the ultra-HCF region, typically above 107 cycles
where there may well be no data. In the absence of data, the structure of the materials
model accommodates a number of alternative assumptions:
o If it is desired to posit a quasi-endurance limit, the shape parameter for
the ultra-HCF region is set to an arbitrarily large fixed value, say
m =20.
. If it is desired to err conservatively, the ultra-HCF region can simply be
added to the highest life region for which m is determined by data
and any applicable constraints.
. Another option, which is less conservative than Option 2 but not as non-
conservative as Option 1 is to extrapolate to the ultra-HCF region an
S/N curve estimated from data under environmental conditions such
that the unknown S/N curve should be strictly above the extrapolated
estimated curve. For example, in some applications, if operating con-
ditions are cryogenic and we have no data above 107 cycles, we can
use room temperature data to estimate an S/N curve which would be
used only in the ultra-HCF region. These options are illustrated in Fig-
ure 2-2.
For LCF applications, we may also need to represent the S/N curve in a region
between 1 cycle and the smallest observed value of N. The materials model can
represent an S/N curve in such a region by simulating the curve as before for the
higher life-regions and then tying a calculated tensile test stress-life value to the
simulated S/N curve subject to the constraint m 1 >__0. In general
MED(ml) > MED(m2) SO that concavity to the origin is only required above the first life
2-17
InS
(2)
I InN
107
(1)
(3)
Figure 2-2 S/N Curves
region. Note also that this procedure is consistent with the notion that C would not
be constant over life-regions down to 1 cycle.
Variation in the S/N curve parameters {m/}, k, t3o leads to a set of stochastic S/N
curves, represented equivalently by Equation 2-11 or Equation 2-12. The random
variable _p plays the role of a materials life driver. It models intrinsic S/N curve
uncertainty in the Monte Carlo Component Stress/Life Failure simulation. The
parameters of the probability distribution of _p are a function of the S/N curve
parameters {mj}, k, 80.
References
[1] Abramowitz, M., and Stegun, I. A., editors, Handbook of Mathematical Functions.
National Bureau of Standards, Applied Mathematics Series 55, Issued June 1964,
Ninth Printing, November 1970 with corrections.
[2] Johnson, N. L., and Kotz, S., Di_tributi0n_ in Statistics: Continuous Univariate Dis-
tributions - 1, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970.
[3] Spindel, J. E., and Haibach, E., "Some Considerations in the Statistical Determina-
tion of the Shape of S-N Curves," Statistical Analysis of Fatigue Data, edited by
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2.1.2.2 Strain/Life Characterization of Fatigue Failure of Materials
LCF applications, when strain/life rather than stress/life test data is available, our
knowledge of the fatigue properties of a component material is represented by
uncertainty in the appropriate Strain/Life curve for the material. Our model is
analogous to the stress/life fatigue model at the level of total strain data decomposed
into plastic and elastic strain components with no life region partitions.
Information which can be used to characterize the plastic and elastic components
of the Strain/Life curve will be classified as follows:
Necessary Information
• Specific plastic and elastic strain component failure data.
Optional Information
• Specific total strain failure data.
• Related failure data.
• Tensile test data.
• Explicit constraints on the plastic and/or elastic component shape
parameters.
The Strain/Life curve is defined by
Sp = Kp N -limp _o (2-43)
S E = KE N - l lrnEp
~ w(,7o,80)
S _ Sp 4- S E
Where S is total strain, S E is the elastic strain component and Sp is the plastic strain
component. Requiring MED(_o) = 1 implies
r/o = (In 2) -1/'8° (2-44)
From Equation 2-43 and Equation 2-44, using only specific plastic and elastic strain
component failure data, the procedures developed for the stress/life model can be
used to find median values for Kp, KE, mp and m E. Some specific or related optional
information may be available only as total strain failure data. Also, tensile test data
can be used to derive a value of plastic strain at one cycle, given a value for specimen
reduction of area (R.A.), according to
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1 N-V2 (2-45)
Sp = _D
D = -In (1 - RA.)
If we assume that all data sets under consideration follow
Sp, = '_i Si (2-46)
SE_ = (1 -- ;_i) Si
then we can generate both component strain failure data and the elastic component
corresponding to Equation 2-45 by deriving
Sp, __ _i __ Kp NT(m P mE )
SE_ 1 -- _i
(2-47)
from Equations 2-43, 2-44 and 2-46.
Once Equation 2-47 has been used to augment the necessary strain component
failure data with any optional strain component failure data, we consider any shape
parameter constraints and apply the stress/life methodology directly to each set of
strain component failure data.
In the strain/life methodology, since V(In _o) = :_2/6/_2, each strain component
analysis provides an estimate of V(In _). We will specify a unique estimate for/_o by
defining the estimate of V(In _0) to be the average of those derived from the plastic
and elastic strain component analyses.
The strain/life and stress/life characterizations differ significantly only in how life is
calculated. To solve Equation 2-43 for life, N, given total strain, S, we require a
numerical procedure such as Newton's method in order to perform the computation.
2.1.2.3 Process Variation in Materials
Materials test data which is available to characterize fatigue properties in a com-
ponent operating environment is typically from a single heat of the material. The
structure of the materials characterization models has been extended to allow for
consideration of the impact of heat-to-heat or process variation on component
reliability,
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Inthe caseof stress/life test data, process variation is represented by the stochastic
shift factor, ,;LK Z in Equation 2-48
Ill,* Z] (2-48)S = K N -1/rn _ K
with '_'Kand Z defined by
* = */
_LK MED K MED K
Z ~ A(/_, (72)
MED Z = 1 =_ /_ = 0
'_'K can be interpreted as a location shift parameter used to account for the fact that
the location of the median S/N curve constructed from data for a single heat may vary
from the location of a median S/N curve constructed by considering data from multiple
heats, o.2 represents the extent of departures from the multiple heat median S/N curve
warranted by the information available.
From Equation 2-48,
VAR [In NIS, multiple heats]
VAR [In N IS, single heat]
From Equation 2-49,
"_'N =
so that
= m2(02+ 02 ) (2-49)
= m2C 2
VAR [In NIS, multiple heats] = 1 + (72/0 2
VAR [In N IS, single heat]
0"2= ('_'N -- 1) C 2
where C is the coefficient of variation of material fatigue strength.
_'N is a measure of the increase in intrinsic material fatigue life variation for multiple
heats relative to single heat fatigue life variation.
In the case of strain/life test data, analogous results are obtained for the extension
of the materials model given by Equation 2-50.
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Swhere
(2-50)
_K = MED Kp /MED Kp
"_N = 1 + _2/VAR (In _o)
so that
= MEo.;/MEo
Thus, whenever _'K and t N can be specified, we can account for process variation
in materials characterization.
2.1.3 Driver Characterization
2.1.3.1 Driver Probability Distributions
Probabilistic characterization of a component failure mode utilizes an engineering
failure model which determines component failure as a function of both fixed
parameters and stochastic parameters, called drivers. The purpose of this section is
to provide some guidelines for specification of driver distributions.
It is necessary to identify the portion of the driver space critical to accurate
simulation of the left-hand tail of the failure probability curve based on the information
available. With that goal in mind, prior to any exogenous specification of driver
distributions, a failure probability curve based on nominal values of life drivers with a
stochastic materials curve estimated from materials data should be simulated. The
sensitivity of that failure probability curve's left-hand tail to the specification of life driver
distributions should then be investigated in the following way. For each life driver,
define a worst-case value based on available information and re-simulate a cor-
responding failure probability curve with other drivers fixed at nominal values. Single-
loop simulations of size 1000 should be adequate for this procedure. Concern for the
detail of driver distribution specification should focus on those drivers whose worst-
case values correspond to extreme shifts of the left-hand tail of the simulated failure
probability curve. If those worst-case values are due to lack of knowledge rather than
intrinsic variability, then these results also provide an indication of the value of
increasing knowledge about those life drivers. It is important to realize that accurately
specifying the life driver distributions over that part of the life driver space which
corresponds to simulated failures outside the left-hand tail of the failure distribution
function is not necessary.
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Driver distributions should be specified to reflect both intrinsic variability and
variation due to lack of knowledge. For high cycle fatigue and low cycle fatigue
applications to date, three families of distributions have been found sufficient for
characterizing driver distributions.
UNIFORM : X ~ U(a, b) (2-51)
NORMAL : X ~ N(#, 0"2)
BETA : X ~ Be(a, b, p, 8)
Uniform Distribution
The Uniform distribution is illustrated in Figure 2-3 and is given by Equation 2-52.
-b 1 a <x<_b
f(x) = - a -
0 otherwise
(2-52)
It is appropriate to use the Uniform distribution to characterize driver variability
whenever finite bounds, a and b, can be established on the range of a variable and
the probability that the driver falls in the interval (x 1, x2), where a _ x 1 _<x 2 - b, can
be considered to be proportional to (x 2 - xl). That is the case when all the information
that is available about a driver consists of its finite bounds, or the Uniform distribution
may be a useful conservative approximation when the nominal sensitivity analysis
shows that the driver under consideration is not important in determining the left-hand
tail of the simulated failure probability curve.
Normal Distribution
The Normal distribution is illustrated in Figure 2-4 and is given by Equation 2-53.
f(x) (_0.2) -V2 20.2]= exp [- (x -/_)2 /
(2-53)
The Normal distribution is used to characterize a driver in two leading situations. First,
there may be measurements available which suggest that the value of the driver is
distributed symmetrically about some central value, #, and there is sufficient data to
calculate a measure of deviation, 0.. Additionally, if the underlying physical processes
which produce the value of the driver can be considered to operate so that it is the
resultant sum of many small independent effects, then the driver distribution is
approximately Normal as a consequence of the Central Limit Theorem. In the second
situation, the Normal distribution is essentially used as a convenient approximation
where there is additional uncertainty as to appropriate values for # and 0.. Then,
hyperdistributions on # and 0. are formed based on the information available.
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f(x)
1
b-a
Figure 2-3 Uniform Distribution
f(x
Figure 2-4 Normal Distribution
2 - 24
Beta Distribution
Beta distributions are illustrated in Figure 2-5 and Figure 2-6 and are given by
Equation 2-54.
f(x) = Be (x; a, b, p, 8) (2-54)
f(x) = (x - a) p e (b - x) (1 - ,o)e
a<_x<_b 0_<p_<l 8_>0
The Beta distribution family is very useful for characterizing driver variation because
in the (a, b, p, 8) parameterization it provides a framework for experience-based
judgment on driver variability to be translated into shape and location parameters of
a probability distribution. The peak of the distribution occurs at 3 = a + p(b - a)
where a and b are the finite bounds on the range of life driver values. Thus, p
parameterizes the peak of the distribution. _ characterizes the variability of the
distribution. As 8 --, 0, the variability is maximized at (b - a)2/12 since the distribution
converges to U(a, b). As _ --, oo, the variability is minimized at 0, since x approaches
the peak location, 3, with probability 1.
The Beta distribution can be used as follows if warranted by the available informa-
tion. Let a, b and _ be specified from experience-based judgment on the bounds and
shape of the distribution function. Bounds on the peak value 3, 31 and 32, imply
f(x)
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
Be(X; O, .5, e)
0=10
" I
o 0.2 o'4 o'.6 0.8
x
Figure 2-5 Beta Distributionswith p = 0.5 and DifferentValues of 8
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0
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Be(X; O, 1, .7, 0)
8=20
9=10
0=2
\
\
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Beta Distributions with p = 0.7 and Different Values of 0
bounds, _1 and _2 on the mean of the corresponding Beta distribution. We will use
Uniform distributions to represent uncertainty inp and takeF = (/_2 -/_1)/2 to be the
nominal value of the driver. Note that only two of the three parameters (_1, _2, F) can
be uniquely specified from experience-based judgment. The resulting procedure for
finding bounds on p,/31 and/32, is illustrated in Figure 2-7.
SPECIFY a, b, :_1, _, 0
___._1-a _10+a+b
'°1- b-a /_1- 2+0
t
[ #2 ---- 2_" -- ,Ul ]
1
l = ,u2(2 +O)-a-b_2 0
t
P2 --
Figure 2-7 Procedure for Specifying Beta Distribution
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When the information being represented is more diffuse, we can also introduce
variation in 0 by specifying bounds, 01, 02, and simply represent peak variation by
specifying bounds =1, and _2.
These procedures for forming life driver distributions are illustrated in the case studies
of Section 3.0.
2.1.3.2 Load Scale Factors
The design reference values of loads are extreme values of loads derived from
power spectral density enveloping procedures. Load scale factors are stochastic
multipliers which are derived from knowledge of the design reference values, the
procedures used to generate them, and a requirement that the resulting load scale
factors be consistent with any available strain gage stress measurements.
A load scale factor, ;L, can be represented as a Normally distributed random
variable, _. ~ N(F, O'2), where2 is the ratio of load to the reference value of load. Since
;L = 1 represents the design reference value of the load, the problem of statistically
characterizing the load can be posed in terms of finding the parameters /_ and 0 ,2
based on the available information, where/_ + k 0, = 1. Load scale factor density
functions are represented in Figure 2-8 as a function of alternative values of k.
DESIGN REFERENCE VALUE
NORMALIZED LOAD
.__ Ik=0
k=l
: k=2
3
Figure 2-8 Load Scale Factors
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The available information regarding loads is assumed to allow the coefficient of
variation, C, to be approximated, so we have o/IX = C. Then IX and o 2 are given by
1 (2-55)
IX - 1 +kC
To account for the requirement of consistency of Equation 2-55 with measurements
from which loads are obtained, Equation 2-55 will be modified to obtain
d (2-56)
IX-1 +kC
where
1 No Strain Gage Datad = (1 + kC)IXG Strain Gage Data
and IXG represents the average value of ;L indicated by strain gage data.
We will let k ~ U(a, b) in order to account for uncertainty in the appropriate value
for k. An approach to setting a value or range of values for k can be derived by
considering the impact of sample size on the enveloping procedures used to arrive
at a design reference value. In general, design reference values will exceed "30" points
as measured by means of estimates of IX and o. To account for the precision of those
estimates we will use the concept of an expected coverage tolerance limit, described
in [1]. The computed coverage in Table 2-1 is the expected fraction of the population
bounded by a "3o" envelope, based on a sample of size N. The corresponding value
of k is that k required to shift the load scale factor density function so that the probability
of being below the design reference value is the same as the coverage.
Since the design reference values are typically based on sample sizes of 10-15,
these results provide a guide to selecting a value or range of values for k.
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Table 2-1 The Required Values of k and the Computed
Coverage for Sample Sizes of N
N
2
5
10
15
8O
COVERAGE
.855
.974
.990
.992
.997
1.06
1.94
2.33
2.41
2.75
Reference
[1] Owen, D. B., Factors for One-Sided Tolerance Limits and for Variables SamDlinQ
Plans, SCR-607: Sandia Corporation Monograph, March 1963 (Available through
National Technical Information Service, Department of Commerce).
2.1.4 Composite Stresses in High Cycle Fatigue Analysis
Fatigue failure can be the result of a combination of stresses induced by random
vibration and periodic loads. Structural components often exhibit narrow-band
response to a broad-band vibration environment. The narrow-band response fre-
quencies of such components will be near a modal frequency. Periodic loads, such
as those due to constant speed rotation of turbopump components, may be super-
imposed onto the narrow-band response of some structures, producing a complex
stress-time history. In an analytical model representing such cases, narrow-band
Gaussian stresses resulting from the stimulus of broad-band Gaussian loads are
superimposed on sinusoidal stresses generated by the stimulus of sinusoidal loads
to produce a composite stress-time history. In general, that composite stress-time
history will be formed from the superposition of multiple narrow-band Gaussian
stress-time histories, each at a different frequency, and multiple sinusoidal stress-time
histories, each at a different frequency and phase angle. Such a superposition is
illustrated in Figure 2-9 for one narrow-band Gaussian stress-time history superim-
posed on one sinusoidal stress-time history.
A procedure for determining the magnitude and frequency of peak stresses in the
composite process from knowledge about the individual processes is given as
follows. If peaks result from one or more sinusoidal stress-time histories with no
random stresses, the analytical solution is straightforward. If peaks result from a single
narrow-band Gaussian stress-time history with no sinusoidal stress, the analytical
solution is again straightforward. In that case, the peaks follow a Rayleigh distribution
with associated frequency equal to the narrow-band frequency, [1], p. 498. A method
is presented which will accurately describe the magnitude and frequency of peak
stresses for the composite process in the cases where there is at least one random
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Figure 2-9 Superposition of Narrow-Band Gaussian and
Sinusoidal Stress-Time Histories
and one other stress-time history, but will also be valid in all other cases which can
define the composite process presented here.
The procedure is to generate a pseudo-time history of the composite process from
knowledge of the properties of the individual processes, i.e., narrow-band frequen-
cies, variances, and damping coefficients for the narrow-band Gaussian processes
and sinusoidal amplitudes, frequencies and phase angles for the sinusoidal proces-
ses. By generating a pseudo-time history which captures this input information, the
rainflow cycle counting methodology discussed in Section 2.2.1.4 can be used to
compute the magnitude and frequency of peak stresses just as they would be
computed from observations on the composite processes.
Some terms which are used in representing the pseudo-time history are defined as
follows:
crN = standard deviation of narrow-band stresses
fo = a modal frequency of the component: _oo = 2 _ fo
fc = sinusoidal frequency: mc = 2 _ fc
f = frequency used to determine time increment; usually max(f o, fc)
= damping coefficient
N = number of points per cycle of frequency f
T = length of generated stress-time history
A narrow-band Gaussian process {N(t)} can be written in the form
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N(t) = Nc(t ) cos _Oot + Ns(t ) sin _Oot (2-57)
with spectral density
= [
_fo 1 1 ]+ (4 _2 _ 2) (f/fo) 2 + (f/fo) 4 (2-58)
[1], p. 495.
There are computer intensive methods which can be used to generate a narrow-band
Gaussian time history directly by a numerical inverse Fourier transform of a given
spectral density. A simpler procedure which approximates {N(t)} results if we consider
Equation 2-58 in the neighborhood of fo. Then, linear and quadratic deviation terms
can be used to approximate S(f) by
- + ,o)4-
(2-59)
But Equation 2-59 is the spectral density which results when {No(t)} and {Ns(t)} are
independently generated from the AR(1) process (autoregressive process of order
one) specified by Equation 2-60.
x(t) =p x(t- At) + u(t) (2-60)
p=exp [-2_f°/Nfl
At = 1/N f
Thus, each narrow-band Gaussian stress-time history is generated using Equation
2-60 and the composite stress-time history is formed by their superposition with
sinusoidal stress-time histories defined by their frequencies, amplitudes and phase
angles. For a discussion of the procedure used to eliminate insignificant contributors
to the composite process and the procedure used to establish an adequate length of
the composite history, see Sections 2.2.1.5 and 2.3. 7.
Reference
[1] Clough, R. W., and J. Penzien, Dynamics of Structures, McGraw-Hill, 1975.
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2.1.5 Duty Cycle Effects in Reliability Estimation
For some components subject to an LCF failure mode there may be some
significant drivers which exhibit intrinsic variation from mission to mission. In such a
case, the failure to model mission-to-mission variation will result in a conservative
estimate of reliability, i.e., reliability will be understated. That conservatism can be seen
by considering the following analysis.
Let X be the fraction of life consumed in a given time period, f(x) describes the
variation in damage possible during a time period. If we do not model mission-to-mis-
sion variation, then the life distribution simulated is constructed from
1/_,, 1_2' ---, 1/_T (2-61)
where x 1, ..., xT are random draws from f(x). If we do model mission-to-mission
variation, then life, L, is defined by
L (2-62)
xj ___1
j=l
For a fixed integer j, let
{0Yi= if L < j (2-63)
Then Equation 2-63 can be used to represent Equation 2-62 equivalently as
oo
yjxi ---1
j=l
(2-64)
oo
_yj=L
j=l
In turn, Equation 2-64 can be written as
oo
L _ (Yi/L)x i =LX >_ 1
j=l
(2-65)
Thus, from Equation 2-65, the life distribution simulated is constructed from
(1/Xl, 1/X2,...,1/XT ) (2-66)
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ignoring the truncation effects implied by the inequality in Equation 2-65. For a
simulated life set of size T, the effect of modeling mission-to-mission variation on the
life distribution is thus to shift the tails toward the central part of the distribution. Thus,
for high reliability, which corresponds to left-hand tail probabilities, the failure to model
mission-to-mission variation will result in a conservative estimate of reliability.
However, it is also important to note that it is essential that it be possible to accurately
partition driver variation into intrinsic variation and lack of knowledge components for
all drivers whose intrinsic variation is a determinant of mission-to-mission variation.
That is essential because, if we erroneously include variation due to lack of knowledge
in the simulation of the life distribution indicated by Equation 2-66, the effect of
modeling mission-to-mission variation on the life distribution will be to over-shift the
tails toward the central part of the distribution, resulting in a nonconservative estimate
of reliability, i.e., reliability will be overstated.
Mission-to-mission variation has not been implemented in the current computer
code because, for SSME components subject to an LCF failure mode for which the
analysis has been completed, either drivers which do vary mission-to-mission have
an insignificant impact on life or it was not possible to separate intrinsic variation from
variation due to lack of knowledge. The general procedure for adding mission-to-mis-
sion variation to the existing computer code is as follows.
For each iteration of the simulation, a stress or strain time history should be
generated which incorporates driver variation due to mission-to-mission variation for
fixed values of other drivers. The history length should be sufficient to capture the
statistical properties of mission-to-mission variation. A damage histogram on a
mission by mission basis can then be constructed for each iteration and represented
in cumulative distribution form. For example, iteration 1 might correspond to Figure
2-10, a situation with a lot of small damage effects, whereas iteration 2 might
correspond to Figure 2-11, a situation with a rare large damage effect. In order to
simulate component life, we then draw M times from a given damage distribution
function, where M is sufficiently small that the cumulative damage (sum of the variation
drawn) is less than one. The life of the component on that iteration is then taken to
be (M/Cumulative Damage) measured in missions. Note that basing the simulated life
at each iteration on more than one draw is an attempt to capture the likelihood of
experiencing any extremely damaging cycles during a given component's exposure
to risk.
2.1.6 Modeling Spatially Symmetric Components
For those SSME components with spatial symmetry, such as turbine disks and
impellers, engineering analysis is conducted at the level of a symmetric element of
the component. That situation is illustrated in Figure 2-12.
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Figure 2-10 Cumulative Distribution for a Situation with a Lot of
Small Damage Effects
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Figure 2-11 Cumulative Distribution for a Situation with a Rare
Large Damage Effect
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Figure 2-12 Component with 10-element Symmetry
Materials characterization is based on test data presumed to be representative of
the component. The scatter in failure times indicated by test data can be used to
model the scatter in failure times over the symmetric elements of a component when
that scatter is due only to intrinsic materials variability.
In stochastic failure modeling a component with N-element symmetry fails, in a
given environment, at the minimum of N failure times simulated to represent the scatter
in lives due to intrinsic materials variability.
There is a negligible cost in simulation time to modeling spatial symmetry since it
is not actually necessary to simulate N lives to find the minimum life. The Stress/Life
or Strain/Life model is of the form S = f(N)_p, and when scatter in life, for a given
environment, is due to intrinsic material variability, that scatter is simulated by N draws
of _p. The minimum life calculated will correspond to min _p, so finding the life of an
element for the materials curve with _Po = min _pis equivalent to finding the life of the
component.
For any component we analyze, we wish to specify both stress behavior and
materials behavior as accurately as possible. In the following we want to consider
the potential impact on simulated failure distribution curves of two kinds of specifica-
2 - 35
tion errors: (i) neglecting to model load-sharing and (ii) systematic materialsvariation
attributed to random variation. Load-sharing consists of a redistribution of the
stresses encountered at critical locations of the component.
For a component having a single critical location (i) is not an issue, by definition.
However,once we begin to consider a component having multiple nominally identical
critical locations, such as the attachment slots on a disk, it becomes important to
determine, for the failure mode under consideration, (1) whether or not there exist
interaction effects which induce load-sharing so that critical location life correlation
effects need to be captured in the model as well as (2) whether or not there exists
systematic materials variation which should be accounted for in modeling materials
behavior so that it is not falsely attributed to random materials variation. The
load-sharing specification error given by (i) will shift the lower tail of the simulated
failure distribution for a disk toward zero whereas the impact of the systematic
materials variation specification error given by (ii) depends on the particular
misspecification.
If interactioneffectsexistwhich induce load-sharing, anupper bound on a particular
B-lifelof a disk could be found by considering the limiting case where all critical
locations fail simultaneously. Forthe LCFcrack initiationfailure model which we have
postulated, load-sharing has not been included; however, work is currently in
progress to validate or refute that feature of the model specification. That work is
motivated by the fact that, since one disk being modeled has fifty attachment slots, a
specification bias as large as an order of magnitude shift of B-lives toward zero can
result if load-sharing is erroneously excluded.
On the other hand, suppose there exists systematic materials variation which is
misspecified as random variation. Also, let that misspecification assign a significant
probability to materials life being much less than that under a correct specification.
Then the lower tail of the distribution of disk failures predicted by a model incorporating
such a misspecification will be shifted toward zero and away from the distribution of
observed component failures. The magnitude of that shift will be an increasing
function of the number of critical locations. Since one disk being modeled has fifty
attachment slots, if there is a materialsspecification error under the conditions set out
above, there might be a very significant impact on the lower tail of the distribution of
disk failures. We presently have no evidence of the existence of such systematic
variation inthe materialsdata used for our analysisof LCFcrack initiation disk failures.
1 A B-life is the value of accumulated operatin_ time to failure at a failure probability
specified as a percent; e.g., B.1 is the failure time at a probability of 0.001 or 0.1%.
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Under the criteria stated in Section 1, our objective is to present analysis based on
the characterization of a failure distribution warranted by the existing state-of-
knowledge, subject to the constraint never to be nonconservative; i.e., specification
biases are to be avoided, but if it is necessary to introduce those biases in the course
of characterizing the state-of-knowledge, they must be conservative. Therefore, we
will present all our computational results under the condition that neither of the
specification issues discussed is included in our analysis, and with the realization that
if either exclusion is erroneous, our results could be conservative.
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Section 2.2
Engineering Analysis
2.2.1 High Cycle Fatigue Failure Modeling
2.2.1.1 Introduction
The High Cycle Fatigue (HCF) failure model computes the life of a structure subjected
to a relatively large number of small amplitude load cycles. For many spaceflight
systems components, these loads are primarily due to structural vibration. The addi-
tional loads from temperature gradients, aerodynamic effects, and internal and external
pressures combine with the vibrating stresses to cause fatigue failure. Typically, fatigue
crack initiation at a single critical location will determine fatigue life of a component.
A schematic diagram ofthe HCF modeling approach is given in Figure 2-13. A major
element in this approach is the transformation of the loads and other driver
parameters, such as geometry and material properties, to synthesize an equivalent
stress history. The details of the stress analysis are given in the next section. A
description of the driver transformation and the inclusion of the driver uncertainties
are found in Section 2.2.1.3. This is followed by a description of the damage calcula-
tions. Computer implementation of the HCF failure model is described in Section
2.2.1.5. The HCF failure model as developed is generic in nature. Specific details
pertaining to the HCF analyses of three Space Shuttle Main Engine components are
given in Section 2.2.1.5.
ENVIRONMENT AND LOADS STRUCTURAL PROPERTIES
SYNTHESIZE STRESS TIME HISTORIES
1
IDENTIFY CYCLES
1
CHARACTERIZE MATERIALS
FATIGUE LIFE BEHAVIOR
1
CALCULATE DAMAGE
1
ESTIMATE FATIGUE LIFE
DRIVER UNCERTAINTIES
Figure 2-13 High Cycle Fatigue Failure Modeling Approach
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2.2.1.2 Load Description and Stress Analysis
In the cases considered herein, vibration loads are primarily responsible for HCF
failure, and the load environment is characterized by power spectral density (PSD)
envelopes for the different vibration zones. A finite element (FE) model of the
component is employed for the stress analysis. The FE analysis response, near the
location of interest, is then used for a detailed stress analysis.
Vibration Environment Characterization
In the procedures employed by Rocketdyne and NASA/MSFC, data for charac-
terizing the SSME vibration environment are obtained from engine hot fire tests.
Accelerometers are attached at various locations and acceleration response time
histories are recorded in one, two or all three of the global directions. The time signals
are converted to PSDs by fast Fourier transform (FFT). A typical time signal is 3
seconds long, and a stationary PSD is determined by ergodically averaging 0.5 sec
time slices. A bandwidth (i.e., frequency discretization interval) of 2.5 Hz is used in
most cases. The vibration environment was separated into sinusoidal and random
vibration components. These environments were used respectively for frequency
response (FR) and random vibration (RV) dynamic analyses. An FR analysis derives
the steady state dynamic response of the structure for a sinusoidal load input. An RV
analysis derives the statistics of the dynamic response of the structure for a stationary
random input process. The response stresses from these analyses are combined to
calculate the fatigue life. The procedure for arriving at the composite stresses and the
method for fatigue life calculation differ from those used by Rocketdyne. A detailed
description of composite stress generation and the justification for the alternative
procedure are given in Section 2.1.4.
The acceleration PSDs are processed by Rocketdyne to derive design envelopes
which are a part of their current R5 vibration load criteria [1]. First, the spikes in the
PSD which correspond to sinusoidal load components are identified and filtered from
each PSD. The square root of the height of the spike is multiplied by the bandwidth
to estimate the magnitude of the sinusoidal load. The filtered PSD with the spikes
removed is the "random" component of the load. Envelope PSDs for each vibration
zone and global direction x, y, z are constructed by adjusting the envelope curve such
that all the filtered PSD curves corresponding to that zone and direction lie below the
envelope. Similarly, the envelope sinusoidal loads are derived based on the highest
peak from among the spikes for the given zone and direction.
The envelopes reflect extreme loads. Thus, in the procedure used by JPL, the
envelope loads (i.e., Rocketdyne's design values) were adjusted to derive the
unbiased nominal loads. Scale factors used to adjust the load distribution were
derived based on information such as coefficients of variation and coverage factors
of the raw PSD sample population. If strain gage measurements were available, the
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meanof the scale factor was further adjusted to reflect the acquisition ofthis additional
information. A detailed discussion on the load factors is given in Section 2.1.3.2.
Finite Element Stress Analyses
The static and dynamic analyses to determine forces at various locations in the
ducts were performed using finite element numerical models. In these models the
ducts were represented by line finite elements (e.g., beams, pipes, elbows) which do
not provide accurate estimates of stress. Thus, the approach adopted was to extract
the beam-end forces at a node close to the location of interest and employ the beam
bending and cylindrical pressure vessel equations to derive the stresses. The beam-
force-to-stress mapping is described in Section 2.2.1.3. Figure 2-14 depicts the
approach to the duct structural analysis used by Rocketdyne and followed in this
publication. The FE analysis to determine beam end forces was performed by
Rocketdyne. These beam end forces were used as input to the probabilistic HCF
duct analysis programs developed by JPL.
The commercial software package STARDYNE was used by Rocketdyne for the
FE analysis [2]. Modal dynamic analysis procedures were used to perform RV and
FR analyses. The first step prior to modal analyses requires the extraction of the
A
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P
USE BEAM BENDING AND THICK
WALLED PRESSURE VESSEL
EQUATIONS TO DERIVE STRESSES
Figure 2-14 Duct Structural Analysis Procedure
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eigenvalues of the system. Typically, the lowest twenty modes in the system were
included in the modal analyses.
A linear RV analysis was performed using the acceleration PSDs for the
component's vibration zone. The excitation was applied along one of the global
directions at the supports of the structure. The analysis was performed separately for
excitation in each of the three global x, y, z directions. Two quantities, namely the root
mean square (RMS) beam-end force Fi and the force velocity Fi', are extracted for the
critical node from the Rocketdyne RV analysis output. The force and the force velocity
at a node are taken as theaverage of the absolute values of the forces and force
velocities at the ends of line elements that are connected to that node. The force
velocity is used to calculate the expected frequency for each force component i as
follows:
(2-67)
This procedure of calculating a frequency for each force component is different from
an approach previously used where a single representative beam frequency was
employed for the fatigue calculation. In the present approach, the RMS value and the
expected frequency for each force component (P, Mz, T, etc.) are used to generate
their respective narrow-band force time-histories.
The procedure for the Rocketdyne FR analysis was similar to their RV analyses.
However, two passes of the FR analysis were performed. In the first pass, the
maximum displacements and the associated phase angles were calculated for all the
sinusoidal frequencies. In the second pass, these phase angles were assigned to
each sinusoidal load and the responses were calculated. For the critical node, the
beam-end force amplitudes for each sinusoidal exciting frequency are extracted. As
in the case for the RV analyses, the absolute values of the element force amplitude
are averaged across the node.
2.2.1.3 Duct Stress Analysis
As mentioned above, stresses at the location of interest in a duct are calculated
using the beam-end forces derived from the FE analyses, thermal gradient, and
internal and external pressures. The 1989 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code
(BPVC) [3] was the basis for the elbow stress equations used in the probabilistic HCF
duct analysis computer programs developed by JPL. The stress coefficients for
moment loading and pressure, given in Section NB-3685.1 of the BPVC, are used
here. These coefficients modify the standard straight-pipe longitudinal and circum-
ferential stress equations. The elbow effects on the radial and shear stresses are
neglected both in BPVC and in this publication.
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Figure 2-15 Geometry of an Elbow Duct
Figure 2-15 describes the geometry and the nomenclature for an elbow duct. The
plane of the bend contains axes x and y, and the location of the axes in the elbow
are consistent with those used in BPVC and in the STARDYNE program. The stresses
in the elbow are given as modifications due to the ovafity effect and the torus effect.
The longitudinal (axial) stress in an elbow is:
P __ MzR R 2(71 = KT1 KoF F 4- 71y i 7/z I R2o-R 2 4- (_TH
(2-68)
in which 71z, Yly are longitudinal stress coefficients for ovality effect, defined in Equa-
tions 2-74 and 2-76, due to in-plane and out-of-plane moments. The circumferential
(hoop) stress in an elbow is:
R2i(R2+R 2) ., R2(R2+R2)t IVlyR + "Ycz + aT,
o 2 = KT2 /3 i R2(R2_R 2) - HOR2(a2o_a2)) + 7cy I
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in which 7cz, Ycy are circumferential stress coefficients for ovality effect, defined in
Equations 2-75 and 2-77 due to in-plane and out-of-plane moments, andfl is the stress
coefficient, defined in Equation 2-79, for the torus effect. In the above equations, the
thermal stresses at the inside and outside wall are:
(_TH =
ATa E
Ro
2(1 - v) In -_
Ro
1 - (R 2 _ R2 ) In
(2-70)
A positive AT will result in tension in the outer wall and compression in the inner wall.
The radial stress is:
R2.tR2_R2"_ R2(R2-R 2)
_ I\ 0 J
a3 = -Pi R2(R2_R 2) + Po R2(R2o_R 2)
and the only non-zero shear stress component is in the yz plane and is
(2-71)
MxR 2 Vy cos _ 2 Vz sin _ (2-72)
a4- 2/ A ---A-
The notation for the above equations is as follows:
Pi, Po = internal and external pressure
R = radius where the stress is to be found
R i, R o = internal and external radii
P = axial force along axis x
My, M z = moment about axes y (out-of-plane) and z (in-plane)
Vy, Vz = shear forces along axes y and z
M x = torque about axis x
KT1, KT2, KOFF = stress concentration factors
AT = temperature difference across wall Tin-Tou t
E = Young's modulus
a = thermal coefficient of expansion
v = Poisson's ratio
¢ = angle between z-axis and critical location on the circumference
A = cross-sectional area
/ = cross-sectional moment of inertia
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For a straight pipe, the ovality effect coefficients become Ylz= sin q_, Y/y = cos _,
Ycz = Ycy = 0, and the torus effect coefficient/_ = 1, in which case Equations 2-68
through 2-72 would reduce to the standard multi-axial bending and pressure vessel
equations.
The factors KT1 and KT2 are stress concentrations along the axial and hoop direc-
tions of the duct, respectively. They are functions of the duct geometry, welding
process, and the reaming or polishing procedure used after welding. The factor
KoFFis an additional stress concentration due to weld offset. Assuming the joint to have
zero weld dimensions, it can be shown that (1 + 3 WoFF) is a good approximation for
the stress concentration due to a weld offset WoFF [4]. This stress increase is
conservative for weld thickness and length that is greater than the wall thickness. The
empirical relation used in this study to estimate the stress concentration factor is
KoFF= ';LoFF[1 + 3Fk WoFul (2-73)
in which _.oF_is the weld offset accuracy factor and Fk is a stress reduction factor [5]
which is based on the ratio R/t. A piecewise linear Fk vs. R/t curve was used to obtain
Fk for a given value of R/t.
In [6], Fk factors are presented for different R/t ratios based on FE stress analysis
of detailed models of weld regions. Many Fk vs. R/t curves have been generated
based on such analyses in the last few years, e.g., [5,6]. The Fk values from these
studies vary since they are sensitive to the weld bead size and shape. In the
application examples of this study, an Fk vs. R/t curve was used along with a _'oFFfactor
which accounted for the uncertainty in Fk. This Fk curve and the distribution for/1.OFF
are given in Section 3.A.2.3.
Ovality Effect
In a curved beam, the neutral axis for bending in the plane of the curve does not
pass through the centroid of the beam, due to fibers of different lengths in the inner
and outer sides of the bend. The normal stress due to bending moments and
longitudinal force, and shear stresses due to shear forces, are different from straight
pipe stresses. Also, due to components of the normal stresses in the radial direction,
radial stresses are present. For tubular cross sections, these radial stresses attempt
to make the circular sections in elbows become oval in shape. This ovafity effect
reduces the stiffness of the elbow and modifies the stresses. Also, internal and
external pressures affect the elbow flexibility and stresses. In this publication, the
ovafity effect refers not only to the consequence of tubular sections going oval, but
also it includes the curved beam effect which is present in non-tubular sections.
2 - 45
The 1957 paper by Rodabaugh and George [7] was an important contribution
towards understanding the ovality effect, and it gave expressions for accurately
calculating stresses in elbows subject to in-plane and out-of-plane bending and
internal pressure. Since then, various papers have been written extending
Rodabaugh's 1957 solutions to include effects due to elbow-to-straight-pipe transi-
tions, flanges, and flexibility of joints. Most notable among them is the series of papers
by Whatham, et al. [8,9]; an outcome of their work was an elbow analysis software
package called BENDPAC. As mentioned above, the expressions from BPVC were
used in this publication.
The ovality stress effect coefficients in Equations 2-68 and 2-69 Ylz, 71y, Ycz, and
7cy are given as follows:
71z = A,oval [ Sin (/) + Qo ( Clz Tiz' - SJn _ ) ] (2-74)
Ycz = '&oval Qo Ccz Ycz' (2-75)
(2-76)
Ycy = _'oval Oo Ccy 7cy' (2-77)
in which 2ova/is the accuracy factor on the ovality effect calculations; Qo is the ovality
stress decay factor; C/z, Ccz, C/y, and Ccy are the stress carryover factors; and
t t t t
7/z, 7/y, Ycz, and Ycy are as follows (from Table NB3685.1-2 in [3])
7/z' = }Ptmi +-" V_/nbi
7cz' = l_Ttmi 4- 7nbi
!
71y = 7tmo 4- Wnbo
!
7cy = VTtmo 4- _/nbo
in which
= sin _ + I(1.5X2 - 18.75) sin 3_ + 11.25 sin 5_] / X4Ytmi
7nbi = _(9X2 COS 2_ + 225 COS 4_) /X 4
Y,mo= COSe + [(1.5X2-- 18.75)COS_ + 11.25COS_] /X,
2 - 46
Ynbo= 2(9X2sin 2_ + 225 sin 4_) /X 4
X 1 =5+622+24_
X 2= 17+60022+480_
X3 = X 1 X2 - 6.25
X, = (_ -v _) (X_ - 4.5X 4
tm Re 2 >- 0.16
2 = Rm 2 l_/-_-__v,z,
Pj RB
- ERmt m
and
R e = radius of bend
R m = mean duct radius Ri + R°2
tm = mean wall thickness
The coefficients _, ', Y ', Y ', and _, ' used in this publication and given in the BPVC,iz ly cz cy..
are from Rodabaugh's paper [7], and they are the second-order approximations of
series solutions for stresses in an elbow. The approximations are valid for values of
2 > 0.16. The derivation assumes that the elbow is continuous with a constant radius
and that it has no end effects due to elbow-to-straight-pipe transitions or flanges.
Figure 2-15a shows a typical elbow and, as per the assumptions, the stresses
calculated from the BPVC are applicable at the midpoint M of the elbow. In this
publication, the stresses at the straight-pipe transition point T are estimated by
modifying the mid-elbow stresses via carryover factors Ciz, Ccz, C_/, and Coy. Often
the weld (i.e., critical location) is at the transition point T.
The carryover factors depend on relative stiffness between the straight pipe and
elbow, distance to straight-pipe transition point, existence of flanges, and rigidity of
the weld. They may be estimated using a program such as BENDPAC [8]. If joint
flexibility and relative stiffnesses are not known accurately, experiments will have to
be performed to determine the carryover factors. In this publication, to account for
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uncertainty in the carryover factors, they were specified as probability distributions.
The range of the distributions is assigned based on elbow stress analysis and
experiments in the literature [8,9,10].
If the weld J joining the segments is a distance WD from T, then stresses at the weld
are estimated via an ovality stress decay factor Qo, as suggested in [11]. This factor
decays the stress at T linearly to the straight-pipe stress value at a distance of two
diameters (4Rm) away from T. The decay factor for the ovality effect is given by
(2-78)
Torus Effect
The torus effect is the result of pressure in the elbow causing unbalanced shell
forces perpendicular to the plane of the bend. The circumferential (hoop) stress due
to internal or external pressure in an elbow, unlike in a straight pipe, is no longer a
constant value but is a function of the circumferential location and the bend radius.
The torus effect is given by
fl = 1 + QT [ ,8' - 1] (2-79)
in which QT is the torus stress decay factor and,8' is the stress effect for a continuous
torus with no end effect and is given as follows (Table NB-3685.1-1 of [3]):
(2RB + Rrn sin q))
,8' = 2 (R B + R m sin _)
The torus effect similar to the ovality effect, is assumed to decay linearly to the straight
pipe value of unity at a distance of half the diameter (Rm) from T. The decay factor is
given by
OT= 1 ----
WD (2-80)
R m
Stress Summation
The stress components due to static and dynamic load sources are combined to
derive the history for each stress component. That is,
NLOAD (2-81 )
°k(t) = A'ST _'STstr (TSTk 4- _ _'Di _'DYNstr (lDki(t)
i=1
in which
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;LST
A'STstr
%Tk
_DYNstr
%ki(t)
NLOAD
= accuracy factor on the static load source
= static stress analysis accuracy factor
= kth stress component due to static loads
= accuracy factor on the ith dynamic load source
= dynamic stress analysis accuracy factor
= time history for kth stress component due to ith dynamic load source
= total number of dynamic load sources
The static stresses aSTk are due to pressures Pi and Po, temperature difference AT,
and secondary static loads. The secondary static loads are from misalignment, gimbal
displacement, fluid momentum, acceleration loads and the non-vibrating component
of the aerodynamic loads and are specified as concentrated nodal forces
P, My, Mz, etc., for the stress calculation. The dynamic load sources are due to
random vibration, superimposed sinusoidal forces, and the vibrating component of
the aerodynamic load.
An efficient form of the calculation given by Equation 2-81 was implemented for
summing the stresses from dynamic loads. First, reference time histories are derived
for each dynamic load source. The reference histories due to a random load are
generated for a standard deviation of unity. The sinusoidal reference time histories
were generated having a maximum amplitude of unity. The reference histories are
generated in a separate computer program and are used as input for the probabilistic
HCF duct analysis programs. Then, the non-time varying stress amplitudes aOk i are
used to scale the reference histories. The aOk i are the stress components derived
due to the RMS values and maximum amplitudes of the beam-end forces obtained
from the RV and FR analyses, respectively. The implementation of Equation 2-81 may
be written as
NLOAO (2-82)
ak(t) = ';LST _STstr (TSTk 4- _ "_Di '_'DYNstr aDki ai(t)
i=1
in which ai(t ) is the reference time history for the ith dynamic load source.
As mentioned above, separate RV and FR analyses were performed by applying
the excitation along each global direction x, y and z. Thus, the total stress response
is the summation from responses in each direction. The dynamic stresses in Equation
2-82 for the three directions are given by
(TDk i ai(t) = aDkix aix(t) + aDkiy aiy(t) + aDkiz aiz(t) (2-83)
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The reference time histories for the different load sources in a given direction were
generated by assuming that they were fully correlated. However, across the three
directions x, y, z, the histories were assumed to be uncorrelated.
The loads-to-stress mapping for an elbow duct is shown schematically in Figure
2-16. The injection of uncertainty at the different stages of the calculation is shown.
The von Mises criterion is used to combine the individual stress components ok(t ) to
derive a single equivalent stress history. There are four non-zero components of stress
in this case. The equivalent stress
1
The equivalent stress is assigned the algebraic sign of the maximum principal
stress- in this case, it is of the axial stress component o 1(t).
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2.2.1.4 Damage Calculations
A common approach for HCF analysis involves the use of an endurance limit. This
is based on the notion that a material has a safe stress below which fatigue failure
never occurs (i.e., infinite life). It is now known that many materials do not exhibit a
clearly defined endurance limit. In such cases, design and life prediction methods
have shifted to the concept of finite fatigue life. Here failure is considered to be due
to damage accumulation from a finite number of cycles at different stress levels.
The finite life approach employing a stress time history is used here. A key step in
damage calculations is to identify the magnitudes and the number of the stress cycles
in the stress time history. A cycle counting method called the rainflow technique has
been implemented to calculate the number of cycles at different stress levels in the
stress history.
A procedure for computing the cycles vs. stress level information directly from the
PSD in the frequency domain has often been used for HCF analysis. However, this
procedure is valid only when stress is a narrow-band Gaussian process such that the
peaks may be represented by a Rayleigh distribution [12]. For a given SSME
component, the stress may not be a narrow-band process. It is usually a composite
process of a number of narrow-band and sinusoidal processes. Thus, a general
approach was adopted in the JPL methodology for generating each narrow-band and
sinusoidal process as a time history and correctly combining them in the time domain.
The number and amplitude of stress cycles needed for fatigue calculation is obtained
by performing a rainflow count on the combined stress time history.
Rainflow Cycle Counting
The objective of cycle counting is to reduce an irregular stress history to a
number-of-cycles versus stress-level table so that a stress/life (S/N) curve obtained
with uniformly repeated simple load cycles may be used for estimating the fatigue life
of the component. The rainflow method [13] used here is an accepted technique.
The rainflow algorithm initially resequences the data such that the largest cycle
occurs first. The portion of the stress history prior to the largest stress is shifted as a
block to the end of the stress history. Thus, the largest stress is at the beginning and
at the end of the stress history, while the cyclic shape of the history is unchanged.
Next, all the non-extrema points are filtered out since the cycles depend only on the
peak and trough points. Then the identification of the cycles begins. A schematic of
the rainflow algorithm is given in Figure 2-17.
A cycle is a closed loop on a cyclic stress-strain diagram. The algorithm is based
on the idea that a cycle has been closed if the stress difference between a peak-valley
pair is less than the stress difference of the neighboring pairs. Once a closed cycle is
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Figure 2-17 Procedure for Rainflow Counting
identified having a maximum stress of UPEAKand a minimum stress of UVALLEY,then the
alternating stress and mean stress are calculated as follows:
UPEA K -- UVALLE Y (2-85)
OALT = 2
OPEAK 4- OVALLEY (2-86)
UMEAN -'_ 2
Then the closed cycle is deleted and the process is repeated. A pictorial walk-through
example of rainflow counting is given in Appendix 2.A.
Mean Stress Effects
The mean stress can have a substantial influence on fatigue behavior. In general,
tensile mean stresses are detrimental and compressive mean stresses are beneficial.
In the components analyzed for HCF failure, the mean stresses are the result of static
loads due to pressure and temperature. Although the alternating stresses due to
dynamic loads alone were elastic, there were instances where the combined stresses
from static and dynamic loads resulted in plasticity at the critical location.
As described above, the equivalent stress time history is derived based on elastic
material behavior. Thus, when the elastic stresses exceed the linear portion of the
material stress-strain curve, the stresses had to be adjusted. Two approaches were
employed to approximate these stresses.
The first approach was used when the stress vs. strain diagram were elastic
perfectly plastic. The total stress UMEAN '{- UAL m cannot exceed the yield stress oy.
There are three cases to calculate the adjusted mean stress. They are:
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_G_sse1 if __T + OME_< ay
i
£,ase 2 if _,_T + _._ > Cryand o__T< _y (2-87)
case3 if _r__T > _ry
u,,'_ = 0
The mean calculation for case 2 is shown in Figure 2-18.
The second approach was based on the Neuber's rule [13]. Here, the stress vs.
strain curve may be a general shape-a piecewise linear definition of a curve was
employed here. Neuber's rule states that the product of stress and strain is the same
for elastic regions and small regions of plastic deformation. That is
(7 8 = C (2-88)
in which C is a constant. Equation 2-88 is a hyperbola, and its intersection of the
stress-strain curve defines the desired oN value. Figure 2-19 shows the application of
the Neuber's rule to estimate the mean stress.
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Figure 2-18 Mean Stress Calculation Assuming an Elastic Perfectly
Plastic Stress-Strain Curve
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Figure 2-19 Mean Stress Calculation Using Neuber's Rule
The new mean stress based on the adjusted stress u N is given by
OMEAN = _neu (TN -- aALT (2-89)
in which "_'neu iS the accuracy factor on Neuber's rule calculation. All cycles due to
dynamic loads lie in the elastic region around (TMEAN. It may be seen that this approach
would reduce to the first approach if the stress vs. strain diagram were elastic perfectly
plastic. The mean stress for the history is taken as the mean of the largest stress
cycle from the rainflow count.
The analysis is conducted using S/N curves which are based on a zero mean stress.
Thus, the stress cycles from rainflow are adjusted to equivalent zero-mean amplitudes
using the Goodman relation [13]. The equivalent stress amplitude given by the
Goodman relation is:
OEQ--
__
UALT
MEAN
(2-90)
in which UU,T is the ultimate strength for the material. Also, if the available S/N
information was for non-zero mean, the same Goodman relation is employed to
convert the data to zero-mean S/N curves. The fatigue life is calculated by accumulat-
ing the damage due to the stress cycles utilizing Miner's rule. The life in seconds is
L = "_'dam n 1
(2-91)
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in which Nj are the cycles to failure given by Equation 2-12 corresponding to a stress
level aj; Tis the length of the reference stress time histories in seconds; n is the number
of stress cycles after rainflow counting; and "_dam is the accuracy factor on damage
accumulation.
2.2.1.5 Component Analyses
A flowchart for the damage calculations of the HCF failure model is given in Figure
2-20. The failure model computation is embedded within the simulation loops of the
Monte Carlo (MC) procedure, as shown in Figure 2-1. For every MC simulation, the
driver values are perturbed by randomly drawing from their respective probability
distributions. The outcome of the simulation is a list of lives of the component. Since
the failure probabilities of interest are of the order 10 -3 , only the smallest one percent
of these failure times is saved and used to calculate the Bayesian Prior Distribution
parameters. A more detailed description of the MC procedure can be found in Section
2.1.1. Specific details of the software are given in Section 5.1.
Three SSME components were analyzed using the HCF failure model. Static and
dynamic analyses to determine beam-end forces (see Section 2.2.1.2) were con-
ducted by Rocketdyne on 3-D finite element models of the components. The bend
segments of the elbow ducts were modeled using STARDYNE elbow finite elements.
These elbow elements accounted for the ovality effect via a flexibility reduction factor.
STARDYNE had an option to calculate this factor internally, as specified by the BPVC
(NB-3686.2). As mentioned above, the BPVC expressions did not account for the end
effects. Thus, in some cases an estimate of the flexibility factor based on end effects
was used in the FE analysis.
The static analyses took account of the loads due to misalignment, gimbaling,
acceleration, and fluid momentum. Static beam-end forces were obtained at a node
closest to the critical location from these analyses. Similarly, the RV analyses provided
the RMS beam-end forces and the expected frequencies, and the FR analyses gave
the beam-end force amplitudes at the critical locations. The beam-end forces from
the static and dynamic analyses were used in the HCF analysis performed at JPL.
Before performing HCF analyses, preliminary analyses were made to identify the
worst circumferential location, to choose a suitable load history length and a random
number seed for the stochastic reference time histories, and to identify significant
beam-end force components.
In general, the worst circumferential location on a pipe does not necessarily lie on
the bending axes (such as the extrados, intrados, or crown for elbows), since
multi-axial moments and shear forces and, for the elbow ducts, ovality and torus
effects can cause the highest stresses to occur anywhere around the circumference
of the pipe. Thus, the worst location was identified by computing single fatigue life
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values (i.e., a deterministic run with nominal values) for different circumferential
positions on the duct. This involved repeating the analyses and varying angle _ in
Equations 2-68, 2-69 and 2-72. The critical circumferential angle corresponds to the
analysis with minimum life.
The stochastic reference histories are generated for a given length (in seconds) of
load history. The suitable length for a specific problem is determined by calculating
single fatigue lives, each time increasing history lengths, until the change in the lives
becomes negligible. The histories are generated using a random number stream as
described in Section 2.1.4. Since finite length histories are employed to keep com-
putational costs down, the occurrence of peaks in the histories will vary with different
random number streams. The random number stream is based on the random
number seed input for the analysis. The suitable random number seed is selected by
generating reference time-histories for 21 seeds and calculating a single fatigue life
for each history. The chosen seed is the one that gave the median life from among
the 21 lives calculated.
The next set of preliminary analyses involved identifying significant random beam-
end forces such as P, Mz, etc., and sinusoidal load frequencies. Reducing the number
of force components can decrease the effort involved in input/output and processing
of their respective force histories. First, the life was calculated when all the forces were
present. Then the analyses were repeated, starting with the force components which
were most likely to be significant, each time adding back the forces. The goal was to
get a good estimate of the life by using as few force components as possible. The
outcome of these force identification analyses for the three components is sum-
marized in Table 2-2. This initial step saved considerable computing time, with no
significant loss in accuracy of the result.
The applications of HCF probabilistic failure models to three SSME components
are presented in Section 3. They are the High Pressure Oxygen Turbo Pump (HPOTP)
main discharge duct, Low Pressure Fuel Turbo Pump (LPFTP) turbine drive duct, and
the HPOTP heat exchanger coil small tube outlet. The critical location on each duct
was identified as that having stresses sufficiently high to control HCF life for the
component. The input, rationale for driver specification, and the results of the
probabilistic failure assessment are given in Sections 3.1 and 3.2.
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Table 2-2 Summary of Load Sources, Critical Locations
and Significant Force Components
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2.2.2 Low Cycle Fatigue Failure Modeling
2.2.2.1 Introduction
A Low Cycle Fatigue (LCF) Failure Model calculates the crack initiation life of a
structure subjected to a small number of high amplitude load cycles. In the ATD-Tur-
bopump, these loads result from start-up, throttling, and shutdown. As shown in
Figure 2-21, the driver information used in LCF failure modeling, includes environmen-
tal parameters, loads, material properties, structural parameters, and model specifica-
tion uncertainties. The available information about the drivers, including their
uncertainties, is used to generate stress or strain histories. Individual cycles of the
stress or strain histories are identified and characterized by a value of equivalent stress
or strain range that accounts for the mean and extrema of each cycle. The materials
characterization model establishes a value of fatigue life for the equivalent stress or
strain range of each cycle. The fatigue life for a stress or strain history is computed
from the accumulated damage due to a sequence of individual cycles.
Figure 2-22 shows the life calculation procedure in more detail. The major elements
of the life calculation procedure are driver selection, driver transformation, rainflow
cycle counting for multiple cycle histories, the materials model, and the damage
accumulation algorithm which is used for multiple cycle histories. In the driver
transformation, stress or strain is defined as a function of the drivers.
The driver transformation can be performed in two ways. A rigorous structural
analysis can be incorporated within the Monte Carlo simulation, or the driver trans-
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Figure 2-21 Low Cycle Fatigue Failure Modeling Approach
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formation can be accomplished by a parametric representation of the rigorous
structural analysis, i,e., by a response surface. The latter approach was chosen
because response surface methods gave accurate answers and were computation-
ally efficient. A parametric representation of the structural analysis is obtained by
performing a sensitivity analysis using structural finite element models. The results of
the sensitivity analysis are then expressed as a functional relationship of stress or
strain with respect to the relevant drivers.
Factors to account for uncertainties, such as that of modeling accuracy, are inserted
as appropriate, at the steps of the life calculation procedure of Figure 2-22. When
multiple cycle histories are analyzed, rainflow cycle counting is used to identify
individual cycles. The fatigue life corresponding to each cycle is provided by the
materials model. The failure time for multiple cycles is obtained from the damage
accumulation calculation using Miner's rule. Details on rainflow cycle counting, the
materials characterization model, and the damage accumulation algorithm can be
found in Sections 2.2.1.4, 2.1.2, and 2.2.1.4, respectively.
The ATD-HPFTP Turbine Disk low cycle fatigue analysis is described below. The
engineering analysis and driver transformation are presented, followed by a discus-
sion of the implementation of the failure simulation model for the Disk.
2.2.2.2 ATD-HPFTP Second Stage Turbine Disk LCF Analysis
Component Description
The ATD-HPFTP Turbine Disk is a monolithic forging with two rows of turbine blades
attached to its outer circumference. Figure 2-23 shows an axial cross section of the
monolithic disk with both rows of blades. Figure 2-24 illustrates the face of a stylized
disk and its blade attachment areas. The actual ATD Disk has fifty blade attachment
areas. The turbine is driven by high temperature, high pressure steam (H20) and
gaseous hydrogen (H2). The Disk is surrounded by flowing hydrogen coolant to
control the temperature and thermal gradient at critical locations.
Low Cycle Fatigue Failure Modeling Approach
The LCF analysis for the ATD Disk is performed at the location identified as having
the largest local total strain range and as the controlling location for LCF crack initiation
life. This critical location is in the blade attachment area, and the fact that there are
fifty such locations is taken into account in the failure simulation. The position of the
critical location is indicated in the axial and radial cross sections in Figures 2-23 and
2-24, respectively. The critical location is on the downstream face and in the lower
lobe.
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Figure 2-23 Axial Cross Section of the ATD-HPFTP Turbine Show-
ing the Monolithic Disk
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Figure 2-24 Stylized Radial Cross Section of a Turbine Disk
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The strains in the disk at the critical locations are produced by mechanical and
thermal stresses. The mechanical stress is due to centrifugal effects caused by blade
pull and the mass of the disk itself. The thermal stress is primarily due to the radial
and axial thermal gradients in the attachment area.The results of sensitivity analyses
with the finite element structural and thermal models show that thermal stress is also
dependent on the temperature of the disk in the attachment area.
The location of highest local total strain range is that having the largest "equivalent"
elastic stress.The term "equivalent" is used because the actual materialyields locally,
so the peak stress is not within the elastic range. The LCF life analysiswas based on
a reference stress that, for a given notch stress concentration, determines the strain
at the critical location. This approach is illustrated in Figure 2-25 and will be referred
to as the reference stress method. In this approach, fatigue life materials data are
taken in the form of stress controlled tests of notched specimens in which the stress
concentration factor at the notch of the test specimen approximately matches that of
the component location being analyzed. The reference stress S R used to relate the
specimen fatigue data to the critical location of the disk is given by
(2-92)
where SE is the equivalent elastic stress at the critical location and K t is the local stress
concentration factor. SR corresponds to the average stress across the specimen cross
NOTCHED TEST SPECIMEN BLADE ATTACHMENT
S R = P/A
P
7 Kt
Figure 2-25 Reference Stress Method for ATD Disk LCF Life
2 - 63
section, as indicated in Figure 2-25. With fatigue data thus characterized, an elastic
stress analysis can be used to predict failure at a notched location of a component.
The test specimens of the ATD Disk material were subjected to stress controlled
cyclic loading with a stress ratio of R = 0.05. The fatigue tests were performed in
5000 psig hydrogen at room temperature. The stress field of the ATD Disk is elastic,
except for a small region of plasticity at the critical location. Consequently, a linear
elastic analysis can be used to determine the equivalent elastic stress. The reference
stress at the critical location is then given by Equation 2-92.
Driver Transformation
The equivalent elastic stress can be written as the sum of mechanical and thermal
components
S E = S M Jr S T (2-93)
where S M is the total mechanical stress due to both rotor mass and blade pull, and
ST is the total thermal stress due to both thermal gradient and metal temperature.
The variation in mechanical stresses due to rotor mass SMM and blade pull SMp iS
expressed as a function of rotor speed only. This allows the combined stresses SM
due to rotor mass and blade pull to be adjusted for rotor speed variation as follows:
SM(o )= MM( Oo)+ SMp( o) (2-94)
= Cs(oO ) SM o
where
(.O
O9o
SM(')
SMM ( * )
SMp(°)
Cs(')
SMo
= actual rotor speed;
= nominal rotor speed;
= total mechanical stress;
= nominal mechanical stress due to rotor mass;
= nominal mechanical stress due to blade pull;
= speed variability correction factor (co/COo)2 ;
= nominal mechanical stress, equal to the sum of the stresses due to rotor
mass SMM (OJo) and blade pull SMp (eJo).
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The thermal stresses due to metal temperature and thermal gradient were found
to be primarily dependent on the temperature of the hydrogen coolant supplied to the
disk. Thermal sensitivity analyseswere performed for three different temperature and
coolant flow combinations. A coolant flow model was used to establish boundary
conditions for a two-dimensional (2-D) thermal analysis to characterize the disk
internal temperature field. This thermal analysis provided the two important
parameters necessary to characterize the thermal stresses: the thermal gradient and
the metal temperature at the critical location. Both parameters can be expressed as
a function of the coolant fluid temperature. Uncertainty in both parameters is due to
uncertainty in the coolant fluid temperature. The functions relating these parameters
to coolant temperature are conveniently expressed in terms of deviation of the
parameters from their nominal values and a coefficient derived from the sensitivity
analysis. Hence, the deviation from nominal metal temperature AT m, can be ex-
pressed as a function of the deviation from nominal coolant fluid temperature ATf, that
is,
AT m = Cm t AT t (2-9s)
where Cmf is the sensitivity of metal temperature to deviation from nominal coolant
fluid temperature. Similarly, AG T, the deviation from the nominal thermal gradient is
also expressed as a function of the deviation from coolant fluid temperature ATf, as
follows
AG T = _C_1 ATf, ATf < 0[cG2ATe, >_0
(2-96)
where CG1 and CG2 characterize the sensitivity of thermal gradient to deviation from
nominal coolant fluid temperature.
The disk internal temperature field obtained from the thermal analysis was also used
to provide boundary conditions to a 2-D finite element stress analysis carried out to
obtain thermal stress sensitivities. The stress due to metal temperature S m may be
related to its nominal value Smo by the parameter '_m
'_'m = Sm / Smo"
And the difference S m - Smo is conveniently expressed in terms of AT m by
Sm - Smo = Crn ATrn
where C m is the sensitivity of S m to AT m as determined by the finite element structural
analysis. That is,
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Thus, the sensitivity of stress due to metal temperature variation is
_'m = 1 + C m AT m / Smo. (2-97)
Analogously, the sensitivity of stress due to thermal gradient variation is then ex-
pressed as
AG = 1 + CG AG T/SGo (2-98)
where C G is the variation in stress due to thermal gradient and SGo is the nominal
thermal stress due to the nominal thermal gradient. The thermal gradient at the critical
location is defined as the difference in metal temperatures between lobe center lines
as illustrated in Figure 2-26.
The effects of stresses due to metal temperature Smo and thermal gradient SGo on
the total thermal stress S T are given by
ST = '_'m Smo 4- _'G SGo (2-99)
Combining Equations 2-93, 2-94 and 2-99, the total equivalent elastic stress becomes
S E = C s SMo 4- _'m Smo 4- _G SGo" (2-100)
The values for the nominal stresses, SMo, Smo and SGo were obtained from a
NASTRAN finite element (FE) stress analysis. The blade attachment area shown in
Figure 2-26 was discretized using a finely meshed 2-D FE model. Stress was treated
only as a function of disk radius r and angular position 0. However, the location of
maximum SE is not the actual critical location, since stress also depends on axial position
within the disk. Thus, a second 2-D coarse mesh finite element stress analysis was
performed to characterize stress in the blade attachment area with respect to radius r
and axial location z, as shown in Figure 2-27. This second analysis was used to
determine the variation with respect to axial position of stress at the radial location of
maximum SE; that is, to determine Sd = f(z). A stress adjustment factor K d was defined
as the ratio of the maximum value of Sd(Z ) to the value Sdo which corresponds to the
axial location at which the analysis to determine S E was performed, thus
max S_z) (2-101)
Z
Sdo
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V T = (TO - T1)/(r o - r 1)
WHERE
TO = TEMPERATURE AT CRITICAL LOCATION
T1 = TEMPERATURE IN ADJACENT LOBE
ro = POSTION OF CRITICAL LOCATION
r1 = POSTION OF ADJACENT LOBE
Figure 2-26 Radial Cross Section of the Disk Blade Attachment
Area Illustrating the Thermal Gradient Between the
Lobes
AXIAL LOCATION
OF max Sd(Z)
1
CRITICAL LOCATION
RADIAL, r
; AXIAL, z
Figure 2-27 Axial Cross Section of the Disk Illustrating K d, the
Stress Factor to Adjust Axially for Two-Dimensional
Analyses
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The maximum value of S d was found to occur at the downstream face of the disk.
The equivalent elastic stress at the critical location is then S E K d. An uncertainty factor,
2K,, has been included in the LCF model to account for uncertainty of the K d value.
The stress concentration factor at the critical location was determined in a separate
effort using established engineering methods. According to Equation 2-92, the
reference stress at the critical location then becomes
S R
SE Kd (2-102)
Kt
An uncertainty factor, ,_K,, has been included in the LCF model to account for
uncertainty of the Kt value.
The driver transformation equation for the ATD Disk can now be obtained by
combining Equations 2-100 and 2-102, and applying the uncertainty factors for Kd and
K t. The result is the reference stress SR given by
SR = '_'Kd'_'K, ICs SMo 4- _'m Smo 4- "_GSGoI Kd / Kt (2-103)
Mission Stress History for the ATD Disk
A representative stress-time history for the ATD Disk is shown in Figure 2-28. The
start-up-shutdown cycle dominates the mission duty cycle because the minor throt-
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Figure 2-28 Illustration of the Stress-Time History for the ATD Disk
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tie-down cycle contributes negligible damage. Note that the stress reached during
steady state operation is the "peak" value of the start-up-shutdown cycle. No
significant minor cycles occur during the start-up-shutdown transients. Consequent-
ly,the history can be reduced to a single stress cycle characterized by SR. Since the
fatigue life is due to one cycle only, rainflow cycle counting and Miner's rule are not
required to calculate damage.
Modeling Multiple Critical Locations
The fact that only one blade attachment area is modeled by the engineering analysis
while there are fifty identical blade attachment areas around the circumference of the
disk must be considered. The procedure for modeling LCF failure in this case is
discussed in Section 2.1.6 and is used in the ATD Disk LCF Model.
ProbabilisUc Failure Model Implementation
The probabilistic failure model (PFM) for low cycle fatigue (LCF) failure of the ATD
Disk generates a distribution of failure times that results from the probabilistic
characterization of drivers. As shown in Figure 2-29, the PFM model for the ATD Disk
consists of the materials model, the LCF failure simulation, the structure for selection
of drivers, and the procedure for characterizing the simulated failures as a Bayesian
prior failure distribution for the purpose of allowing the impact of any available disk
success/failure data to be included in our characterization of the disk failure distribu-
tion. Since the current analysis is for a candidate disk, no test data is available to use
Bayesian updating.
In the PFM model shown in Figure 2-29, ATf is characterized by two Beta
distributions, while to, _-K, and 2K_ are each characterized by a single distribution. The
materials model provides a family of stochastic curves relating fatigue life to stress.
In the outer loop, to be executed N times, the Beta distribution for ATf is selected, and
the materials model parameters are established. Then, in the inner loop, to be carried
out n times, values of ATf, to, 2K, and ZK_ are drawn from their respective distributions.
Since the ATD Disk has fifty attachment areas, the appropriate realization of the
stochastic stress-life curve to use in computing component life for each inner loop
iteration will be that corresponding to the minimum of fifty selections of the materials
model parameter, _0. See Section 2.1.6 for further explanation. Since a Disk LCF life
is calculated for each inner loop iteration, a total of Nn simulated failure times will be
calculated. The disk results presented in Section 3 were obtained using N = 20,000.
Since the failure probabilities of interest are of the order 10 -3, only the smallest one
percent of these failure times is saved and used to calculate the Bayesian Prior
Distribution parameters a,/_, 0. The procedure for calculating a,/_, and 0 is discussed
in Section 2.1.1.
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• PROBABILISTIC CHARACTERIZATION
OF DRIVER UNCERTAINTIES
• NOMINAL STRESSES AND ENVIRONMENT
• PARAMETRIC SENSITIVITIES
• MATERIALS DATA
• NUMBER OF CRITICAL LOCATIONS
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Figure 2-29 Structure of the Probabilistic Failure Model for the
ATD-HPFTP Second Stage Turbine Disk
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The double-loop structure allows the user to improve computing efficiencyfor large
sample sizes. The simulation may be run in a single loop rather than a double loop
by specifying a value of 1 for n. It was found that, for the driver variation used in the
ATD Disk analysis with N = 200 and n = 100, the left-hand tail distribution of simulated
failures was essentially the same as for a single-loop simulation with N = 20,000 and
n = 1. The ATD Disk results presented in Section 3.3 were obtained using N = 20,000
and n = 1.
The driver transformation and the fatigue life calculation used in the ATD Disk LCF
failure simulation are shown in Figure 2-30. The driver transformation, shown in
Equation 2-103, is performed in several steps. The first step is to calculate C s, 2m, and
2G using the parametric relationships of Equations 2-94 through 2-98, and the values
of _ and ATf. Then C s, 2tm, 2tG, the nominal stresses and the model accuracy factors
_.K, and 2K, are combined using Equation 2-103. The result is the reference stress for
the single-cycle stress history. The predicted failure time Nf is then obtained using the
randomly selected S/N curve from the materials characterization model.
The probability distributions characterizing driver uncertainty in the ATD Disk PFM
are summarized in Table 2-3. ATf is characterized by two Beta distributions with the
capability for assigning Uniform distributions on the hyperparameters, p and 0. In the
ATD Disk simulation, p and 0 were fixed at specific values, so no hyperdistributions
were used. Turbopump speed is considered to be Normally distributed with fixed
mean and variance. The model accuracy factors, A.K,and JtKd, are represented by
Uniform distributions with fixed endpoints. The specific distributions for all drivers are
discussed in Section 3.3.
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Figure 2-30 Structure of the LCF Failure Simulation for the
ATD-HPTFP Second Stage Turbine Disk
Table 2-3 Driver Distributions for the ATD-HPFTP Second Stage
'_Kd
Turbine Disk
DRIVER DISTRIBUTION HYPERDISTRIBUTION
A Tf Two Betas Fixed
_o Normal N/A
_.Kt Uniform N/A
Uniform N/A
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Section 2.3
Analysis Procedures
2.3.1 Introduction
The procedure for conducting a probabilistic analysis of fatigue failure modes is
described here. The relevant statistical and engineering theory is given in Sections
2.1 and 2.2. Although the procedure is described for high and low cycle fatigue
failures, the approach is general, and the procedure for analyzing other failure modes
will be similar. Case studies were conducted for four SSME components to
demonstrate the application of the methodology. The results of the application
examples are given in Section 3.
The overall procedure is schematically described in Figure 2-31. The driver char-
acterization and preliminary deterministic analysis steps, described in Sections 2.3.2
and 2.3.3, are carried out in parallel. This information is then utilized in the driver
transformation step described in Section 2.3.4. For fatigue failure modes, the driver
transformation is the mapping of the applied loads to stress or strain at the critical
location.
The key step in the procedure is the formulation of the probabilistic failure model
and it is described in Section 2.3.5. This step incorporates the driver transformation,
stress or strain history, materials characterization and the damage accumulation
model in a stochastic simulation structure. The failure models are often unique for a
specific component geometry and failure mode, although the procedure for formulat-
ing the model and performing the failure assessment are the same. In this work, a
separate program was developed for each failure model instead of developing a single
general purpose program. Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 give a description of the programs,
their user's guides, and the listings. The materials characterization and time history
definition are described in Sections 2.3.6 and 2.3. 7.
Once the probabilistic model is in place a set of abbreviated probabilistic analyses
are often employed to identify and eliminate non-life controlling parameters (e.g.,
insignificant load components) as described in Section 2.3.8. This step is optional
although it can save significant computational time. The calculation of the probability
of failure vs. fatigue life curve is described in Section 2.3.9, and the driver sensitivity
analysis is described in Section 2.3.10. The inclusion of operating experience by
Bayesian updating is described in Section 2.3.11. Standardization of the probability
of failure curve to a desired assurance level is described in Section 2.3.12.
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DRIVER CHARACTERIZATION
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Figure 2-31 Overall Procedure for Fatigue Failure Modes
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2.3.2 Driver Characterization
Deterministic engineering failure models are used to compute a failure parameter
as a function of a set of inputs which are called "drivers." Those drivers which are
stochastic are responsible for the probabilistic character of the PFA methodology.
The need to represent a driver stochastically derives from two fundamental sources:
intrinsic variability and specification error. Some stochastic drivers have intrinsic
stochastic components, and drivers may have stochastic components because
specification error is being represented. Specification error can be further divided
into that due to engineering model accuracy and into that due to limited information
and incomplete knowledge about physical parameters.
Consider the example of a finite element model used to compute stresses given
input loads, material properties, and other drivers. Material properties and input loads
are possible sources of intrinsic variation. The finite element model itself is a source
of specification error in the computation of stresses since the model will not match
the hardware precisely. Loads are often sources of specification error. There are
cases where engineers know that a certain load varies very little from flight to flight or
part to part, but they may only know the load magnitude within a factor of four. If such
a load is computed from a phenomenological model, specification error in the load
model itself and limited information about its inputs account for the need to charac-
terize the load stochastically. Examples such as this have been encountered in case
studies conducted for SSME components presented in Section 3.
For many stochastic drivers it is not possible to distinguish between intrinsic
variation and variation due to specification error. In those cases, a stochastic driver
is characterized by the compounded effect of both sources of variation without
attempting to model each source separately. Examples of this are the characterization
of stress concentration factors presented in Sections 3.1.3 and 3.2.2. There may exist
heterogeneity due to manufacturing variability and that heterogeneity will also be
imperfectly translated into stress concentration factor variability.
In the PFA methodology, a stochastic driver is characterized by a probability
distribution over the range of values it can assume. That distribution expresses
uncertainty regarding specific driver values within the range of possible values. The
stochastic characterizations of drivers are inputs to the PFA simulation so that there
is no restriction on specifying explicit driver probability distributions or defining a
process which generates an implicit driver probability distribution.
There is no specific or required information for any driver. Drivers are characterized
using the information that exists at the time of analysis. If driver information is very
sparse, then the probabilistic characterization of such a driver must reflect that
sparseness. If extensive experimental measurements have been performed for a
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driver, its nominal value and characterization of its variability can be inferred directly
from empirical data. However, if little or no directly applicable empirical data is
available for a driver, engineering analysisand past experience with similar or related
systems must serve for that characterization.
Drivers are fundamental in the sense that they represent parameters of direct
experience for which information regarding their values can be empirically obtained.
All sources of driver uncertainty must be represented in order to appropriately
represent risk due to limited information. By inferring failure risk from an analysis
based on the specification of failure models, drivers, and operating experience, the
PFAmethodology permits the assessment of reliabilitywhen the relevant data base
does not existat the higher levelof direct knowledge about component reliability itself.
In the PFA methodology, driver characterization is carried out according to the
criterion of never overstating the available information.
Some general guidelines for characterizing stochastic drivers have emerged from
case studies conducted to date. Information is typically provided by engineers
experienced in the characterization of a particular driver. All sources of uncertainty
must be considered, and the information used must be traceable and documented.
Such information includes available driver data, related past experience, and en-
gineering analysis. For drivers which have physical bounds such as temperature,
controlled dimensions, and loads with physical upper limits, the Beta distribution
parameterizedwith location, shape and scale parameters hasbeen used. Ifonly scale
information is available, applying our characterization criterion results in the special
case of the Beta distribution called the Uniform distribution. For a driver such as
turbopump speed whose variation canbe thought of as dueto the combined influence
of a large number of small independent effects, the Normal distribution can be used.
Also, past experience incharacterizing a particulardriver such as a materialsproperty
may suggest the use of a particular distribution, Weibull, Normal, Lognormal, etc.
The sparseness of the information typically availablefor characterizing a stochastic
driver and the existence of significant specification error has often led to the use of a
hyperparametric structure, which is a natural format for extracting information from
experienced engineers. For example, to characterize stress concentration factor
uncertainty, engineering information was used to establish upper and lower bounds
on the value for the stress concentration factor. In order to capture the fact that the
most likely value of the stress concentration factor is not known with certainty, a Beta
distribution with a Uniform distribution on the location parameter was used. This
Uniform distribution is the hyperdistribution associated with the stress concentration
factor uncertainty, and its parameters arethe associated hyperparameters. Examples
of driver characterization are given in Sections 3.A.2.3 and 3.A.3.3
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2.3.3 Preliminary Deterministic Analysis
The component and the failure mode are selected for probabilistic failure assess-
ment based on the criteria outlined in Section 1. The criteria call for preliminary
deterministic analyses to identify the critical components that warrant a probabilistic
failure assessment. Also, in most cases a recent deterministic stress analysis or even
a deterministic fatigue analysis used for conventional design is available. Such
deterministic analyses form the basis for the probabilistic failure model.
Results from deterministic stress, thermal, and fluid flow analyses may be used for
driver characterization and the formulation of the driver transformation. Stress
analysis including static and dynamic finite element analysis may be used to identify
the high stress locations and the significant drivers that control life. Thermal and fluid
flow analyses may provide bounds on temperatures, temperature gradients, pres-
sures, etc.
Development of the probabilistic failure model may be tested by running the
embedded deterministic module as a stand-alone program. Deterministic modules of
the duct stress analysis software were used to identify the critical circumferential
location on the tube (angle (p in Equations 2-68 through 2-72) and to rank order the
force components based on their contribution to the von Mises stress and damage
indices as described in Section 2.3.8. Examples of deterministic analysis are given in
Sections 3.A.2.2 and 3.A.3.2.
2.3.4 Driver Transformation
The driver transformation is the mapping of the external loads to the stress or strain
at the location of interest. It can be in the form of a set of analytical equations (e.g.,
beam bending and pressure vessel Equations 2-68 through 2-72 for ducts), a finite
element stress analysis code, or empirical relationships which relate loads to stresses
(e.g., stresses from blade pull and temperature gradient in a disk given by Equations
2-93 through 2-103).
It is computationally inefficient and often unnecessary to include a complete finite
element stress analysis procedure within a driver transformation. Instead empirical
relationships or response surfaces may be established off-line, by performing a few
finite element stress analyses with input forces, temperatures, and other drivers
carefully chosen to ensure that the stress or strain responses are in the domain of
interest. The response surface will be a multi-variable function; the unknown coeffi-
cients may be determined by a statistical fit of the data points generated from the finite
element stress analyses. A driver may be specified to capture the level of approxima-
tion in the generated response surface.
2 - 77
The driver transformation may also include expressions for local stress concentra-
tion due to geometric discontinuities. For example, empirical expressions given by
Equation 2-73 were used to account for stress concentration due to weld offset in
ducts. Information from relevant experimental data may be used to generate the
response surface or merely to calibrate the analytical stress equations. The latter is
achieved for duct stress analyses via a strain gage factor d in Equation 2-56.
2.3.5 Probabilistic Failure Model Formulation
The formulation of the probabilistic failure model is a key step in the procedure for
conducting a probabilistic analysis of fatigue failure modes. This step incorporates
the driver characterization, driver transformation, materials characterization, time
history definition, and the damage accumulation model in a stochastic simulation
structure. Failure models are often formulated for a specific component geometry
and failure mode, although the procedures for formulating the models and performing
the failure risk assessment are the same. Computer programs were developed for
each of the three failure models presented in this publication.
The first step in formulating the probabilistic failure model is driver characterization
and it includes the identification of the appropriate random number generation
software modules. Modules for Uniform, Normal/Lognormal, Beta, Gamma and
Weibull distributions are described in Sections 4.4 and 7.6. Section 4.4 contains
references to literature which gives algorithms for generating random numbers from
other distributions.
The driver transformation step is described in Section 2.3.4. This step usually
requires some computer code development, since this is where the engineering
analysis for specific failure modes is used.
Materials characterization, Section 2.3.6, is performed using the software described
in Sections 4.1, 6.3 and 7.3. After the materials model parameters have been
established and the appropriate exogenous information has been incorporated, the
appropriate code modules for materials characterization are selected. Section 7.3.1.4
guides the analyst in this step.
Time history generation, Section 2.3. 7, is typically performed independently of the
fatigue model code by program NBSIN. Also the time histories can be obtained from
test data. The failure model code must be set up to read and save the history data.
Finally, a damage accumulation model, Section 2.2.1.4, is incorporated if needed.
Usually a module from an existing failure model program can be used with few
modifications. Section 7.1 contains the damage accumulation modules included in
this publication.
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2.3.6 Materials Characterization
Materials characterization is the process of using the information available to
provide a probabilistic representation of materials behavior. For the HCF and LCF
applications in this report, the materials characterization models described in Sections
2.1.2.1 and 2.1.2.2 have been used. Sections 4.1, 6.3, and 7.3 give a description of
the program, the user's guide, and the program listing. Using the stress/life formula-
tion of the materials model, materials characterization is accomplished by means of
fatigue data from tests on material specimens and by exogenous constraints on
materials model parameters. Using the strain/life formulation of the materials model,
materials characterization is accomplished by means of plastic and elastic strain
component data from fatigue testing to failure, total strain fatigue failure data, tensile
test data and, if warranted, by explicit constraints on plastic or elastic component
shape parameters.
In order to implement the stress/life formulation of materials characterization, it is
necessary to specify the number of life regions. That is accomplished by plotting the
stress/life data on log-log paper and making a visual assessment of the number of
life regions required to capture any nonlinearity in the plot. With the sparse data sets
typical for these applications, no more than two life regions covering the data are
feasible, and most often a single region will be adequate. If more than one life region
covers the data, it is necessary to assign data to a region. While most data naturally
corresponds to a particular life region, there may be a few data points near life region
boundaries where the choice of assignment should be made so as to err on the side
of conservatism by selecting the lower life region when a question of appropriate life
region exists.
The value of exogenous constraints on materials model parameters results from
the situation where there is a limited amount of usable test data. There are such cases
where the procedure used to assign uncertainty to materials model parameters can
allow materials curves in the simulation which violate known materials properties.
Those properties, expressed as exogenous constraints, can be imposed on the
model with the result that such improper materials curves will be precluded from the
simulation. Examples of materials characterization are given in Sections 3.A.2.4 and
3.A.3.4.
2.3.7 Time History Definition
The composite stresses in HCF analysis result from a superposition of stresses
induced by random vibration and periodic loads. The theoretical foundation for
creating a composite stress-time history from a knowledge of the structural properties
of individual processes is described in Section 2.1.4. A description of the program,
the user's guide, and the program listing are given in Sections 4.5, 6.6, and 7. 7.
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In order to implement the procedure in Section 2.1.4 it is necessary to select f, the
frequency used to determine the time increment; N, the number of generated values
per cycle of frequency f; T, the length of the generated stress-time history; and the
random number seed used to initiate the generation of the random processes
described by Equation 2-60. Ideally, T and f.N are sufficiently large that the statistical
properties of the stress-time history are captured by the generated values and the
results of life calculations are invariant to the choice of random number seed. In
practice, data storage and cost constraints require that the foregoing parameters be
selected so as to meet practical constraints without sacrificing essential accuracy in
life calculations.
The procedure which has been developed to accomplish this follows. N = 10 is
sufficiently large to maintain accuracy in life calculations if f is taken to be the highest
frequency associated with an individual process. If the highest frequency turns out
to be associated with a process which is not significant according to the procedure
described in Section 2.3.8, f should be taken to be the highest frequency associated
with a significant individual process. The number of points generated is then given
by N.f. T, so that storage constraints determine feasible values for T, given N and f.
Suppose T = 4 seconds is the maximum value of T compatible with storage con-
straints. A number of stress-time histories of length 4 seconds are then generated,
each based on a different initiating random number seed. It has been found to be
sufficient to consider 21 alternative random number seeds. Fixing all drivers at their
nominal values, the 21 corresponding values of life are calculated using the failure
model for T = 1, 2, 3 and 4 seconds. If those lives are rank-ordered for each value
of T, it is possible to select a random number seed which corresponds to a life near
the median life for each value of T considered. T is then selected to be the smallest
value considered for which the calculated life is close to those for higher values of T.
This choice of random number seed and T minimizes the need to choose a very large
value of T in order to wash out initializing effects. Although T and the random number
seed have been selected on the basis of nominal driver values, their choice is robust
to other decision rules, involving driver variation, which are much more costly to
implement. An example of time history definition is given in Sections 3.A.2.5.
2.3.8 Significant Parameter Identification
This step in the procedure is optional. In some cases the identification and
elimination of some insignificant input parameters may save considerable computa-
tional time. For example, in the HCF analysis of the ducts, the insignificant loads and
associated reference histories were eliminated. The loads are eliminated if their
contribution to damage is negligible. Calculation of the load histories and the von
Mises stress, due to random and sinusoidal load sources present in SSME ducts, are
given by Equations 2-82 and 2-84.
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CALCULATE VON MISES STRESS CONTRIBUTIONS
• PERFORM A DETERMINISTIC STRESS ANALYSIS WITH
SINGLE CYCLE HISTORIES FOR EACH LOAD, AND TABULATE
THE CONTRIBUTION TO THE VON MISES STRESS DUE TO
EACH RANDOM AND SINUSOIDAL LOAD
l
DAMAGE INDEX CALCULATION
• CALCULATE A DAMAGE INDEX fSm FOR EACH FORCE COM-
PONENT AND SINUSOIDAL LOAD
PRELIMINARY SELECTION OF SIGNIFICANT LOADS
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1
TABULATE THE SIGNIFICANT LOADS
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HOOP, ETC.)
• WITHIN EACH STRESS COMPONENT GROUP, TABULATE
THE LOADS IN DESCENDING ORDER OF THEIR DAMAGE
INDICES
1
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Figure 2-32 Procedure for Significant Load Identification
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The significant load identification procedure is schematically shown in Figure 2-32.
First, a deterministic stress analysis is performed with single cycle histories for the
loads, and von Mises stresses due to each random and sinusoidal load are calculated.
Next, a damage index fSm is calculated for each load. The symbol f is the frequency
of the load, S is the von Mises stress, and the value rn is the lower bound of the shape
parameter of the SIN model given in Equation 2-11. Then a preliminary selection of
the significant loads are made. The loads with the largest damage index and those
with indices that are not larger than 1% of the largest damage index are selected.
Checks are then done to ensure that none of the loads that were eliminated are in
fact significant. This is done by performing single life calculations with full length load
histories and calculating their impact on life while adding back the eliminated loads
one at a time. However, the choice of loads to be added back is based not only on
the next highest value of the damage index but also on their contribution to the
individual stress components (such as axial hoop, radial and shear). To perform the
check, loads are first listed in groups that contribute to a certain stress component.
For example, as seen from Equation 2-68 and 2-69, the moment Mz contributes to the
axial and hoop stress components 0"1 and 0"2but not to the radial and shear stress
components 0"3and 0"4. On the other hand the shear force Vz contributes to only the
shear stress component 0"4.The loads from the preliminary selection would be at the
top of the list in each group.
The final selection of the significant loads is conducted as follows. A single
simulation is performed with all the loads from the preliminary selection included.
Then, single simulations are performed by adding to the selection the loads from the
list in each group, one at a time. The life is compared to the previous simulation and
this procedure is continued until the change in life is not greater than 2%. This is
repeated for the lists in each group, retaining all the loads that have been selected so
far. When this has been done for all the stress component groups, the selected loads
are deemed the significant ones. An example of significant parameter identification is
given in Section 3.A.2.6.
2.3.9 Probability of Failure Curve Parameter Estimation
The model used to represent the probability of failure as a function of service life is
described in Section 2.1.1. Descriptions of the software, the user's guides, and the
program listings are given in Sections 4.2, 6.4, and 7.4. In principle, a,/_ and 0 can
be estimated simultaneously using Equation 2-8. However, since we are interested
in the region of high reliability (low failure probability), Equation 2-9 suggests that an
identifiability problem may occur since only two parameters are required to specify
the region of extremely high reliability. Therefore, we will attempt to bound one of the
parameters conservatively and estimate the other two parameters from Equation 2-8
under that bounding constraint.
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From Equation 2-9 it can be seen that the parameter/_ is the slope of the failure
probability-life curve in the log-log space for sufficiently small values of failure
probability and life. This simple physical interpretation of/_ lends itself to devising
procedures for bounding it. For example, if the simulated failure curve is significantly
nonlinear in log - log space in the failure probability range 10-3 to 10-2, then a subset
of that data extending from10 -3 to some value below 10 -2 can be used to estimate
a bounding value of/_. Another procedure, which is less conservative, is to generate
failures from a failure simulation which only considers variation in those drivers which
reflect the state of knowledge concerning component capability, e.g., dimensions and
materials properties. The latter procedure is only operational when the "all driver"
simulation and the "capability" simulation generate failures of interest from the same
life region of the S/N curve. Once a bounding value for/_ has been established, a and
0 can be estimated from Equation 2-10. Examples of probability of failure curve
parameter estimation are given in Sections 3.A.2. 7 and 3.A.3.6.
2.3.10 Driver Sensitivity Analysis
The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the drivers according to the impact of
their uncertainty on the failure probability curve. The failure simulation capability
provides a means to do this as desired by the analyst. We have used the following
procedure for reporting on the importance of driver uncertainty across component
failure modes.
A failure simulation is executed with all drivers except intrinsic materials variation
set at nominal values. Then a series of simulations are performed, allowing the
variation of one other driver at a time. Together with the failure simulation which was
executed with all drivers simultaneously varying, these simulations provide an infor-
mation set which allows for the quantification of the relative importance of individual
driver variation. The impact of variation in a driver is a function of failure probability
level, but the rank-order of drivers measured by that impact is independent of that
level. The selection of a failure probability level is largely a matter of convenience. The
impact of driver variation was measured at a failure probability level of 10 -2 to
accommodate the use of relatively small simulation sizes, of the order of 1000
replications, to accurately capture driver variation impacts.
For example, in Figure 3-9, variation in the driver "Damage Accumulation Accuracy"
has the greatest impact on life, with the drivers "S/N Model Parameters" and "Stress
Concentration Factor" having nearly the same impact. Jointly, those three drivers
account for 93% of the difference between "nominal" life and "all driver" life at 10 -2
failure probability level. Other examples of driver sensitivity analysis are given in
Sections 3.A.2.8 and 3.A.3.7.
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2.3.11 Bayesian Updating
In the region of interest, the probability of failure curve given by Equation 2-6 is
estimated by the procedures described in Section 2.3.9 above. In order to include
the impact of operating experience, we have used Bayes rule. Bayes rule changes
the probability of failure curve by updating the parameters a and 8 of the probability
distribution of the Bayesian parameter, A,, in a Weibull failure process. The Bayesian
model and consequent updating algorithms are given by Equations 2-1 and 2-2.
2.3.12 Probability of Failure Curve Standardization
It is desirable to standardize our results over component failure modes to a common
measure of precision. The Bayesian confidence interval can be used to accomplish
this. At any fixed value of life a one-sided Bayesian confidence interval on reliability
can be constructed based on the distribution of ;t given by Equation 2-2. A Bayesian
confidence interval is a fixed interval which covers a random parameter. We will refer
to the Bayesian confidence level as the assurance level to distinguish it from the term
confidence level associated with sampling theory confidence intervals. The latter
confidence intervals are random intervals which cover a fixed parameter. Both kinds
of confidence levels are measures of precision for appropriate applications. The
curve traced out by the Bayesian confidence interval endpoint as life varies will be
called an assurance curve. Our results are reported at a 95% assurance level. That
means that the probability is .95 that the reliability warranted by the information
available is greater than that corresponding to the 95% assurance curve. The curve
is constructed by using the known distribution of _ to find the value of ;to in Equation
2-5. Given A,o and the bounding value for/_, the assurance curve is defined by
Ro = exp (-40 N/_). Standardized curves can be computed both before and after
Bayesian updating, if desired. Examples of probability of failure curve standardization
are given in Sections 3.A.2.9 and 3.A.3.8.
2 - 84
Appendix 2.A
Pictorial Example of Rainflow Counting
Preprocessing
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Figure 2-33 Preprocessing
2 - 85
Cycle Identification
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Figure 2-34 Cycle Identification
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Figure 2-34 Cycle Identification (Cont'd)
A total of 5 cycles were identified
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Appendix 2.B
List of Symbols for Statistical Analysis
a
a
A
b
b
Be(.)
C
C, Co
f
f(.)
fo
rc
F(.)
Io
Jo
Kj, K*
Kp
HE
L
L(.)
m_
Beta distribution range parameter
Uniform distribution range parameter
statistical assurance that reliability is at least as large as stated
S/N curve location parameter
Beta distribution range parameter
Uniform distribution range parameter
Beta distribution function
coefficient of variation
coefficient of variation of fatigue strength
frequency
probability density function
modal frequency
sinusoidal frequency
cumulative probability distribution function
credibility range for coefficient of variation of fatigue strength
credibility range for an S/N curve shape parameter
S/N curve location parameter
plastic strain/lifecurve location parameter
elastic strain/life curve location parameter
life of an SSME component
likelihood function
Bayesian posterior mean of S/N curve shape parameter
?
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m o
m
m
mp
m E
M
MED(.)
n
n
N
N
N
N
Nc(.)
Ns(.)
Nj
Ni, i+1
N(.)
P(.)
R, Ro
R
8
s(.)
S
S
S/N curve shape parameter
Bayesian prior mean of S/N curve shape parameter
lower bound S/N curve shape parameter constraint
upper bound S/N curve shape parameter constraint
plastic strain/life curve shape parameter
elastic strain/life curve shape parameter
mission-to-mission variation damage distribution samples
median value
inner loop simulation trials
number of tests
degrees of freedom parameter
outer loop simulation trials
fatigue life
number of points per cycle
random variable generated by an autoregressive process of order one
random variable generated by an autoregressive process of order one
size of the jth materials fatigue test data set
S/N curve life boundaries
Normal distribution function
Bayesian prior distribution function
component reliability
number of life regions used to represent an S/N curve
number of failures
spectral density function
stress
total strain range
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2
Sx , Sy
Sxy
Sp
SE
S/N
t(.)
ti
r
U(.)
VAR(.)
w(.)
xi
x
Y
a_ a t
7
6
_1o
8, 81, 82
;t,_ o
;t
)]'K
A N
sample variance
sample covariance
plastic strain
elastic strain
stress/life
Student's t-distribution function
operating test duration
size of life distribution simulation
length of stress-time history
Uniform distribution function
Variance value
Weibull distribution function
fraction of life consumed in ith time period
In (stress)
In (life)
Gamma distribution parameter
Weibull distribution shape parameter
Euler's constant, .577 ....
Bayesian prior distribution shape parameter for S/N curve shape parameter
Weibull distribution scale parameter
Gamma distribution parameter
Beta distribution parameter
Weibull distribution parameter
load scale factors
materials process variation shift parameter
materials process variation relative variability parameter
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A(.)
_(.)
_' _1' "_2
P, Pl,P2
P
2
(7
2
(7
2
G
_N
2
z2(.)
o) c
Lognormal distribution function
Lognormal distribution parameter
Normal distribution parameter
Beta distribution mean value
average value of load scale factor indicated by strain gage data
damping coefficient
3.14159265...
distribution function assigned to S/N curve shape parameters
Beta distribution peak values
Beta distribution parameters
autocorrelation coefficient
Lognormal distribution parameter
Normal distribution parameter
known variance of In (fatigue life) within a life-region
standard deviation of narrow-band stresses
Bayesian posterior variance of S/N curve shape parameter
Chi-square distribution function
modal frequency
sinusoidal frequency
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Appendix 2.C
List of Symbols for Engineering Analysis
A
C
C
%
E
ti
{F}
I
K,j
K,
KT
M
NLOAD
P
P
Oo
Or
r
cross-sectional area of duct
sensitivity; Ce = sensitivity of stress due to thermal gradient; CG1,Ce2 = sensitivities
of thermal gradient due to coolant fluid temperature; Cm = sensitivity of stress due to
metal temperature; Cmf = sensitivity of metal temperature due to coolant fluid tempera-
ture
stress carryover factor; C/z = in-plane axial stress carryover factor; Cly = out-of-plane
axial stress carryover factor; Ccz = in-plane circumferential stress carryover factor; Ccy
= out-of-plane circumferential stress carryover factor
disk speed variability correction factor
Young's modulus
frequency of the ith force component
beam end force vector with elements Fi
cross-sectional moment of inertia of duct
2-D finite element analyses stress adjustment factor
local stress concentration factor
stress concentration factor; KT1 = stress concentration along axial direction; KT2 =
stress concentration along hoop direction; KOF F = stress concentration due to weld
offset
high cycle fatigue life in seconds
moment; Mx = moment about x axis; My = moment about y axis; Mz = moment about
z axis
total number of dynamic load sources
pressure; Pi = internal pressure; Po = external pressure
axial force along x axis
ovality stress decay factor
torus stress decay factor
radial position
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RR
S
T
t
V
WOFF
Z
a
7
AG T
ATm
AT
c
radius; RB = elbow bend radius; Ri = internal duct radius; Ro = external duct radius;
Rm = mean duct radius
stress ratio = O'min / O'max
stress; Sd(Z) = stress as a function of axial location z from the 2-D coarse mesh finite
element stress analysis; Sdo = Sd at axial location of interest; SE = equivalent elastic
stress; So = stress due to thermal gradient; SGo = nominal stress due to thermal
gradient; Sm = stress due to metal temperature; Smo = nominal stress due to metal
temperature; SM = total mechanical stress; SMo = nominal total mechanical stress;
SMM = mechanical stress due to rotor mass; SMp = mechanical stress due to blade
pull; SR = reference stress; ST = total thermal stress
length of reference time history in seconds
metal temperature; Tmo = nominal metal temperature
wall thickness of duct; tW 1 = thickness at outside of bend; tw2 = thickness at inside of
bend; tm= mean wall thickness
shear force; Vy = shear force along y axis; Vz = shear force along z axis
distance of weld from elbow tangent point
percentage weld offset for duct
axial position on disk
thermal coefficient of expansion
torus effect stress index
stress indices for the ovality effect; 71z= longitudinal stress index due to in-plane mo-
ment; 7/y = longitudinal stress index due to out-of-plane moment; 7cz = circumferential
stress index due to in-plane moment; 7cy = circumferential stress index due to out-of-
plane moment
deviation from nominal thermal gradient
deviation from nominal coolant fluid temperature
deviation from nominal metal temperature
temperature difference across duct wall
strain
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Jt
1/
or
60
accuracy or uncertainty factor; _OFF --= weld offset accuracy factor for duct; _ST = ac-
curacy factor on the static load source; _'oi = accuracy factor on the ith dynamic load
source: _K_ = stress adjustment factor Kd uncertainty; 2Kt = stress concentration fac-
tor Kt uncertainty; _DYNstr = dynamic stress analysis accuracy; ;_STstr= static stress
analysis accuracy; "_oval = ovality effect calculation accuracy; _neu = Neuber's rule ac-
curacy factor; _'dam = damage accumulation accuracy factor
sensitivity; _G = sensitivity of stress due to thermal gradient variation; '_m = sensitivity
of stress due to metal temperature variation
Poisson's ratio
angle between z axis and critical location on the circumference of the tube
stress; or1 = axial stress; or2= hoop stress; % = radial stress; or4= shear stress;
OrALT = alternating stress amplitude; orDki(t) = time history for kth stress component
due to ith dynamic load source; orOki= non-time varying stress amplitude; orEQ =
equivalent zero-mean alternating stress amplitude; ori(t) = reference time history for ith
load source; ork= kth stress component; orMEAN= mean stress; or_fEAN = adjusted
mean stress; orN = adjusted total stress from using Neuber's rule; orSTk= kth stress
component due to static loads; orTH -----thermal stress; orULT = ultimate strength; ory =
yield stress
bend angle
rotor speed; _oo = nominal rotor speed
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Application Examples
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Section 3.1
Elbow Duct HCF Analysis
3.1.1 HPOTP Main Discharge Duct Description
The HPOTP main discharge duct supplies liquid oxygen from the high pressure
oxidizer turbo-pump (HPOTP) to the main oxidizer valve and main injector oxidizer
supply. Figure 3-1 shows how the duct fits into the assembled engine. Deterministic
structural analyses of the main discharge duct, performed by Rocketdyne, showed
that the stresses at weld 6 are sufficiently high to control the HCF life for the
component. The weld is 0.112 inches from the tangency line of the elbow. The bend
radius for the elbow is 6.00 inches. The minimum wall thickness is 0.1115 inches, and
the wall thickness at the bend is 0.1378 inches. The duct inside diameter is 4.00 inches.
Figure 3-2 shows this component in detail.
The HPOTP discharge duct is made of Inconel 718. The welded Inconel 718 [1]
fatigue test data used in the JPL analysis is given in Figure 3-3. Twenty fatigue failure
tests at - 320°F with straight and hourglass specimens were used.
Figure 3-1 Location of the HPOTP Main Discharge Duct
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Figure 3-2 Detail of HPOTP Main Discharge Duct Near Weld 6
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Figure 3-3 Inconel 718 Weld Data [1]
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3.1.2 LPFTP Turbine Drive Duct Description
The LPFTP turbine drive duct carries gaseous hydrogen from the main combustion
chamber coolant jacket to the turbine inlet of the low pressure fuel turbopump
(LPFTP). Figure 3-4 shows how the duct fits into the assembled engine. The life-
controlling location for the drive duct was identified as weld 32 by Rocketclyne's
deterministic analyses. The weld is 0.700 inches from the tangency line of the elbow.
The bend radius for the elbow is 6.00 inches. The minimum wall thickness is 0.1180
inches, and wall thickness at the bend is 0.1660 inches. The duct inside diameter is
2.00 inches. Figure 3-5 shows this component in detail.
The LPFTP drive duct is made of Incoloy 903. The welded Incoloy 903 [2] fatigue
test data used in the JPL analysis is given in Figure 3-6. Twenty fatigue failure tests at
75°F, with ten smooth specimens and ten rough specimens, were used [2]. Two life
regions divided at 106 cycles were used in the materials characterization model
described in Section 2.1.2.1.
Figure 3-4 Location of the LPFTP Turbine Drive Duct
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3.1.3 Driver Description for Elbow Ducts
Fifteen drivers, in addition to the materials model, were used in the probabilistic
HCF model for elbow ducts. The same drivers were used for the HPOTP main
discharge duct and the LPFTP turbine drive duct. However, the parameters for the
driver probability distributions, including the range of the driver values, differ in some
cases. In particular, the loads are different for the two ducts and they are given in
Tables 3-3 and 3-4. Tables 3-1 and 3-2 give the drivers, their distributions, and
parameters for the discharge duct and the drive duct, respectively.
Stress concentration factors due to weld surface finish and geometry effects were
treated separately. The distribution for the weld stress concentration factor KT_I_,
which accounts for surface finish effects, was based on a consideration of the
condition of the welded surface. The range of KT,_I_ was established from analyses
of bounding expectations of the weld condition. The location analyzed on the HPOTP
main discharge duct had an unflushed weld; hence, the range of the stress concentra-
tion factor KT_,,_ was assessed to be 1.2 to 3.5. The weld analyzed on the LPFTP
turbine drive duct was flushed; hence, the range of KT_,__ was assessed to be 1.05 to
1.45. The Beta distribution was used to characterize KT_,_, and the Beta distribution
parameter p was considered to be Uniformly distributed. The geometry stress
concentration factor KT_o," accounts for the radius transition in the vicinity of the critical
location. The range of KT_o," used in the failure simulation was 1.20 to 1.35 for both
the discharge duct and the drive duct.
As discussed in Sections 2.1.3.2 and 2.2.1.2, the design reference loads are
obtained from PSD enveloping procedures. The random and sinusoidal dynamic load
adjustment factors ;LD_ooM, ;LBs_Nuso,_were represented by Normally distributed ran-
dom variables, where ;Los are the ratios of load to design reference load. The
parameters of the distribution are the meanff = 1/(1 + kC) and the standard deviation
= C/(1 + kC) where C is the coefficient of variation. The value of k was derived by
considering the raw PSD population used in the enveloping procedure and by
accounting for sample size effects using the concept of an expected coverage
tolerance limit. That is, k is the value required to shift the load factor density functions
so that the probability of being below the reference value is the same as the coverage.
A value of k = 2 was used here, and Figure 2-8 shows the probability density function
for alternative values of k. The strain gage adjustment factor d was based on
comparisons of the strain gage measurements from hot fire tests with the dynamic
stresses from Rocketdyne's finite element (FE) analysis. The measured stresses for
the discharge duct and the drive duct near welds 6 and 32, respectively, were a factor
of 0.67 of the values of the predicted dynamic stresses. In order for d/(1 + kC) to be
0.67 given the values for k and C, the d was set to 0.87 for random loads and 0.93
for sinusoidal loads. The static loads due to gimbaling, misalignment, and quasi-static
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Table 3-1 Driver Distributionsfor the HPOTP Main Discharge
Duct
DRIVER DISTRIBUTION RANGE
Weld Offset WOFF Fixed 13%, 20%, 50%
IBeta _, 0) ]
_kp~ Uniform (.087,.35)j 1.2 to 3.5Weld Stress Concentration Factor KTweld L0 = 10
Beta (p, 0)
Geometry Stress Concentration Factor KTgeo m , p ~ Uniform (.3,.7) , 1.2 to 1.34
0 ~ Uniform (.5,10)
rN°rmal ]Random Load Adjustment Factor_DRANDO M ,k = 2.0, C = 0.15[d = 0.87
[Normal ]Sinusoidal Load Adjustment Factor _k = 2.0, C = 0.20
'_DS/NUSO/DAL [d = 0.93
Static Load Adjustment Factor '_ST Uniform ( .9, 1.1 ) .9 to 1.1
Dynamic Stress Analysis Accuracy Factor
'_DYNstr Uniform ( .8, 1.2 ) .8 to 1.2
Static Stress Analysis Accuracy Factor _'STstr Uniform ( .9, 1.1 ) .9 to 1.1
In-plane Axial Stress Carryover Factor C/z Uniform ( 0.4, 0.6 ) .4 to .6
Out-of-plane Axial Stress Carryover Factor C/y Uniform ( 0.4, 0.6 ) .4 to .6
In-plane Circumferential Stress Carryover
Factor Ccz Uniform ( 0.4, 0.6 ) .4 to .6
Out-of-plane Circumferential Stress Carryover
Factor Ccy Uniform ( 0.4, 0.6 ) .4 to .6
Ovality Analysis Accuracy Factor _ova/ Uniform ( .85, 1.15 ) .85 to 1.15
Weld OffsetStress ConcentrationAccuracy Uniform ( .8, 1.2 ) .8 to 1.2Factor 2tOF
Damage Accumulation Accuracy Factor Adam Uniform ( In 1/4,In 2.59 ) In 1/4to In 2.59
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Table 3-2 Driver Distributions for the LPFTP Turbine Drive Duct
DRIVER
Weld Offset WOF F
Weld Stress Concentration Factor KTweld
Geometry Stress Concentration Factor KTgeo m
Random Load Adjustment Factor,_.DRANDOM
Sinusoidal Load Adjustment
Factor _DSINUSOIDAL
Static Load Adjustment Factor _ST
Dynamic Stress Analysis Accuracy Factor
_'DYNstr
Static Stress Analysis Accuracy Factor,_STstr
In-plane Axial Stress Carryover Factor Clz
Out-of-plane Axial Stress Carryover Factor Cly
In-plane Circumferential Stress Carryover
Factor Ccz
Out-of-plane Circumferential Stress Carryover
Factor Ccy
Ovality Analysis Accuracy Factor _oval
Weld Offset Stress Concentration Accuracy
Factor "_OFF
Damage Accumulation Accuracy Factor,_dam
DISTRIBUTION RANGE
Fixed 22%, 40%
[Beta (,o, 0)
[p =.5,0= 10
Beta (p, 0)
p _ Uniform (.3,.7)
0 ~ Uniform (.5,10)
Normal ]
ik = 2.0, C = 0.15
ld = 0.87
Normal
k = 2.0, C = 0.20
d = O.93
1.05 to 1.45
1.21 to 1.35
Uniform (.9, 1.1 ) .9 to 1.1
Uniform ( .8, 1.2 ) .8 to 1.2
Uniform (.9, 1.1 ) .9 to 1.1
Uniform ( 0.4, 0.6 ) .4 to .6
Uniform ( 0.4, 0.6 ) .4 to .6
Uniform ( 0.4, 0.6 ) .4 to .6
Uniform ( 0.4, 0.6 )
Uniform ( .85, 1.15 )
Uniform (.8, 1.2 )
Uniform ( In 1/4, In 2.59 )
.4 to .6
.85 to 1.15
.8 to 1.2
In 1/4 to In 2.59
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fluid loads were estimated to be within 10% of their true value; hence "_ST was assigned
a Uniform distribution with a range of 0.9 to 1.1.
The stress analysis accuracy factors _ST,_ and "_DYN_ account for uncertainty in the
static and dynamic FE analyses, respectively. A review of FE literature and discussions
with stress analysts who have compared analysis and tests indicate that a correct
static FE stress analysis would calculate stresses to within 10% of the true value. Thus,
the _ST_, was represented as a Uniform distribution between 0.9 and 1.1. The
uncertainty in the dynamic FE stress analyses were estimated to be higher and to be
within 20% of the true dynamic stresses.
The straight-pipe stress equations were modified using stress indices which
account for the ovality and torus effects in the elbow, as described in Section 2.2.1.3.
The accuracy of the ovality effect calculation is taken into account by _oval" The
carryover factors Ciz, C/y, Ccz and Ccy were used to estimate the stresses at the
straight-pipe elbow transition point. The carryover factors depend on relative stiffness
between the straight pipe and the elbow, existence of flanges, rigidity of the welds,
etc. The range of 0.4 to 0.6 for the carryover factors was estimated from detailed
elbow stress analysis and experiments reported in the literature [3, 4].
The weld offset was treated parametrically, i.e., the analyses were run with the
discharge duct weld offset fixed at 13%, 20%, and 50% and the drive duct weld offset
fixed at 22% and 40%. For the discharge duct, the weld offset of 13% is estimated to
be typical, 20% is the design specification, and 50% is the worst case from the
Rocketdyne structural audit [5]. For the drive duct, a 22% weld offset was the average
and 40% was the worst case from a study of five ducts in the structural audit. As
described in Section 2.2.1.3, an empirical relationship derived from FE stress analysis
of the weld region was employed to model the stress concentration due to the weld
offset. The ,tOEF accounts for the uncertainty in the empirical relationship used for
calculating the stress increase due to the offset.
The damage accumulation accuracy factor '_dam accounts for uncertainties in the
linear Miner's rule, transformation of a variable amplitude stress history to constant
amplitude stress cycles using rainflow counting, and the transformation of cycles at
different stress ratios to equivalent cycles at a common stress ratio via the Goodman
relation. Evidence in literature indicates factors of up to four between the calculated
HCF life and tests. Since the life prediction is made in log life space, the distribution
on '_dam was cast in log space. The distribution was Uniform, and the lower bound
was set at In(1/4). In order for its mean value to be 1.0, the upper bound was set at
In(2.59).
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C) Finite Element Number
• Node Number
Figure 3-7 Finite Element Discretization of HPOTP Main Dis-
charge Duct Forces Extracted from Node 24
3.1.4 HPOTP Main Discharge Duct Analysis
The program DCTHCF was used to perform the HCF analysis of the HPOTP main
discharge duct. The overall description of the program is given in Section 5.1. The
user's manual for DCTHCF, including the description of the input variables is given in
Section 6.1. A source listing of DCTHCF is given in Section 7.1.1. The steps of the
PFA analysis are given in Section 2.3.
As described in Section 2.2.1.2, the beam-end forces close to weld 6 were extracted
from FE analyses conducted by Rocketdyne on a beam model of the discharge duct.
The node and element numbers for the beam model are shown in Figure 3-7. The
beam-end forces at node 24 are given in Table 3-3. The static forces were due to
loads from misalignment, gimbaling, acceleration and fluid flow, and were provided
by Rocketdyne as the maximum values on the duct circumference.
The R5 vibration environment given in [6] was employed in the random vibration
(RV) and frequency response (FR) STARDYNE analyses performed by Rocketdyne.
The HPOTP main discharge duct was primarily excited by R5 zone G vibration loads.
Analyses were performed for excitations applied along the Y and Z directions. The
RMS beam-end forces and the corresponding force velocities were extracted at node
24 from the RV analysis output. The root mean square (RMS) force magnitudes given
in Table 3-3b are the averages of the two RMS values from element numbers 23 and
24 on both sides of node 24. The expected frequency for each force component is
calculated using Equation 2-67. The beam-end force amplitudes were extracted for
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Table 3-3 HPOTP Main Discharge Duct Beam-End Forces Near
Weld 6
(a) BEAM-END FORCES FROM STATIC LOADS
P (Ib) Vy (Ib) Vz (Ib)
8120
Mx (in.-Ib) My (in.-Ib) Mz (ino-lb)
20900 42010 42010 38O5 3805
(b) BEAM-END FORCES FROM RANDOM VIBRATION ANALYSES
P Mx My Mz Vy Vz
Y-DIR
RMS VALUE
FREQUENCY (Hz)
Z-DIR
RMS VALUE
FREQUENCY (Hz)
237.7
1306
190.5
1262
103.4
323
98.43
378
181.2
420
179.1
636
626.2
498
588.4
563
147.5
1116
142.7
1197
34.08
462
39.72
707
(c) BEAM-END FORCES FROM FREQUENCY RESPONSE ANALYSES
FREQUENCY (Hz) P Mx My Mz Vy Vz
500
600
1000
1200
1500
2000
42.03
20.60
25.71
15.87
63.31
117.6
18.83
15.32
28.35
2.584
1.881
37.81
445.6
1.598
23.27
10.16
4.905
47.42
109.3
47.50
218.1
7.041
57.73
134.9
45.08
65.93
45.83
7.996
30.37
176.1
39.34
3.752
34.09
1.515
79.57
21.75
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node 24 from the FR analyses output. The forces given in Table 3-3c are the sum of
the amplitudes from Y and Z direction FR analyses. The force magnitudes are the
averages of the absolute values of the forces on both sides of node 24.
The DCTHCF input for the HCF analysis of the discharge duct performed by JPL
is given in Appendix 3.B. 1. The input included narrow-band and sinusoidal reference
time histories that were generated using the program NBSlN described in Section
4.5. Preliminary analyses described in Section 2.2.1.5 were used to identify the critical
circumferential position and the significant forces. The critical location was at a
circumferential angle of 20° on the outside wall. The significant force components
were P, My, M z, and Vy, and the significant sinusoidal frequencies were 500Hz,
1000Hz, 1500Hz, and 2000Hz.
3.1.5 Results for HPOTP Main Discharge Duct
The results of failure simulations for the discharge duct are given in Figure 3-8. The
graphs present the left-hand tails of the failure distributions for different simulations.
The ordinate of these graphs is the failure probability. The abscissa of the graphs is
the life of the component for HCF failure of the discharge duct. The life is given in
seconds where approximately 500 seconds of exposure to this failure mode occurs
during an SSME mission.
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Figure 3-8 shows the impact of 13%, 20%, and 50% weld offset on failure probability.
The three curves are for a 95% assurance level. The meaning of a 95% assurance
curve is that the failure probability at a given failure life will lie with 95% probability
below that curve. For the maximum allowable weld offset of 50%, the B. 1 life 1 at 95%
assurance is about 30 missions. However, at a typical weld offset of 13%, the B. 1 life
is about 140 missions and the extrapolated B.01 life is about 40 missions.
Figure 3-9 provides the output of failure simulations for a 50% weld offset. These
curves represent the direct output of the Monte Carlo simulation and are not given at
a specified assurance. The right-most curve labeled "nominal" is for a simulation
which included intrinsic materials variation only (see Section 2.1.2.1); all the other
drivers were fixed at their nominal design values. The left-most curve in Figure 3-9 is
the "all driver variation" curve. The input and output files from the "all driver" analysis
are given in Appendix 3.B. 1. A measure of the relative importance of individual drivers
is given in the upper left corner in Figure 3-9. These were obtained by finding the
marginal effects of driver uncertainties on B1 lives using several sensitivity runs, where
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1 A B-life is the value of accumulated operating time to failure at a failure probability specified
as a percent; e.g., B.1 is the failure time at a probability of 0.001 or 0.1%.
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one driver was allowed to vary while the rest were held at their nominal values. The
S/N model parameters, stress concentration factor, and damage accumulation ac-
curacy variation were the most significant drivers in this analysis, with a 93%
contribution to the decrease in life. The middle curve in Figure 3-9 shows the shift to
the left due to variation only in the S/N model parameters, stress concentration factor,
and damage accumulation accuracy.
Figure 3-10 may be used to demonstrate a risk-equivalent life-limiting procedure.
The curves in Figure 3-10 are the same as those in Figure 3-8, with the left-most curve
at the 50% weld offset labeled MRB to represent a component with a weld offset that
requires a material review board (MRB) action to establish a safe service life. This
component may be life limited as a function of the weld offset. For example, in order
to maintain reliability with 95% assurance the same for 200 missions at 13% weld
offset, the MRB component must be limited to a service life of 45 missions.
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Figure 3-11 Finite Element Discretization of LPFTP Turbine Drive
Duct Forces Extracted from Node 61
3.1.6 LPFTP Turbine Drive Duct Analysis
The program DCTHCF was also employed for analysis of the LPFTP turbine drive
duct. The node and element numbers for the turbine drive duct beam FE model are
shown in Figure 3-11. The beam-end forces at node 61 are given in Table 3-4.
The R5 vibration environment given in [6] was employed in the RV and FR
STARDYNE analyses performed by Rocketdyne. The LPFTP turbine drive duct was
primarily excited by the R5 zones A and H vibration loads. Analyses were performed
for excitations applied along the X, Y, and Z directions. The RMS beam-end forces
and the corresponding force velocities were extracted at nodes 61 and 62 from the
RV analysis output. The P, M x, Vy and Vz RMS force magnitudes given in Table 3-4b
are the averages of the RMS values from element numbers 6 and 7 on both sides of
node 61. However, the My and M z RMS force magnitudes are the averages of the
values from element numbers 7 and 8 on both sides of node 62. Similarly, the
beam-end force amplitudes were extracted for nodes 61 and 62 from the FR analyses
3-16
Table 3-4
Weld 32
LPFTP Turbine Drive Duct Beam-End Forces Near
(a) BEAM-END FORCES FROM STATIC LOADS
P (Ib) Mx (in.-Ib) My (in.-Ib) Mz (in.-Ib)
6820 16775 167752138
Vy (Ib) Vz (Ib)
1080 1080
(b) BEAM-END FORCES FROM RANDOMVIBRATION ANALYSES
P Mx My Mz Vy Vz
X-DIR
RMS VALUE
FREQUENCY (Hz)
Y-DIR
RMS VALUE
FREQUENCY (Hz)
Z-DIR
RMS VALUE
FREQUENCY (Hz)
42.74
510
28.07
910
16.24
463
145.4
49
169.3
51
152.3
129
41.68
81
42.19
96
202.7
165
202.3
226
57.69
126
42.76
365
68.54
523
126.8
88
28.64
150
20.30
62
22.52
75
26.08
582
(C) BEAM-END FORCES FROM FREQUENCY RESPONSE ANALYSES
FREQUENCY (Hz)
270
5OO
540
600
810
1000
1080
1630
2000
21.91
78.55
19.62
Mx
43.91
1.609
3.359
My
39.48
0.974
1.339
Mz
60.54
73.77
32.92
166.4
24.16
14.80
11.16
0.723
6.768
0.548
1.O43
0.083
4.250
0.753
0.238
1.619
0.008
0.137
6.061
0.021
0.395
189.1
18.55
18.05
8.034
1.598
17.00
vy
14.91
4.589
7.498
22.33
1.769
3.721
2.633
1.337
1.566
Vz
12.88
0.265
0.721
0.100
0.285
0.057
0.586
0.006
0.200
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Figure 3-12 LPFTP Turbine Drive Duct Impact of Weld Offset on
Failure Life Distribution
output. The forces given in Table 3-4c are the sum of the amplitudes from X, Y, and
Z direction FR analyses.
The DCTHCF input for the HCF analysis of the turbine drive duct performed by JPL
is given in Appendix 3.B.2. The input included narrow-band and sinusoidal reference
time histories that were generated using the program NBSIN described in Section
4.5. Preliminary analyses described in Section 2.2.1.5 were used to identify the critical
circumferential position and the significant forces. The critical location was at a
circumferential angle of 25° on the outside wall. The significant force components
were P, Mx, My, M z, and Vy, and the significant sinusoidal frequencies were 270Hz,
500Hz, 540Hz, 600Hz, 810Hz, 1000Hz, 1080Hz, and 2000Hz.
3.1.7 Results for LPFTP Turbine Drive Duct
The results of failure simulations for the turbine drive duct are given in Figure 3-12.
Figure 3-12 shows the impact of the 22% and 40% weld offset on failure probability.
For a weld offset of 40%, the B.1 life2 at 95% assurance is about 700 missions.
2 A B-life is the value of accumulated operating time to failure at a failure probability specified
as a percent; e.g., B.1 is the failure time at a probability of 0.001 or 0.1%.
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Figure 3-13 LPFTP Turbine Drive Duct Failure Life Distribution and
Driver Sensitivities
However, at a weld offset of 22% the B.1 life is about 81,800 missions, and the
extrapolated B.01 life is about 27,700 missions.
Figure 3-13 provides the output of failure simulations for a 40% weld offset. These
curves represent the direct output of the Monte Carlo simulation and are not given at
a specified assurance. The right-most curve, labeled "nominal," is for a simulation
which included intrinsic materials variation only (see Section 2.1.2.1); all the other
drivers were fixed at their nominal design values. The left-most curve in Figure 3-13
is the "all driver variation" curve. The input and output files from the "all driver" analysis
are given in Appendix 3.B.2. A measure of the relative importance of individual drivers
is given in the upper left corner in Figure 3-13. These were obtained by finding the
marginal effects of driver uncertainties on B1 lives using several sensitivity runs, where
one driver was allowed to vary while the rest were held at their nominal values. The
offset accuracy factor was the most significant driver in this analysis, with a 97%
contribution to the decrease in life. The middle curve in Figure 3-13 shows the shift
to the left due to variation in offset accuracy factor alone.
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Section 3.2
HPOTP Heat Exchanger Coil HCF Analysis
3.2.1 Component Description
The heat exchanger (HEX) is a coil pack installed in the oxidizer side of the hot gas
manifold and is shown in Figure 3-14. It converts liquid oxygen tapped from the
discharge of the high pressure oxygen turbopump (HPOTP) to gaseous oxygen for
the vehicle oxygen tank and the POGO accumulator pressurization system. The
crossflow of the hot turbine exhaust gases from the HPOTP provides the heat energy
required to gasify the oxygen. The coil pack consists of a helically wound small tube
approximately 30 inches long (primary tube) in series with two larger tubes, each
approximately 300 inches long (secondary tubes). The tubes are made of 316L CRES
stainless steel. The critical location is at weld 3 on the small tube outlet near the
bifurcation joint, as shown in Figure 3-15. Analyses by Rocketdyne showed that weld
3 stresses control the HCF life for the HEX coil.
Figure 3-14 HPOTP Heat Exchanger
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Figure 3-15 Detail of the HPOTP Heat Exchanger Coil Near Weld 3
Fatigue test data was not available for 316L CRES weld material. AISI 321 weld test
data [8] was used in the PFA analysis as the best available proxy. Figure 3-16 is a
plot of 316L [7] and 321 parent material test data. The 321 weld material test data [8]
used as a proxy is given in Figure 3-17. Thirteen tests to failure conducted at 70°F
were used.
3.2.2 Driver Description
A total of sixteen drivers were identified which included five drivers to account for
accuracy in the analyses. The list of drivers for the HEX coil HCF analysis, their
distributions, and parameters are given in Table 3-5.
The distribution on the stress concentration factor KTwas based on the condition
of the welded surface after finishing. Consideration of possible reamer gouges and
the height of the offset that could remain after reaming gave KTvalues in the range of
1.2 to 3.5, based on the behavior of welds determined by experiments reported in
[9]. The driver KTwas described by a Beta distribution with a hyperdistribution for the
"location" parameter p. The parameter p was assigned a Uniform distribution. This
resulted in a family of Beta distributions for KT, as illustrated in Figure 3-18.
The drivers may be uncorrelated or correlated with the correlation structure
specified explicitly or implicitly. For many drivers there are physical reasons why they
are uncorrelated. In the HEX analysis, all the drivers except the flow conditions (wall
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Table 3-5 Driver Distributions for the HPOTP Heat Exchanger
Coil
DRIVER DISTRIBUTION RANGE
Weld Offset WOFF Fixed 6%, 10%, 20%
i Beta (p, 8) 1
Weld Stress Concentration Factor K T iP ~ Uniform (. 13, .57) I 1.2 to 3.518= 10
"Normal
Random Load Adjustment Factor _'DRANDOM • k = 2.0 m
C = 0.15
"Normal
Sinusoidal Load Adjustment Factor k = 2.0
"_DSlNUSOIDAL LC = 0.20
Buffeting Aero Load Factor Uniform ( .5, 1.5 ) .5 to 1.5
Drag Aero Load Factor Uniform ( .8, 1.2 ) .8 to 1.2
[Normal (F, °2)
Inner Wall Temperature Ti {/_ ~ Uniform (486, 666) m
[cr _ Uniform (29, 56.5)
Normal _, o_)
Outer Wall Temperature TO ./_ _ Uniform (799, 908)
cr _ Uniform (48, 49.5)
INormal _, o_)
Internal Pressure Pi i/x ~ Uniform (3808, 4177) _
Lo= 69
Beta (p, e)
Inner Diameter D i "P8 =_ .5Uniform (.5, 20) .1885 to .1915
Beta (p, 8)
Wall Thickness tm . p = .27 .0113 to .0157
8 ~ Uniform (.5, 20)
Dynamic Stress Analysis Accuracy Factor Uniform ( .8, 1.2 ) .8 to 1.2
_'DYNstr
Static Stress Analysis Accuracy Factor JtSTstr Uniform ( .9, 1.1 ) .9 to 1.1
Damage Accumulation Accuracy Factor2da m Uniform ( In !/4, In 2.59 ) In 1/4to In 2.59
Neuber's Rule Accuracy Factor )tne u Uniform ( .6, 1.4 ) .6 to 1.4
Weld Offset Stress Concentration Accuracy Uniform ( .8, 1.2 ) .8 to 1.2
Factor 2OFF
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temperatures and internal pressure) are uncorrelated. The correlation in the flow
conditions was implicitly specified in the driver transformation by requiring the inner
and outer wall temperatures and internal pressure to increase and decrease accord-
ing to governing physics. The inner and outer wall temperatures Ti, and TOand the
internal pressure Pi were represented by Normal distributions. The parameters of the
Normal distributions were described by Uniform hyperdistributions. The ranges for
the temperature and pressure drivers were derived from thermal and fluid dynamic
analyses performed by Rocketdyne. The inner diameter and wall thickness were
represented by Beta distributions. The ranges of these distributions were the specified
manufacturing tolerances for the dimensions. The location parameterp ensures that
the peaks of the distributions are at 0.1900 and 0.0125 for the diameter and the
thickness, respectively. The Uniform hyperdistribution on _ captures the uncertainty
in the shape of their Beta distributions.
The weld offset was treated parametrically, i.e., the analysis was run with the offset
fixed at 6%, 10%, and 20%. The weld offset of 6% was the average from a Rocketdyne
survey of ten coils, and the 10% offset was the design specification for this weld. The
Neuber's rule accuracy factor accounts for the uncertainty in the calculation of the
stresses when the stress vs. strain relationship is nonlinear. An accuracy range of 0.6
to 1.4 was estimated for _'neu, based on energy consideration. The probability
distributions for 2STs_,'_'OYNs_, _OFF, and _'damare the same as for the elbow ducts and
are described above in Section 3.1.3. The parameters k and C for AO_o M and
2tDs,Nuso,,_distributions are the same as for the elbow ducts, but the strain gage factor
d was set to unity for the HEX coil since available strain gage data was not applicable.
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3.2.3 Analysis
The program HEXHCF was used to perform the probabilistic HCF analysis of the
HPOTP heat exchange coil. The overall description of the program is given in Section
5.1. The user's manual for HEXHCF, including the description of the input variables,
is given in Section 6.1. A source listing of HEXHCF is given in Section 7.1.2. The steps
of the PFA analysis are given in Section 2.3.
The radius of bend for the coil was relatively large as compared with its cross-sec-
tional dimensions. This allowed the tube to be considered as a straight pipe for the
stress analysis. As described in Section 2.2.1.2, the beam-end forces close to weld
6 were extracted from FE analyses conducted by Rocketdyne on a beam model of
the HEX coil. The node and element numbers for the beam model are shown in Figure
3-19. The beam-end forces at node 27 are given in Table 3-6. The aerodynamic loads
on the coil due to flow past it were provided by Rocketdyne as the maximum static
and dynamic stress values. The aerodynamic beam-end forces given in Table 3-6a
were estimated from the stresses by assuming the coil to be a simple beam.
The R5 vibration environment [6] was employed for the RV and FR STARDYNE
analyses performed by Rocketdyne. The HEX coil was primarily excited by the R5
zone G vibration environment. Analyses were performed for excitations applied along
the X, Y, and Z directions. The RMS beam-end forces and the corresponding force
velocities were extracted at node 27 from the RV analysis output. The RMS force
magnitudes given in Table 3-6b are the averages of the RMS values from element
numbers 25 and 26 on both sides of node 27. The expected frequency for each force
component was calculated using Equation 2-67. The beam-end force amplitudes were
extracted for node 27 from the FR analyses output. The forces given in Table 3-6c are
the sum of the amplitudes from X, Y, and Z direction FR analyses.
The HEXHCF input for the probabilistic HCF analysis for the HEX coil is given in
Appendix 3.B.3. The input included narrow-band and sinusoidal reference time
histories, which were generated using the program NBSIN described in Section 4.5.
Preliminary analyses, described in Section 2.2.1.5, were used to identify the critical
circumferential position and the significant forces.. The critical location was at a
circumferential angle of 85 °. The significant force components were P and Mz and the
significant sinusoidal frequency was 500Hz. The aerodynamic load was also deter-
mined to be significant. The details of the HEX coil probabilistic failure assessment
are given in Section 3.A.2.
3.2.4 HEX Coil Results
The results of the failure simulations for the HEX coil are given in Figures 3-20 and
3-21. The graphs present the left-hand tail of the failure distribution for different
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Table 3-6 HPOTP Heat Exchanger Coil Beam-End Forces Near
Weld 3
(a) BEAM-END FORCES FROM AERO LOADS
P (Ib) Mx (in.-Ib) My (in.-Ib) Mz (in.-Ib) Vy (Ib) Vz (Ib)
STATIC 0.000 0.000 - 0.072 0.000 0.000 0.000
DYNAMIC
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.072 0.000 0.000
1780 Hz
(b) BEAM-END FORCES FROM RANDOM VIBRATION ANALYSES
P Mx My Mz Vy Vz
X-DIR
RMS VALUE
FREQUENCY (Hz)
Y-DIR
RMS VALUE
FREQUENCY (Hz)
Z-DIR
RMS VALUE
FREQUENCY (Hz)
0.857
236
0.621
84O
0.041
1404
0.001
634
0.004
8OO
0.014
1018
0.004
424
0.009
275
0.050
1224
0.141
386
0.355
320
0.007
1336
0.259
740
0.627
1040
0.049
1392
0.019
358
0.016
1011
0.643
1394
FREQUENCY (Hz)
500
600
(C) BEAM-END FORCES FROM FRE
P Mx My
0.270 0.003 0.010
0.070 0.002 0.005
QUENCY RESPONSE ANALYSES
Mz Vy
0.205 0.348
0.015 0.035
Vz
0.052
0.038
1000
1500
1800
2000
0.126
0.077
0.024
0.074
0.003
0.003
0.0003
0.0009
0.007
0.019
0.0002
0.003
0.024
0.019
0.003
0.009
0.127 O.O35
0.144 0.307
0.035 0.0007
0.099 0.077
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Figure 3-20 HPOTP Heat Exchanger Impact of Weld Offset on
Failure Life Distribution
simulations. The weld offset was treated parametrically, and Figure 3-20 shows results
for 6%, 10%, and 20% weld offsets. For a weld offset of 20% the B.1 life3 at 95%
assurance is about 28,000 missions, and the extrapolated B.01 life is about 8,500
missions. At a weld offset of 6% the B. 1 life is about 74,000 missions.
Figure 3-21 provides the output of failure simulations for a 10% weld offset. These
curves represent the direct output of the Monte Carlo simulation and are given at a
specified assurance. The left-most curve is the "all driver" variation curve and the input
and output files for this analysis are given in Section 3.B.3. The right-most curve in
Figure 3-21 labeled "nominal" is for a simulation which included intrinsic materials
variation only (see Section 2.1.2.1); all the other drivers were fixed at their nominal or
most likely values. A measure of the relative importance of individual drivers is given
in the upper left corner in Figure 3-21. These were obtained by finding the marginal
effects of driver uncertainties on B1 lives using several sensitivity runs, where one
driver was allowed to vary while the rest were held at their nominal values. The stress
concentration factor and S/N model parameter variation were the most significant
3 A B-life is the value of accumulated operating time to failure at a failure probability specified
as a percent; e.g., B.1 is the failure time at a probability of 0.001 or 0.1%.
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Figure 3-21 HPOTP Heat Exchanger Failure Life Distribution and
Driver Sensitivities
10 lo
drivers in this analysis with a 96% contribution to the decrease in life. The middle curve
in Figure 3-21 shows the shift to the left due to variation only in the stress concentration
factor and S/N model parameters. The load variation, stress analysis accuracy, weld
offset stress accuracy, and wall thickness were moderately important drivers. Flow
parameters, inner diameter, and the Neuber's rule accuracy were not important
drivers. It should be noted that the welded 321 material data may be a conservative
or nonconservative representation of the behavior of welded 316L material.
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Section 3.3
ATD-HPFTP Second Stage Turbine Disk
LCF Analysis
3.3.1 Component Description
The ATD-HPFTP turbine disk is a monolithic forging with two rows of turbine blades
attached to its outer circumference. Figure 3-22 shows an axial cross section of the
monolithic disk with both rows of blades. Figure 3-23 illustrates the face of a stylized
disk with blade attachment locations. The actual ATD disk has fifty blade attachment
locations. The turbine is driven by high temperature, high pressure steam (H20) and
hydrogen (H2). The disk is surrounded by flowing hydrogen coolant to control the
temperature and thermal gradient at critical locations.
As discussed in Section 2.2.2.2, the life-controlling location is in the blade attach-
ment region of the disk. The radial and axial positions of this critical location are
indicated in Figures 3-23 and Figures 3-24, respectively. The axial position is on the
downstream face and the radial position is in the lower lobe. The local strain range
at this location is sufficiently high to control LCF crack initiation life.
The ATD-HPFTP turbine disk is made of Inconel 100. Inconel 100 notched fatigue
test data used for the analysis is given in Figure 3-25. Nine test specimens of the
material were subjected to stress-controlled cyclic loading with a stress ratio of
R = 0.05. The fatigue tests were performed in 5000 psig hydrogen at room tempera-
ture [10].
3.3.2 Driver Description
Four drivers, in addition to materials behavior, were characterized by probability
distributions in the disk LCF analysis. Two of these drivers account for uncertainty of
analysis methods. A list of the drivers, their distributions, and parameters are given
in Table 3-7.
The stress concentration uncertainty factor hE, was characterized by a Uniform
distribution over the range (.95, 1.05). This relatively tight distribution was selected
since the geometry and stress concentration factor of the fatigue test specimens were
very close to those of the actual part. Experience has indicated that the error in the
ratio of local stresses between the test specimens and actual parts is less than _5%.
The stress analysis accuracy factor ;LK_accounts for uncertainty in the FE analysis.
A review of FE literature and discussions with stress analysts who have compared
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Figure 3-22 Axial Cross Section of the ATD-HPFTP Turbine Show-
ing the Monolithic Disk
RADIAL DIRECTION
Figure 3-23 Stylized Radial Cross Section of a Turbine Disk
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Figure 3-25 Incone1100 Fatigue Life for Notched Specimens [10]
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analysis and tests indicate that a correct FE stress analysis would calculate stresses
to within 20% of the true value. Thus, _.K_was represented by a Uniform distribution
over the range (.80, 1.20).
The rotor speed _o is distributed according to a Normal distribution about the
nominal rotor speed with a standard deviation of 1.35% of the mean. This charac-
terization is based on an analytical turbopump performance model.
Characterization of ATf, the deviation from nominal coolant fluid temperature, is
accomplished by means of Beta distributions. A Beta distribution can be
parameterized as Beta(a, b, p, 0), where a and b are the lower and upper bounds of
the range of the random variate, p is a location parameter, and 0 is a shape parameter.
See Section 2.1.3.1 for a more detailed description of this parameterization of the Beta
distribution.
ATf was assigned the distribution
.95 Beta( -200°F, 200°F, .5, 0) + .05 Beta(200°F, 500°F, 0, 10).
This distribution is shown in Table 3-7 and illustrated in Figure 3-26. The information
available for characterizing the distribution of ATf is that ATf most likely lies between
Table 3-7 Driver Distributions for the Turbine Disk
DRIVER DISTRIBUTION
2Kt Uniform(0.95, 1.05)
_lKd Uniform(0.80, 1.20)
Normal(H, a 2)
_o /_ =37592 rpm
a = 1.35% of/_ = 507 rpm
Beta(a, b, p, 0 )
ATf .95 Beta( -200°F, 200°F, 0.5, 0 )
+ .05 Beta( 200°F, 500°F, 0, 10 )
- 200 0 200
A Tf (°F)
Figure 3-26 Driver Distribution for ATf
I
50O
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-200°F and 200°F,with no information availableto differentiate among values in that
range, and that ATr is much less likely to lie between 200°F and 500°F. A probability
of .95 was assigned to the -200°F to 200°,=interval and .05 was assigned to the
200°F to 500°F interval.
For the Beta distribution characterizing -200°F <__ATf <__200°F, p is .5 and e is 0,
which is equivalent to assigning a Uniform distribution to ATf in this interval. For the
Beta distribution characterizing 200°F <-ATf <_500°F, p is 0 and e is 10, which
represents the higher likelihood of ATf values closer to 200°F than to 500°F.
3.3.3 Analysis
The program TRBPWA was used to perform the LCF analysis of the ATD-HPFTP
second stage turbine disk. The overall description of the program is given in Section
5.2. The user's manual for TRBPWA, including the description of the input variables,
is given in Section 6.2. A source listing of TRBPWA is given in Section 7.2.
As described in Section 2.2.2.2, the values for the nominal stresses and stress
adjustment factor were obtained from a NASTRAN FE stress analysis performed by
Pratt & Whitney. The FE analysis was performed at a nominal rotor speed _oo of 38,600
rpm. The nominal mechanical stress SMowas 159,807 psi, the nominal stress due to
metal temperature Smowas 1,915 psi, and the nominal stress due to thermal gradient
SGowas 14,749 psi. The stress adjustment factor Kd was found to be 1.41, and the
value of the stress concentration factor Kt was 2.18. The FE analysis also provided
Cmf, the sensitivity of metal temperature to deviation from nominal coolant fluid
temperature, and CG1 , CG2 , the sensitivity of thermal gradient to deviation from
nominal coolant fluid temperature. The values were 0.91325 for Cmf, 0.04 for Cm,
and 0.07 for CG2. The remaining sensitivities were obtained from the thermal analysis
performed to provide boundary conditions for the FE analysis. The sensitivity of
stress to change in metal temperature Cm was 4.44 psi/°F, and the sensitivity of stress
to change in thermal gradient CG was 101.72 psi/°E
3.3.4 Results
The results of failure simulations for the disk are given in Figure 3-27. The graph
presents the left-hand tail of the failure distribution derived from the simulations. The
ordinate of this graph is failure probability and the abscissa is life of the disk to LCF
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Figure 3-27 ATD-HPFTP Second Stage Turbine Disk Failure Life
Distribution
failure. Life is given in missions and, for this analysis, a mission is one start-up-shut-
down cycle. Figure 3-27 shows disk LCF life at 95% assurance. The meaning of a
95% assurance curve is that the failure probability at a given life will lie with .95
probability below that curve. The B.1 life 4 at 95% assurance is 85 missions.
Figure 3-28 shows the output of failure simulations conducted to assess the
sensitivity of the turbine disk failure life distribution to the drivers. The curves of Figure
3-28 represent the direct output of the Monte Carlo simulation and are not given at
specified assurance. The right curve, labeled "nominal" in Figure 3-28, is for a
simulation which included intrinsic materials variation only (see Section 2.1.2.1); all
the other drivers were fixed at their nominal or most likely values. The left-most curve
in Figure 3-28 is the "all driver variation" curve, which essentially coincides with the
curve for the combination of variation in "S/N model parameters" and "stress
adjustment factor." The input and output files from the "all driver" analysis are given
in Section 3.B.4. A measure of the relative importance of individual drivers is given
in the lower right corner in Figure 3-28. These were obtained by finding the marginal
4 A B-life is the value of accumulated operating time to failure at a failure probability specified
as a percent; e.g., B.1 is the failure time at a probability of 0.001 or 0.1%.
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Figure 3-28 Driver Sensitivities for the ATD-HPFTP Second Stage
Turbine Disk LCF Failure Life
effects of driver uncertainties on B.1 lives using several sensitivity runs, where one
driver was allowed to vary while the rest were held at their nominal values. The S/N
model parameters and stress adjustment factor 2K_ were the most significant drivers
in this analysis, with an essentially 100% contribution to the decrease in life. Variation
in the stress concentration factor 2K,, deviation from nominal coolant fluid temperature
ATf, and rotor speed _ are not important drivers.
This analysis is for a 1988 design. The Pratt & Whitney designers decided to
redesign for longer life because their analysis showed unacceptably high stresses.
This probabilistic analysis is consistent with the need to redesign since the B. 1 life for
the nominal failure probability curve is below the design goal of the order of 1000
missions. Since additional information that would permit more accurate specification
of the driver distributions could not shift the failure distribution sufficiently to make the
design acceptable, it was concluded that this design is not information sensitive,
providing that the nominal values of drivers have not been significantly misspecified.
Thus, there is no need to acquire additional driver information. Stress must be
reduced through a redesign in order to achieve the life goal.
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Appendix 3.A
Probabilistic Failure Assessment Details
3.A.1 Introduction
The details of two Probabilistic Failure Assessment (PFA) application examples are
given here. Every step of the procedure, including intermediate calculations and
results, is presented. Section 3.A.2 describes the HPOTP HEX Coil HCF analysis and
Section 3.A.3 describes the ATD-HPFTP turbine disk LCF analysis. The overall
procedure for PFA is given in Section 2.3.
3.A.2 HPOTP Heat Exchanger Coil HCF Analysis Details
3.A.2.1 Selecting the Component, Failure Mode, and Critical Location
The HEX coil is a critical component since a leak in the coil carrying liquid oxygen
can cause the liquid oxygen to mix with the hydrogen outside and cause a malfunction
of the system. The failure mode and critical location for this study were based on the
deterministic analyses that had been performed for the HEX coil. Since the HEX coil
was already in operation at the time of this study, deterministic stress and fatigue
analyses were available for the component. These deterministic analyses indicated
that the stresses at the small tube outlet weld could approach the fatigue endurance
limit for the component. Thus, it was deemed appropriate to apply the PFA methodol-
ogy to evaluate its HCF failure risk.
3.A.2.2 Preliminary Deterministic Analysis
The stress, thermal, and fluid flow deterministic analyses performed by Rocketdyne
were used for formulating the driver transformation and to identify and characterize
driver distributions for the PFA. The Rocketdyne stress analyses included random
vibration and frequency response dynamic analyses, and they are described in
Section 2.2.1.2.
For the HEX coil, a deterministic module, which was a variation of the module
embedded in the simulation loops, was used to test the driver transformation, scan
the circumference of the duct to find the worst stress position, and to aid in significant
load identification, as described in Section 3.A.2.6. The analysis for location of the
worst stress position on the circumference were run with single cycle time histories-
the amplitude of the random reference histories was three, and those for the sinusoidal
reference histories was one. Table 3-8 gives the outcome of the deterministic analysis
for finding the critical location at the circumferential angle of 85 ° in the HEX coil.
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Table 3-8 Scanning Circumference for Critical Angle
Causing Minimum Life
ANGLE (deg) LIFE (secs)
0
40
60
70
75
80
85
90
100
120
160
200
240
28O
320
6.19 x 1014
3.71 x 10 l°
8.11 x 109
5.51 x 109
4.92 x 109
4.62 x 109
4.56 x 109
4.73 x 109
5.92 x 109
1,84 x 1010
2.83 x 1013
1.17 x 1014
7.88 x 101°
5.60 x 1010
1.37 x 1013
3.A.2.3 Driver Characterization
The list of drivers for the HEX coil, their distributions, and ranges are given in Table
3-5. The rationale for assigning the distributions for these drivers was presented in
Sections 3.1.3 and 3.2.2. The information used to describe some of these distribu-
tions and the specification of the distribution parameters are given here.
Weld Offset
Weld offset measurements were available from ten coils at weld 3. Table 3-9 gives
the serial numbers of the coils and the weld offsets in inches. In cases when a low
and high measurement were provided, the high value was used. This data was
considered inadequate to assign a probability distribution for the weld offset, and as
mentioned in Section 3.2.2, the weld offset was treated parametrically. The average
weld offset for the ten coils was 0.00073 inches. The average percentage weld offset,
obtained by dividing it by the nominal thickness of 0.00125, is 6%. In addition to the
average weld offset of 6%, the HEX coil was analyzed for 10% and 20% weld offsets.
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Table 3-9 Weld Offset Measurements
SERIAL NUMBER WELD OFFSET (in.)
8674330
8581654
8577498
8690140
8682049
8701217
8577501
8577502
8674328
8577500
0.0005
0.0005*
0.0012"
0.0006*
0.0005*
0.0010"
0.0005
0.0005
0.0010
0.0010
*Highest of the low/high values
The 10% offset was the design specification for this weld, and 20% offset was the
maximum weld offset that may be specified by MRB for weld 3.
Stress Concentration Factor
As mentioned in Section 3.2.2, the stress concentration factor KTwas based on the
condition of the welded surface after finishing. The depth of the gouges made by the
reamer was assumed to be equal to the radius of the reamer, which was 0.003 in.
Also, the range of the positive and negative steps left after reaming and polishing was
0.001 to 0.003 in. The stress concentration factor KT for a 0.003 in. deep gouge in a
0.125 in. thick tube is about 2.2 [11]. The stress concentration due to the step was
inferred from fatigue failure data on weldments for different height to thickness ratios
h/t reported by Reemsnyder [9] and is shown in Figure 3-29. The KT for a step with
h/t of 0.08 to 0.16 is between 1.50 to 3.50. The KT values given by Peterson [11] for
a trapezoidal step in tension was between 1.2 to 2.2. Based on all the above
information, KTwas considered to be between 1.2 and 3.5. Since the value of KTwas
bounded, it was decided to use the Beta distribution. The information, however, was
inadequate to describe the shape of the distribution, except that the value was more
likely to be closer to the lower bound. Thus, the uncertainty inthe shape was modeled
by varying the shape parameter p in the Beta distribution.
Wall Temperature and Internal Pressure
The ranges of temperatures and internal pressure obtained from an engine balance
model were provided by Rocketdyne. These were the nominal, or mean, # and the
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F + 2u values of the temperatures and pressure for minimum and maximum flow
conditions and they are given in Table 3-10. For the PFA, the temperatures and
pressure were characterized with hyperparametric Normal distributions. That is, the
mean and standard deviation of the Normal distributions themselves were charac-
terized by Uniform distributions whose endpoints correspond to the driver values
given in Table 3-10 for the minimum and maximum flow conditions. The variation of
the temperatures and pressure were correlated such that they assumed values that
corresponded to the same flow condition, the correlation was specified implicitly in
the HEXHCF program.
Weld Offset Stress Concentration Accuracy Factors
The weld offset stress concentration accuracy factor is given by Equation 2-73, and
as mentioned in Section 2.2.1.3, the Fk factor in this equation was determined using
finite element stress analyses of detailed models of the weld region [12]. The Fk
factors were determined to be functions of the radius to thickness ratio R/t. Figure
3-30 gives Fk vs. R/t curves from different studies. The curve used in the HCF
application examples is shown in Figure 3-30, and the distribution on the uncertainty
factor _,OFF specified to account for uncertainty of this curve is also shown.
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Table 3-10 Wall Temperature and Internal Pressure at Weld 3
From Engine Balance Model
"/'innerwall (°R)
Touterwall (°R)
Pintemal (psi)
ff ff +2a a
MINIMUM MAXIMUM MINIMUM MAXIMUM MINIMUM MAXIMUM
FLOW FLOW FLOW FLOW FLOW FLOW
666 486 779 544 56.5 29
908 799 1004 898 48 49.5
4177 3808 4315 3946 69 69
1.5 --
1.0 --
0.5
0
e BEER [13]
x OUTSIDEWALL/ GUNAY [14]
• INSIDEWALL J
.... LOWERAND UPPERRANGEOF FKDUE TO _+20%2tOF
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Figure 3-30 Fk Values From Different Sources, Comparison with
Curve in Use and Accuracy Factor,_OFF Impact
3.A.2.4 Materials Characterization
As described in Section 3.2.1, proxy 321 weld S/N material data had to be used for
the HEX coil. The data is given in Table 3-11 and is shown plotted in Figure 3-17.
Based on the data points, a single data region was used since it was decided that the
In(S) vs. In(N) behavior was linear in the life ranges of interest. Prior to using the S/N
data for the HEX coil PFA, it was studied using the materials characterization program
MATCHR (described in Section 4.1).
The 95% confidence intervals on the coefficient of variation C and the slope m
denoted by Io and Jo, respectively, in Equations 2-24 and 2-26, and generated by
MATCHR for the 321 weld data, are given in Table 3-12. Point estimates for C and m
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Table 3-11 321 SS Welded S/N Data [8]
STRESS LIFE
S (psi) N (cycles)
40,000
40,000
40,000
40,000
40,000
30,000
30,000
25,000
25,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
1000
2000
3000
5000
6000
23,000
66,000
72,000
190,000
789,000
1,070,000
1,450,000
Table 3-12 Summary of Materials Characterization Study of 321
Weld Data
Coefficient of Variation C Slope Parameter m
95o/o Confidence Interval Io = {0.047, 0.114} Jo = {7.14, 9.60}
Point Estimates 0.067 8.37
Posterior Credibility Range 7.14
Lower bound -- 9.60
Upper bound
are also given in the table. These point and interval estimates of C and m are
consistent with any exogenous constraints on C and m, so there is no need to impose
explicit constraints.
3.A.2.5 Time History Definition
The time histories were generated as described in Sections 2.1.4 and 2.3. 7. The
frequency f of the random and sinusoidal load components for the HEX coil are given
in Table 3-6. If the highest frequency among the significant load components is fmax,
then the number of points that will be generated is given by N. fmax" T, where T is the
length of the history in seconds and N is the number of points within a single cycle of
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Table 3-13 Lives for Different Random Number Seeds and History
Length
SEED
175
275
375
475
575
T=I
.7935 x
1.853 x
3.015 x
2.162 x
3.167 x
10 lo
10 lo
10 lo
10 lo
10 lo
10 lo
T=2
.8229 x 101°
1.765 x 101°
2.842 x 1010
2.056 x 1010
3.250 x 1010
2.604 x 101°
T=3
1.054 x 1010
1.869 x 101°
2.853 x 101°
2.312 x 10 l°
3.082 x 1010
2.472 x 10 l°
T=4
1.281 x 1010
1.872 x 101°
2.992 x 101°
2.233 x 101°
2.900 x 1010
2.215 x 101°675 2.270 x
775 2.674 x 1010 2.906 x 101° 3.238 x 101° 3.232 x 1010
875 1.241 x 1010 1.268 x 10 l° 1.672 x 10 l° 2.037 x 10 l°
975 2.554 x 101° 2.779 x 10 l° 3.049 x 10 l° 2.689 x 10 l°
1075 2.473 x 10 l° 2.639 x 1010 1.842 x 10 l° 1.846 x 1010
1175 2.174x 101° 2.070 x 101° 1.668 x 101° 1.853 x 101°
1275 1.636 x 10 l° 2.092 x 1010 1.733 x 1010 1.944 x 1010
1375 1.948x 101° 2.167 x 101° 2.468x 101° 2.513 x 101°
1475
1575
2.121 x 101°
2.037 x 101°
3.111 x 1010
3.131 x 101°
3.400 x 101°
2.745 x 1010
1675
1775
2.592 x 101°
1.531 x 10 l°
3.122 x 10 l°
3.432 x 101°
3.804 x 1010
1.866 x 101°
1.839 x 1010
2.151 x 1010
2.783 x 101°
2.962 x 1010
2.447 x 101°1010
1875
1.704 x 10 l°
2.026 x 1010
2.243 x 1010
2.866 x 1010
2.268 x 1010
2.074 x 10101975 2.977 x
2075 2.494 x 101° 1.727 x 1010 2.065 x 101° 2.064 x 101°
2175 2.114x 101° 2.937 x 101° 3.009 x 101° 2.773 x 101°
the highest frequency history. The results of the significant load component selection
is given below in Section 3.A.2.6. The length and the initiating random number seed
for the reference time-histories were decided based on the lives calculated with 21
random number seeds and lengths of T = 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0 secs. The lives were
calculated with nominal driver values and are given, for each value of T, in Table 3-13.
The desired random number seed and history length are those which correspond to
the life near the median life and the shortest value of T for which the calculated life is
close to those for higher values of T. From Table 3-13 the chosen seed was 675 and
the optimum length was 1.0 sec.
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3.A.2.6 Significant Load Identification
The significant load identification is carried out as described in Section 2.3.8. The
von Mises stress and the damage index that were calculated for each load component
are given Table 3-14. The random load components P, M z, 500Hz sinusoidal load,
and the aerodynamic load were identified as significant based on their damage
indices. Table 3-15 lists the load components that contribute to each stress com-
ponent, rank ordered by their damage indices within each group. Analyses were
performed by including the next significant load from the list in each stress component
group. Table 3-16 shows the outcome of these analyses.
3.A.2.7 Probability of Failure Curve Parameter Estimation
The steps required to carry out the probability of failure curve parameter estimation
for this HEX example are given in Figure 3-31. This procedure was used to obtain
the results discussed in Section 3.2. Only the calculations for the 10% weld offset
case will be presented in this section.
The parameters of the prior distribution are estimated by determining a value for
/_, then estimating a and 0 for fixed/3. The first step in the procedure is to plot the
failure simulation results contained in file LOWLIF for the "all drivers" run. That plot
is shown in Figure 3-21. Since the all drivers run is nonlinear, the alternative procedure
of Section 2.3.9 was used. This run is called the "capability" run and was carried out
by allowing variation in the stress concentration factors, inner diameter, wall thickness,
and the S/N material properties. The other drivers were held at their nominal values.
The/_ estimate is based on an approximate linear portion of the left-hand tail (.001
to .005 on the ordinate) for this example. This probability range corresponds to
simulated lives with index numbers 20 through 100, inclusive, in file LOWLIE A value
for/_ is estimated by program BFIT. The pertinent methodology is discussed in
Section 2.1.1, the program description and flowcharts are presented in Section 4.2.2,
the user's guide for running this program is given in Sections 6.4.1-6.4.6, and the
code structure and listing are provided in Section 7.4.1. Program BFIT has provided
the estimate/3 = 1.951 for this example.
The a and 0 estimate must be based on the all driver run in order to fit a model
which is nonlinear in log-log space. It is only necessary to consider points with
probability in the range .001 to .01. a, 0 are estimated by program ABTFIT. The
pertinent methodology is discussed in Section 2.1.1, the program description and
flowcharts are presented in Section 4.2.3, the user's guide for running this program
3 - 46
Table 3-14 Yon Mises Stress and Damage Indices Due to Each
Load Component
LOAD
COMPONENT
X-P
Y-P
Z-P
X- Mx
Y- Mx
Z- Mx
X-My
Y-My
Z-My
X- M z
FREQUENCY
(Hz)
236
840
1404
634
8OO
1018
424
275
1224
386
VON MISES
STRESS
193.8
140.4
9.307
2.984
7.772
28.73
1.456
3.419
18.31
586.7
DAMAGE
INDEX
5.06 X 1018
1.81 x 1018
1.16 x 1010
1.56 x 106
1.83x 109
2.63 x 1013
6.21 x 103
1.78 x 106
1.27 x 1012
2.25 x 1022
Y-Mz
Z-M z
X- Vy
Y- Vy
Z- Vy
X- Vz
Y- Vz
Z- Vz
AERO
SIN1
SIN2
SIN3
SIN4
SIN5
SIN6
320
1336
740
1040
1392
358
1011
1394
1780
50O
600
1000
1500
1800
2000
1479
31.12
9.838
23.80
1.857
8.314
6.770
279.0
298.7
919.3
80.81
132.6
167.0
17.48
66.84
1.38 x 1025
6.10 x 1013
9.09 x 109
7.01 x 1012
1.16 x 105
1.32 x 109
8.61 x 108
4.03 x 1020
8.38 x 1020
7.21 x 1023
2.50 x 1016
1.43 x 1018
1.11 x 1019
1.34 x 1012
2.15 x 1016
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Table 3-15 Load Components Rank Ordered by Damage Indices
for Contributing Stress Components
RANDOM LOAD COMPONENTS
AXIAL STRESS SHEAR STRESS
Y-Mz
X-M z
X-P
Y-P
Z-P
Y-My
X-My
Z-Vz
Z-M x
Y- Vy
X- Vy
X- Vz
Y-M x
Y- Vz
X- Mx
i Z-Vv
SINUSOIDAL LOADS
AXIAL STRESS SHEAR STRESS
SIN1
SIN3
SIN4
SIN2
SIN6
SIN5
SIN1
SIN4
SIN6
SIN2
SIN3
SIN5
Table 3-16 Significant Load Identification Checks
LOADS INCLUDED B.1 LIFE B1 LIFE
Y- Mz, SIN1
Y - Mz, SIN1, AERO
Y - Mz, SIN1, AERO, X - Mz
Y - Mz, SIN1, AERO, X - Mz, X - P
Y - Mz, SIN1, AERO, X - Mz, X - P, Y - P
Y - Mz, SIN1, AERO, X - Mz, X - P, Y - P, Z - Mz
Y - Mz, SIN1, AERO, X - Mz, X - P, Y - P, SIN3
ALL LOADS
8.699 x 106
6.474 x 106
4.506 x 106
4.199 x 106
3.400 x 106
3.387 x 106
3.312 x 106
3.277 x 106
4.292 x 10 7
3.249 x 107
2.276 x 107
2.108 x 107
1.766 x 107
1.760 x 107
1.715 x 107
1.687 x 107
26
Plot the failure simulation results contained in file LOWLIF in log-log space for both
the "all driver" and "capability" runs.
Since the data for the capability run from .001 to .005, that is, point 20 to point 100 of
file LOWLIE is approximately linear, it can be used to estimate/_.
Create file BFITD to indicate the indices of the LOWLIF data to be used in the/_
estimation. See Section 6.4.3.1 for a detailed description of the contents of file
BFITD.
Run program BFIT. The pertinent methodology is discussed in Section 2.1.1, the
program description and flowcharts are presented in Section 4.2.2, the user's
guide for running this program is given in Sections 6.4.1-6.4.6, and the code
structure and listing are provided in Section 7.4.1. BFIT has two input files,
LOWLIF and BFITD, and two output files, BFITO and IOUTPR.
Obtain/_ estimate from output files BFITO and IOUTPR. Program BFIT has provided
the estimate of 1.951.
In order for a and e to be uniquely determined, it is only necessary to consider
the range .001 to .01, that is, point 20 to point 200 inclusive, of file LOWLIF (for
the all driver run), for the estimated curve to be nonlinear in log-log space. Cre-
ate file PARAMS to indicate the indices of the LOWLIF data to be used in the a, e
estimation, the initial values for a and 8, and any scaling factors required. See
Section 6.4.9.1 for a detailed description of the contents of file PARAMS.
Run program ABTFIT. The pertinent methodology is discussed in Section 2.1.1, the
program description and flowcharts are presented in Section 4.2.3, the user's
guide for running this program is given in Sections 6.4.7-6.4.12, and the code
structure and listing are provided in Section 7.4.2. ABTFIT has two input files,
LOWLIF and PARAMS, and three output files, ABTOUT, BAYESD and IOUTPR.
Obtain a, 8 estimates from output files ABTOUT and BAYESD. Program ABTFIT has
provided the values 2.08 x 10 14 for 8 and 0.00766 for a.
Calculate assurance based on estimates of a,/_, 8. The assurance calculation is
performed by program LZERO. The pertinent methodology is discussed in Sec-
tion 2.1.1, the program description and flowcharts are presented in Section 4.2.4,
the user's guide for running this program is given in Sections 6.4.13-6.4.18, and
the code structure and listing are provided in Section 7.4.3.
Figure 3-31 Steps of the Probability of Failure Curve Parameter
Estimation for the HEX HCF
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Table 3-17
C_
8
_o for 95% Assurance
Probability of Failure Curve Parameter Estimates for
6%, 10% and 20% Weld Offset
WELD OFFSET
6% 10% 20%
1.94555
0.007558
3.33665 x 1014
1.91225 x 10 -18
1.951 O0
0.007657
2.08238 x 1014
3.34602 x 10 -18
1.97183
0.007521
7.27963 x 1013
8.47997 x 10-18
is given in Section 6.4.7-6.4.12, and the code structure and listing are provided in
Section 7.4.2.
PARAMS requires initial values 5 for a and 0 that were obtained as follows:
B.16 = .7718 x 107
B1 = 3.593 x 107
LSCALE 7= (1 /.7718x107 ) = 10 -7
0 o = N._OOl = (.7718 x 107) 1.951 = 2.7386 x 1013
XGUESS(2) = a o = - In .999 /In 2 = .0014434
Program ABTFIT has provided the estimates 0 = 2.0824 x 10 TM and a = 0.007657.
Table 3-17 gives the a, /_, and 0 values which define the left-hand tail of the
probability-life distribution for weld offsets of 6%, 10%, and 20%.
5 The calculation of initial values is illustrated in Section 6.4.11.
6 B-lives were obtained from file LOWLIF. A B-life is the value of the failure parameter (e.g.,
failure time) at a failure probability specified as a percent: e.g., B.1 is the failure time at a
probability of .001 or .1%.
7 Life scaling factor is described in Section 6.4.9.
8 Calculation of initial guesses is described in Section 6.4.11.
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Table 3-18 Driver Sensitivity Analysis for 10% Weld Offset
DRIVER
VARIATION
IN ANALYSIS
NOMINAL
ALL DRIVERS
Kt
S/N MODEL PARAMETERS
_DRANOOM + "_DSlNUSOIDAL
Adam
_OFF
_DYNstr
_'neu
Ti+ To+ Pi
BUFFETING AERO LOAD
tr,,
Di
"_STstr
DRAG AERO LOAD
B1 LIFE
(seconds)
3.8547 x 109
4.7195 x 107
5.3093 x 108
8.2609 x 108
1.6247 x 109
1.8380 x 109
2.1833 x 109
2.4667 x 109
3.5912 x 109
3.6199 x 109
3.6790 x 109
3.6927
3.7424
3.8299
3.8570
SHIFT IN
LIFE FROM
NOMINAL
% SHIFT IN
LIFE FROM
ALL DRIVERS
3.8
3.3
3.0
2.2
2.0
1.7
1.4
2.6
2.3
1.8
x 109 1.6
x 109 1.1
x 109 2.5
x 109 -2.4
x 109
x 109 87
x 109 80
x 109 59
x 109 53
x 109 44
x 109 36
x 108 6.9
x 108 6.2
x 108 4.6
x 108 4.3
x 108 2.9
x 107 .6
x 106 0
RELATIVE
IMPORTANCE
100
91
67
61
50
42
8
7
5
5
3
1
0
3.A.2.8 Driver Sensitivity Analysis
As described in Section 2.3.10, a set of simulations were executed to obtain the
driver sensitivities. The first simulation was the nominal run, which included intrinsic
materials variation only (see Section 2.1.2.1); all the other drivers were fixed at their
nominal or most likely values. Figure 3-21 shows the output of the nominal simulation
for the HEX with a 10% weld offset. The next simulation was the "all driver" variation
run, which was performed by allowing all the drivers to vary. Figure 3-21 shows the
output of the all-driver run for the HEX with a 10% weld offset.
Finally, the driver sensitivities were derived using simulations for which each driver
(together with intrinsic material variation) was allowed to vary one at a time while all
the other drivers were held at their nominal values. Some related drivers, such as the
load adjustment factors (for random and sinusoidal loads) and the flow parameters
(inner and outer wall temperatures and internal pressure), were allowed to vary
together to estimate the sensitivity of the load factors or the flow parameter drivers
as a group. The output from these simulations along with the results from the
aforementioned all-driver variation and nominal runs allows the drivers to be rank
ordered and allows their relative importance to be characterized. The impact of the
drivers was calculated based on the failure lives at the .01 probability level, given in
Table 3-18, for the all-driver, nominal, and driver sensitivity runs.
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To calculate the relative importance of a driver, the change in life from the nominal
analysis due to driver variation was first calculated as a percentage of the shift due to
the all-driver variation, for each driver. The largest shift was caused by variation in the
stress concentration factor, which is therefore the most important driver. The relative
importance was derived by normalizing the percentage shifts due to variation of each
driver with the percentage shift due to variation of the most important driver, in this
case the stress concentration factor. Table 3-18 gives the percentage shift in lives
and the relative importance for each driver.
3.A.2.9 Probability of Failure Curve Standardization
In order to standardize the results, the probability of failure vs. life curves were
generated for a given assurance level. The curve is constructed by first calculating
4o in Equation 2-5 for an assurance level of 95% by using the program LZERO. The
pertinent methodology is discussed in Section 2.1.1, the program description and
flowcharts are presented in Section 4.2.4, the user's guide for running this program
is given in Sections 6.4.13-6.4.18, and the code structure and listing are provided in
Section 7.4.3. The values of ;Lo for 6%, 10%, and 20% weld offsets are given in Table
3-17. Given _.o and the bounding value of/_, the assurance curve may be defined as
described in Section 2.3.12. The 95% assurance curves for the three weld offsets are
given in Figure 3-20.
3.A.3 ATD-HPFTP Second Stage Turbine Disk LCF Analysis Details
3.A.3.1 Selecting the Component, Failure Mode, and Critical Location
The turbine disk was chosen for analysis since it is a CRIT I component and the
deterministic analysis of the design resulted in an unacceptably low life. The failure
mode and critical location for this study were based on the deterministic analyses that
had been performed for the turbine disk during design. It was deemed appropriate
to apply the PFA methodology to evaluate its LCF failure risk.
3.A.3.2 Preliminary Deterministic Analysis
The stress, thermal, and fluid flow deterministic analyses performed by Pratt &
Whitney were used for formulating the driver transformation and to identify and
characterize driver distributions for the PFA. The steps of the Pratt & Whitney stress
analysis are as follows:
1 Perform coolant flow model to establish boundary conditions.
2 Perform 2-D thermal analysis to characterize the disk internal temperature field using
the boundary conditions from (1). This thermal analysis will provide the thermal
gradient and the metal temperature at the critical location
3 Perform 2-D FE stress analysis to obtain the mechanical stress due to rotor mass and
blade pull. This FE model is a radial cross section of the blade attachment area
with a fine mesh.
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4 Perform 2-D finite element stress analysis using the model of (3) and the disk internal
temperature field of (2) to obtain thermal stress sensitivities.
Perform 2-D FE stress analysis to obtain stress adjustment factor. This FE model is
an axial cross section of half of the monolithic disk with a coarse mesh.
3.A.3.3 Driver Characterization
The list of drivers for the turbine disk, their distributions, and ranges are given in
Table 3-7. The rationale for assigning the distributions for these drivers was presented
in Section 3.3.2.
3.A.3.4 Materials Characterization
As described in Section 3.3.1, Incone1100 notched S/N material data was used for
the turbine disk. The data is given in Table 3-19 and is shown plotted in Figure 3-25.
Based on the data points, a single data region was used since it was decided that the
In(S) vs. In(N) behavior was linear in the life ranges of interest. Prior to using the S/N
data for the turbine disk PFA, it was studied using the materials characterization
program MATCHR (described in Section 4.1).
The 95% confidence intervals on the coefficient of variation C and the slope m
denoted by/o and Jo, respectively, in Equations 2-24 and 2-26, and generated by
MATCHR for the IN100 notched data, are given in Table 3-20. Point estimates for C
and m are also given in the table. These point and interval estimates of C and m are
consistent with any exogenous constraints on C and m, so there is no need to impose
explicit constraints.
Table 3-19 Inconel 100 Notched S/N Data [10]
STRESS
S (psi)
160,000
160,000
160,000
140,000
130,000
130,000
120,000
120,000
110,000
LIFE
N (cycles)
636
677
1,019
4,743
3,824
4,163
3,749
11,349
39,600
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Table 3-20 Summaryof MaterialsCharacterizationStudyof IN100
NotchedData
Coefficient of Variation C Slope Parameter m
95% Confidence Interval Io = {0.037, 0.113} Jo = 5.73, 11.97
Point Estimates 0.055 8.85
Posterior Credibility Range 5.73
Lower bound -- 11.97
Upperbound
3.A.3.5 Time History Definition
The time history used for the turbine disk is described in Section 2.2.2.2 and shown
in Figure 2-28.
3.A.3.6 Probability of Failure Curve Parameter Estimation
The steps required to carry out the probability of failure curve parameter estimation
for this disk example are given in Figure 3-32. This procedure was used to obtain the
results discussed in Section 3.3.
The parameters of the prior distribution are estimated by determining a value for
,8, then estimating a and 0 for fixed `8. The first step in the procedure is to plot the
failure simulation results contained in file LOWLIF for the "all drivers" run. That plot
is shown in Figure 3-28.
The ,8 estimate is based on an approximate linear portion of the left-hand tail (.001
to .003 on the ordinate) for this example. This probability range corresponds to
simulated lives with index numbers 20 through 60, inclusive, in file LOWLIE A value
for ,8 is estimated by program BFIT. The pertinent methodology is discussed in
Section 2.1.1, the program description and flowcharts are presented in Section 4.2.2,
the user's guide for running this program is given in Sections 6.4.1-6.4.6, and the
code structure and listing are provided in Section 7.4.1. Program BFIT has provided
the estimate,8 = 2.7815 for this example.
The a and 0 estimate must be based on an extension of the data used to estimate
,8 in order to fit a model which is nonlinear in log-log space. It is only necessary to
consider points with probability in the range .001 to .01. a, 0 are estimated by the
program ABTFIT. The pertinent methodology is discussed in Section 2.1.1, the
program description and flowcharts are presented in Section 4.2.3, the user's guide
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34
6
8
9
Plot the failure simulation results contained in file LOWLIF in log-log space. That plot
is shown in Figure 3-28.
Since the data in Figure 3-28 from .001 to .003, that is, point 20 to point 60 of file
LOWLIF, is approximately linear, it can be used to estimate/_.
Create file BFITD to indicate the indices of the LOWLIF data to be used in the/_
estimation. See Section 6.4.3.1 for a detailed description of the contents of file
BFITD.
Run program BFIT. The pertinent methodology is discussed in Section 2.1.1, the
program description and flowcharts are presented in Section 4.2.2, the user's
guide for running this program is given in Sections 6.4.1-6.4.6, and the code
structure and listing are provided in Section 7.4.1. BFIT has two input files,
LOWLIF and BFITD, and two output files, BFITO and IOUTPR.
Obtain/_ estimate from output files BFITO and IOUTPR. Program BFIT has provided
the estimate of 2.7815.
In order for a and 8 to be uniquely determined, it is only necessary to consider
the range .001 to .01, that is, point 20 to point 200 inclusive, of file LOWLIF, for
the estimated curve to be nonlinear in log-log space. Create file PARAMS to
indicate the indices of the LOWLIF data to be used in the a, 8 estimation, the
initial values for a and 8, and any scaling factors required. See Section 6.4.9.1
for a detailed description of the contents of file PARAMS.
Run program ABTFIT. The pertinent methodology is discussed in Section 2.1.1, the
program description and flowcharts are presented in Section 4.2.3, the user's
guide for running this program is given in Sections 6.4.7-6.4.12, and the code
structure and listing are provided in Section 7.4.2. ABTFIT has two input files,
LOWLiF and PARAMS, and three output files, ABTOUT, BAYESD and IOUTPR.
Obtain a, 8 estimates from out._ut files ABTOUT and BAYESD. Program ABTFIT has
provided the values 1.14 x 10 "for 8 and 0.0204 for a.
Calculate assurance based on estimates of a,/_, 8. The assurance calculation is
performed by program LZERO. The pertinent methodology is discussed in Sec-
tion 2.1.1, the program description and flowcharts are presented in Section 4.2.4,
the user's guide for running this program is given in Sections 6.4.13-6.4.18, and
the code structure and listing are provided in Section 7.4.3.
Figure 3-32 Steps of the Probability of Failure Curve Parameter
Estimation for the ATD-HPFTP Second Stage Turbine
Disk LCF Problem
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for running this program is given in Section 6.4.7-6.4.12, and the code structure and
listing are provided in Section 7.4.2.
PARAMS requires initial values 9 for a and 0 that were obtained as follows:
B.11°= 121.108
B1 = 288.462
•SCALE"= (1/121) -01
0o = N._001 = (121.108) 2.7815 = 6.2280 x 10 5
=  o8x
XGUESS(2) = a o = - In .999 /In 2 = .0014434
2.7815
= 1.7
Program ABTFIT has provided the estimates 0 = 1.1360 x 10 7 and a = 0.020434.
3.A.3.7 Driver Sensitivity Analysis
As described in Section 2.3.10, a set of simulations were executed to obtain the
driver sensitivities. The first simulation was the nominal run, which included intrinsic
materials variation only (see Section 2.1.2.1); all the other drivers were fixed at their
nominal or most likely values. Figure 3-28 shows the output of the nominal simulation
for the turbine disk. The next analysis was the "all driver" variation analysis, which
was performed allowing all the drivers to vary. Figure 3-28 shows the output of the
all-driver run for the turbine disk.
Finally, the driver sensitivities were derived using simulations for which each driver
(together with intrinsic material variation) was allowed to vary one at a time while all
the other drivers were held at their nominal values. The output from these simulations
along with the results from the aforementioned all-driver variation and nominal runs
allows the drivers to be rank ordered and allows their relative importance to be
characterized. The impact of the drivers was calculated based on the failure lives at
9 The calculation of initial values is illustrated in Section 6.4.11.
10 B-lives were obtained from file LOWLIF. A B-life is the value of the failure parameter (e.g.,
failure time) at a failure probability specified as a percent: e.g., B.1 is the failure time at a
probability of .001 or .1%.
11 Life scaling factor is described in Section 6.4.9.
12 Calculation of initial guesses is described in Section 6.4.11.
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Table 3-21 Driver Sensitivity Analysis for the Turbine Disk
DRIVER
VARIATION
IN ANALYSIS
NOMINAL
ALL DRIVERS
;tKd
S/N MODEL PARAMETERS
'_Kt
(,o
AFt
B1 LIFE
(missions)
1116
288
487
568
1037
1070
1100
SHIFT IN
LIFE FROM
NOMINAL
828
629
549
79
46
15
% SHIFT IN
LIFE FROM
ALL DRIVERS
76
66
10
6
2
RELATIVE
IM PORTANCE
100
87
13
7
3
the .01 probability level, given in Table 3-21, for the all-driver, nominal, and driver
sensitivity runs.
To calculate the relative importance of a driver, the change in life from the nominal
analysis due to driver variation was first calculated as a percentage of the shift due to
the all driver variation for each driver. The largest shift was caused by variation in the
stress adjustment factor, which is therefore the most important driver. The relative
importance was derived by normalizing the percentage shifts due to variation of each
driver with the percentage shift due to variation of the most important driver, in this
case the stress adjustment factor. Table 3-21 gives the percentage shift in lives and
the relative importance for each driver.
3.A.3.8 Probability of Failure Curve Standardization
In order to standardize the results, the probability of failure vs. life curves were
generated for a given assurance level. The curve is constructed by first calculating
_.o in Equation 2-5 for an assurance level of 95% using the program LZERO. The
pertinent methodology is discussed in Section 2.1.1, the program description and
flowcharts are presented in Section 4.2.4, the user's guide for running this program
is given in Sections 6.4.13-6.4.18, and the code structure and listing are provided in
Section 7.4.3. The value Of Zo for the turbine disk was 4.2805 x 10 -9. Given Zo and
the bounding value of/_ the assurance curve may be defined as described in Section
2.3.12. The 95% assurance curve for the turbine disk is given in Figure 3-27.
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Appendix 3.B
Input And Output Files
3.B.1 HPOTP Main Discharge Duct HCF Analysis Files
Selected input and output files for the HPOTP main discharge duct "all driver"
analysis are given here. The analysis program DCTHCF requires two input files,
DCTHCD and RELATD, along with the force history files. Annotated examples of the
data file format for DCTHCD and RELATD input files are given in Figures 6-1 and 6-2.
Related material data was not used for this component and hence the RELATD file
was empty. The input file DCTHCD is given below. Section 6.1.3.1 contains a
description of the input variables and a user's guide for running DCTHCF.
The output files from a DCTHCF run are DCTHCO, LOWLIE DUMP, RELATO, and
IOUTPR. The DCTHCO, LOWLIF, and DUMP files are given below. The DCTHCO file
contains an echo of the input data, output from the S/N material model, and the B
lives. The LOWLIF file contains the lowest 200 (1% of total simulated)fatigue failure
lives for the discharge duct, and are shown plotted in Figure 3-10. The DUMP file
contains the results of the materials characterization calculations, including estimated
values of the S/N curve parameters.
Input File - DCTHCD
675
0
1
20000
2
0
0
i0
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
0.007
0 008
0 009
0 010
0 5O
0 O0
1 O0
1.20
0.50 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0
3.50 0.08696 0.3478 i0. I0.
PRECEDINEI PAGE BLANK NO3" FILMED
3 - 59
1.04
1.20
2.00
2.00
0.90
0.80
0.90
0.40
0.40
0.40
0.40
0.85
0.80
-1.38629
12
8130
'YNBP '
'ZNBP '
'YNBM2
'ZNBM2
'YNBM3 1
'ZNBM3 1
'YNBV2 1
'ZNBV2 1
'SIN1' 2
'SIN3' 2
'SIN5 ' 2
'SIN6 ' 2
i.
1.
1.
4675.
6.0
.112
4.
0.1115
0.1378
3.01E+07
1
20.
1.0
0.00
20001
0.235
0.300
0.350
0.400
0.450
0.500
0.550
1.43 0.30
1.34 0.30
2.00 0.15
2.00 0.20
I.i0
1.20
i. I0
0.60
0.60
0.60
0.60
1.15
1.20
0.95166
0.70 0.5
0.70 0.5
0.866667
0.933333
i0.
i0.
20900 42010 42010 3805
1 237.675 O. O.
1 190.53 O. O.
1 O. O. 181.21
1 O. O. 179.11
O. O. O.
O. O. O.
O. O. O.
O. O. O.
42.03382 18.83311 445.606
25.70783 28.35360 23.27139
63.3143 1.881339 4.904875
117.5516 37.80737 47.42376
2.000000
4.800000
7.200001
9.600001
12.50000
15.80000
20.0OO00
3805
O. O. O.
O. O. O.
O. O. O.
O. O. O.
626.175 O. O.
588.44 O. O.
O. 147.49 O.
O. 142.725 O.
109.3303 45.0776 39.34468
218.0569 45.83069 34.09022
57.7348 30.37338 79.56984
134.9266 176.1129 21.75083
3 - 60
0.580 24.00000
0.600 30.00000
0.600 200.0000
'-320 HOURGLASS + STRAIGHT'
178600. 220400. 1 20
20 0.05 1
150000. 65000.
140000. 261000.
120000. 265000.
160000. 377000.
130000. 694000.
ii0000. 2175000.
100000. 4198000.
105000. 5053000.
92000. 9210000.
95000. 9667000.
150000. 418000.
140000. 732000.
130000. 740000.
120000. 859000.
ii0000. 1181000.
i00000. 4020000.
92000. 5917000.
94000. 6522000.
90000. 6891000.
86000. 4460000.
0.00
1 0
1.0E+36
0.00
0 0.00 0.00
Output File - DCTHCO
Copyright (C) 1990, california Institute
Sponsorship under NASA Contract NAS7-918
of Technology. U.S.
is acknowledged.
Government
INPUT DATA
DRIVERS
WELD OFFSET (%) Be(0.50, 0.50)
Be(0.00, 0.00)
TEST = 1.00
PARAMETER DISTRIBUTIONS
RHO THETA
U(0.00000, 0.00000) U( 0.0, 0.0)
U(0.00000, 0.00000) U( 0.0, 0.0)
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K WELD (OD)
K WELD (ID)
K GEOM (OD)
Be(l.20, 3.50)
Be(l.04, 1.43)
Be(l.20, 1.34)
U(0.08696, 0.34780)
U(0.30000, 0.70000)
U(0.30000, 0.70000)
LAMBDARANDOM
LAMBDA SINE
k: U(2.00000, 2.00000)
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION: 0.150
STRAIN GAGE FACTOR: 0.8666670
k: U(2.00000, 2.00000)
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION: 0.200
STRAIN GAGE FACTOR: 0.9333330
LAMBDA STATIC
DYNAMIC STRESS ANALYSIS
STATIC STRESS ANALYSIS
STRESS CARRYOVER FACTORS
IN-PLANE AXIAL
OUT-OF-PLANE AXIAL
IN-PLANE CIRCUMFERENTIAL
OUT-OF-PLANE CIRCUMFERENTIAL
OVALITY ANALYSIS FACTOR
LAMBDA KOFF
DAMAGE MODEL ACCURACY
U( 0.90000, i.i0000)
U( 0.80000, 1.20000)
U( 0.90000, i. I0000)
U( 0.40000, 0.60000)
U( 0.40000, 0.60000)
U( 0.40000, 0.60000)
U( 0.40000, 0.60000)
U( 0.85000, 1.15000)
U( 0.80000, 1.20000)
U(ln 0.25000, in 2.59 001)
U(10.0,
U( 0.5,
U( 0.5,
io.0)
lO.O)
10.0)
LOADS INPUT
P LOADS T LOADS M2 LOADS M3 LOADS V2 LOADS V3 LOADS
(LBS) (IN.-LBS) (IN.-LBS) (IN.-LBS) (LBS) (LBS)
STATIC
8130.0000 20900.0000 42010.0000 42010.0000 3805.0000 3805.0000
YNBP
237.6750 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
ZNBP
190.5300 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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YNBM2
0.0000 0.0000 181.2100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
ZNBM2
0.0000 0.0000 179.1100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
YNBM3
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 626.1750 0.0000 0.0000
ZNBM3
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 588.4400 0.0000 0.0000
YNBV2
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 147.4900 0.0000
ZNBV2
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 142.7250 0.0000
SIN1
42.0338 18.8331 445.6060 109.3303 45.0776 39.3447
SIN3
25.7078 28.3536 23.2714 218.0569 45.8307 34.0902
SIN5
63.3143 1.8813 4.9049 57.7348 30.3734 79.5698
SIN6
117.5516 37.8074 47.4238 134.9266 176.1129 21.7508
GEOMETRIC AND OTHER INPUT
K GEOM (ID)
K HOOP (OD )
K HOOP (ID)
LIMIT PRESSURE, PSI
BEND RADIUS, IN.
WELD DISTANCE FROM ELBOW TANGENCY LINE,
DUCT INSIDE DIAMETER, IN.
MINIMUM WALL THICKNESS, IN.
WALL THICKNESS AT BEND (ID), IN.
ELASTIC MODULUS, PSI
ANALYSIS LOCATION
ANGLE PHI (DEG)
IN.
1.00
1.00
1.00
4675.
6.00
0.112
4.00
0.1115
0.1378
0.30 IE+08
1
20.0
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STRESS-TIME HISTORY PERIOD, SEC
STRESS-TIME HISTORY NOISE FILTER, PSI
NUMBER OF TIME-VARYING LOADS
NUMBER OF POINTS IN HISTORIES
1.00
0.0
12
20001
MATERIAL INPUT
DESCRIPTION :
YIELD STRENGTH
ULTIMATE STRENGTH
NUMBER OF POINTS
-320 HOURGLASS + STRAIGHT
0.17860E+06
0.22040E+06
20
ORIGINAL S/N STRESS
STRESS LIFE RATIO
0.15000E+06 65000.
0.14000E+06 261000.
0.12000E+06 265000.
0.16000E+06 377000.
0.13000E+06 694000.
0.11000E+06 2175000.
0.10000E+06 4198000.
0.10500E+06 5053000.
0.92000E+05 9210000.
0.95000E+05 9667000.
0.15000E+06 418000.
0.14000E+06 732000.
0.13000E+06 740000.
0.12000E+06 859000.
0.11000E+06 1181000.
0.10000E+06 4020000.
0.92000E+05 5917000.
0.94000E+05 6522000.
0.90000E+05 6891000.
0.86000E+05 4460000.
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
REGION
i
i
i
i
I
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
TRANSFORMED S/N
STRESS LIFE
0.11086E+06 65000.
0.99773E+05 261000.
0.79814E+05 265000.
0.12280E+06 377000.
0.89449E+05 694000.
0.70802E+05 2175000.
0.62353E+05 4198000.
0.66510E+05 5053000.
0.55964E+05 9210000.
0.58323E+05 9667000.
0.11086E+06 418000.
0.99773E+05 732000.
0.89449E+05 740000.
0.79814E+05 859000.
0.70802E+05 1181000.
0.62353E+05 4020000.
0.55964E+05 5917000.
0.57532E+05 6522000.
0.54416E+05 6891000.
0.51374E+05 4460000.
3 - 64
THERE IS 1 REGION(S) WITH DATA
AND 0 REGION(S) TO THE RIGHT WITHOUT DATA
THE UPPER BOUND(S) OF THE REGION(S) ARE (CYCLES):
0.100E+37
EXOGENOUS INFORMATION
CONSTRAINT ON COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION, C:
EXPLICIT CONSTRAINT ON m FOR EACH REGION:
REGION # OF POINTS LOWER BOUND
1 0 0.0000
0.0000
UPPER BOUND
0.0000
B LIVES: EMPIRICAL
0.00100 0.164506E+05
0.00200 0.256184E+05
0.00300 0.328444E+05
0.00400 0.397100E+05
0.00500 0.454202E+05
0.00600 0.530106E+05
0.00700 0.583856E+05
0.00800 0.625631E+05
0.00900 0.677342E+05
0.01000 0.733181E+05
0.50000 0.334764E+07
Output File - LOWLIF
1, 5.E-5, 2171.08268607
2, 1.E-4, 2274.610282879
3, 1.5E-4, 5397.61433618
4, 2.E-4, 5436.913987152
5, 2.5E-4, 7590.725113991
6, 3.E-4, 8243.513935069
7, 3.5E-4, 9478.598493334
8, 4.E-4, 9592.334153456
9, 4.5E-4, 10961.29979166
10, 5.E-4, 11248.37224586
11, 5.5E-4, 12006.79530942
12, 6.E-4, 12394.79049961
13, 6.5E-4, 12458.42625798
3 - 65
14,
15,
16,
17,
18,
19,
20,
21,
22,
23,
24,
25,
26,
27,
28,
29,
30,
31,
32,
33,
34,
35,
36,
37,
38,
39,
40,
41,
42,
43,
44,
45,
46,
47,
48,
49,
50,
51,
52,
53,
54,
55,
56,
57,
58,
59,
60,
61,
62,
63,
7.E-4, 12615.58511637
7.5E-4, 13077.76799579
8.E-4, 13245.47144751
8.5E-4, 13298.6206169
9.E-4, 13398.09257794
9.5E-4, 14890.87886404
I.E-3, 16450.60402927
1.05E-3, 17930.50652629
I.IE-3, 18318.76045862
1.15E-3, 18616.07977373
1.2E-3, 18825.78120489
1.25E-3, 19031.35540271
1.3E-3, 19896.02557763
1.35E-3, 19896.45621919
1.4E-3, 20283.58254505
1.45E-3, 20716.21926102
1.5E-3, 21090.96928527
1.55E-3, 21771.34472699
1.6E-3, 22473.12998514
1.65E-3, 22483.11184718
1.7E-3, 23031.93757268
1.75E-3, 23576.6407008
1.8E-3, 23744.0658441
1.85E-3, 24557.7138378
1.9E-3, 24806.64062718
1.95E-3, 24983.14710955
2.E-3, 25618.40563241
2.05E-3, 25653.09540362
2.1E-3, 26190.33441654
2.15E-3, 26337.13572945
2.2E-3, 28353.02541956
2.25E-3, 28834.7318554
2.3E-3, 29108.81760869
2.35E-3, 29162.57978578
2.4E-3, 29244.09472359
2.45E-3, 29603.45152701
2.5E-3, 29632.66087405
2.55E-3, 30291.34679017
2.6E-3, 30446.00942229
2.65E-3, 30493.38478737
2.7E-3, 30673.46359312
2.75E-3, 30760.85836022
2.8E-3, 31007.51798871
2.85E-3, 32148.98623899
2.9E-3, 32372.47132738
2.95E-3, 32390.50914646
3.E-3, 32844.36090394
3.05E-3, 33014.88860404
3.1E-3, 33190.12210164
3.15E-3, 33270.0824175
3 - 66
64,
65,
66,
67,
68,
69,
70,
71,
72,
73,
74,
75,
76,
77,
78,
79,
80,
81,
82,
83,
84,
85,
86,
87,
88,
89,
90,
91,
92,
93,
94,
95,
96,
97,
98,
99,
i00,
i01,
102,
103,
104,
105,
106,
107,
108,
109,
Ii0,
iii,
112,
113,
3.2E-3, 34615.02721604
3.25E-3, 34748.27188751
3.3E-3, 34872.98895736
3.35E-3, 35068.65368964
3.4E-3, 35096.39424284
3.45E-3, 35281.89190532
3.5E-3, 35425.55976141
3.55E-3, 35897.72810911
3.6E-3, 36560.07826949
3.65E-3, 36588.46946974
3.7E-3, 37605.65296311
3.75E-3, 37978.29169689
3.8E-3, 39305.80601728
3.85E-3, 39374.22514173
3.9E-3, 39490.47963762
3.95E-3, 39699.64167016
4.E-3, 39709.99000531
4.05E-3, 40508.29704049
4.1E-3, 41214.003737
4.15E-3, 41506.81491461
4.2E-3, 41532.92876058
4.25E-3, 41622.05616043
4.3E-3, 42243.61170326
4.35E-3, 42632.96056193
4.4E-3, 42744.1434916
4.45E-3, 43060.05554056
4.5E-3, 43148.21678663
4.55E-3, 43425.31080851
4.6E-3, 43485.79372142
4.65E-3, 43665.25474881
4.7E-3, 43679.23619109
4.75E-3, 44087.79399035
4.8E-3, 44466.30256251
4.85E-3, 44838.15511878
4.9E-3, 44938.80625138
4.95E-3, 45160.62247766
5.E-3, 45420.16962913
5.05E-3, 45470.65979261
5.1E-3, 45652.11464271
5.15E-3, 46127.71679451
5.2E-3, 46251.00996064
5.25E-3, 46372.88535658
5.3E-3, 47119.6325578
5.35E-3, 47137.13100697
5.4E-3, 48171.37806459
5.45E-3, 48207.11856747
5.5E-3, 48318.70721881
5.55E-3, 48931.61143896
5.6E-3, 49703.44909796
5.65E-3, 49956.33191574
3 - 67
114,
115,
116,
117,
118,
119,
120,
121,
122,
123,
124,
125,
126,
127,
128,
129,
130,
131,
132,
133,
134,
135,
136,
137,
138,
139,
140,
141,
142,
143,
144,
145,
146,
147,
148,
149,
150,
151,
152,
153,
154,
155,
156,
157,
158,
159,
160,
161,
162,
163,
5.7E-3, 50234.61968773
5.75E-3, 50398.55301772
5.8E-3, 50644.56677104
5.85E-3, 51204.9658348
5.9E-3, 52501.46119135
5.95E-3, 52904.03713305
6.E-3, 53010.6194896
6.05E-3, 53167.75826465
6.1E-3, 53357.64587097
6.15E-3, 53468.23112726
6.2E-3, 53929.93276736
6.25E-3, 54082.80324984
6.3E-3, 54293.44219992
6.35E-3, 54346.43533946
6.4E-3, 55234.56773908
6.45E-3, 55326.77795268
6.5E-3, 55585.55479447
6.55E-3, 55938.43019878
6.6E-3, 56350.38162224
6.65E-3, 56711.10774186
6.7E-3, 56817.21030027
6.75E-3, 56967.09611928
6.8E-3, 57346.04643495
6.85E-3, 57566.47058465
6.9E-3, 57613.30154789
6.95E-3, 57832.43925853
7.E-3, 58385.56620338
7.05E-3, 58462.89978311
7.1E-3, 58624.28036547
7.15E-3, 58782.60363557
7.2E-3, 58971.56159982
7.25E-3, 59110.23542496
7.3E-3, 59122.95734245
7.35E-3, 59272.60177966
7.4E-3, 59324.77926608
7.45E-3, 59465.20911553
7.5E-3, 59763.82855003
7.55E-3, 60154.6430269
7.6E-3, 60396.64734786
7.65E-3, 60406.48823455
7.7E-3, 60515.31715323
7.75E-3, 61252.11016131
7.8E-3, 61363.38086049
7.85E-3, 61453.41837845
7.9E-3, 61578.69974975
7.95E-3, 61600.93010134
8.E-3, 62563.0930965
8.05E-3, 63269.80866235
8.1E-3, 63291.9881826
8.15E-3, 63950.16419736
3 - 68
164,
165,
166,
167,
168,
169,
170,
171,
172,
173,
174,
175,
176,
177,
178,
179,
180,
181,
182,
183,
184,
185,
186,
187,
188,
189,
190,
191,
192,
193,
194,
195,
196,
197,
198,
199,
200,
8.2E-3,
8.25E-3,
8.3E-3,
8.35E-3,
8.4E-3,
8.45E-3,
8.5E-3,
8.55E-3,
8.6E-3,
63965.346384
64102.87159225
64415.36565053
64541.8794529
65163.69082135
65519.40846814
66120.52340431
66308.5054934
66494.47817761
8.65E-3, 66554.46816072
8.7E-3, 66844.66829289
8.75E-3, 67103.77873876
8.8E-3, 67345.80119819
8.85E-3, 67352.66901473
8.9E-3, 67546.08780309
8.95E-3, 67603.05652641
9.E-3, 67734.1771025
9.05E-3, 67883.78039904
9.1E-3, 68326.94572489
9.15E-3, 68594.12670141
9.2E-3, 68746.50091648
9.25E-3, 69099.14523026
9.3E-3, 69250.94593986
9.35E-3, 69337.50660218
9.4E-3, 69548.02239665
9.45E-3, 69554.70766341
9.5E-3, 69635.84059297
9.55E-3, 70031.91794349
9.6E-3, 70150.2009716
9.65E-3, 70318.54906011
9.7E-3, 70342.87926757
9.75E-3, 71264.7486166
9.8E-3, 71823.56061707
9.85E-3, 72118.48961609
9.9E-3, 72605.2876764
9.95E-3, 73300.5780415
I.E-2, 73318.12226789
Output File- DUMP
copyright (C) 1990, california Institute of Technology. U.S.
Sponsorship under NASA Contract NAS7-918 is acknowledged.
Government
RESULTS OF INFORMATION AGGREGATION CALCULATIONS
95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS ON C AND m FOR EACH REGION
3 - 69
REGION : 1 Io = ( 0.092758541, 0.181539608)
Jo = ( 3.596348060, 5.874000250)
POINT ESTIMATES OF C AND m FOR EACH REGION
REGION E(C) E(m)
1 0.122759425 4.735174
POSTERIOR CREDIBILITY RANGE ON m FOR EACH REGION
REGION LOWER BOUND UPPER BOUND
1 3.5963 5.8740
PARAMETER VALUES FOR MEDIAN S/N CURVE
NUMBER OF REGIONS: 1 E(BETAo) = 9.6555 E(k) = 14.2292
REGION m K LIFE BOUND STRESS BOUND
1 4.73517 0.15458E+07 0.I00E+37 0.00000E+00
3.B.2 LPFTP Turbine Drive Duct HCF Analysis Files
Selected input and output files for the LPFTP turbine drive duct "all driver" analysis
are given here. The analysis program DCTHCF requires two input files, DCTHCD and
RELATD, along with the force history files. Related material data was not used for this
component and hence the RELATD file was empty. The input file DCTHCD is given
below. The output files from a DCTHCF run are DCTHCO, LOWLIF, DUMP, RELATO,
and IOUTPR. The DCTHCO, LOWLIE and DUMP files are given below. The DCTHCO
file contains an echo of the input data, output from the S/N material model, and the
Blives. The LOWLIF file contains the lowest 200 (1% of total simulated) fatigue failure
lives for the discharge duct, and they are shown plotted in Figure 3-13. The DUMP
file contains the results of the materials characterization calculations, including
estimated values of the S/N curve parameters.
3 - 70
Input File - DCTHCD
675
0
1
20000
2
0
0
10
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
0.007
0.008
0.009
0.010
0.40 0.40 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
1.00
1.05 1.45 0.50
1.26 1.74 0.30
1.21 1.35 0.30
2.00 2.00 0.15
2.00 2.00 0.20
0.90 i. I0
0.80 1.20
0.90 1.10
0.40 0.60
0.40 0.60
0.40 0.60
0.40 0.60
0.85 1.15
0.80 1.20
-1.38629 0.95166
22
2138.0 6820.0
'XP' 1 42.744
'YP' 1 28.0675
'ZP' 1 16.239
'XT' 1 0.0
'YT' 1 0.0
'ZT' 1 0.0
'XM2' 1 0.0
'YM2' 1 0.0
'ZM2' 1 0.0
'XM3' 1 0.0
0.00 0.0 0.0
0.00 0.0 0.0
0.50 i0. I0.
0.70 0.5 i0.
0.70 0.5 i0.
0.866667
0.933333
16775.0 16775.0 1080.0 1080.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
145.41 0.0 0.0 0.0
169.26 0.0 0.0 0.0
152.29 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 41.675 0.0 0.0
0.0 42.187 0.0 0.0
0.0 68.5355 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 202.675 0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
3 - 71
'YM3' 1
"ZM3' 1
'XV2 ' 1
'YV2 ' 1
'SIN1 ' 2
•SIN2 ' 2
'SIN3 ' 2
'SIN4 ' 2
'SIN5 ' 2
'SIN6 ' 2
'SIN7 ' 2
•SIN12' 2
1.00 1.00
5293.
6.00
0.70
2.0
0.118
0.166
2.7E+07
1
25.
1.5
0.00
30001
0.235
0.300
0.350
0.400
0.450
0.500
0.550
0.580
0.600
0.600
'75 F,
158600.
7 -1.0
70000.
60000.
50000.
40000.
35000.
33000.
32000.
3 -1.0
30000.
29000.
28000.
5 -1.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
21.91435
78.54595
19.6242
166.3695
24.15575
14.80325
11.1594
6.76763
1.00
2.000000
4.800000
7.200001
9.600001
12.50000
15.80000
20.00000
24.00000
30.00000
200.0000
INCOLOY 903'
186500.
1
59900.
85300.
213100.
473900.
892100.
865100.
744100.
2
2799400.
5631800.
2121200.
1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
43.9086
1.60925
3.35879
0.548139
1.04256
0.083479
1.61855
0.1371
2O
0.0 202.305 0.0 0.0
0.0 126.755 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 57.689 0.0
0.0 0.0 42.7605 0.0
39.4836 60.53955 14.9129 12.88245
0.973577 73.7664 4.589225 0.264931
1.339263 32.92415 7.497715 0.721379
4.24984 189.0855 22.3281 0.099988
0.753309 18.54625 1.7687 0.285259
0.238039 18.04635 3.721265 0.05662
6.060575 8.033975 2.63346 0.58617
0.394779 17.00245 1.566452 0.200407
3 - 72
70000. 29000.
60000. 53100.
50000. 142700.
40000. 170500.
35000. 385900.
1 -i.0 2
30000. 1201600.
1 -I.0 1
28000. 614800.
3 -i.0 2
28000. 3796000.
27000. 1345600.
26000. 18940700.
0.00
2 0
1.0E+06
1.0E+36
0.15
2 0.000 3.987284
2 0.000 12.57616
Output File - DCTHCO
Copyright (C) 1990, california Institute of Technology. U.S. Government
Sponsorship under NASA Contract NAS7-918 is acknowledged.
INPUT DATA
WELD OFFSET (%)
K WELD (OD)
K WELD (ID)
K GEOM (OD )
DRIVERS
Be(0.40, 0.40)
Be(0.00, 0.00)
TEST = 1.00
Be(l.05, 1.45)
Be(l.26, 1.74)
Be(l.21, 1.35)
PARAMETER DISTRIBUTIONS
RHO THETA
U(0.00000, 0.00000) U( 0.0, 0.0)
U(0.00000, 0.00000) U( 0.0, 0.0)
U(0.50000, 0.50000) U(10.0, i0.0)
U(0.30000, 0.70000) U( 0.5, i0.0)
U(0.30000, 0.70000) U( 0.5, i0.0)
LAMBDA RANDOM k: U(2.00000, 2.00000)
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION: 0.150
STRAIN GAGE FACTOR: 0.8666670
3 - 73
LAMBDA SINE k: U(2.00000, 2.00000)
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION: 0.200
STRAIN GAGE FACTOR: 0.9333330
LAMBDA STATIC
DYNAMIC STRESS ANALYSIS
STATIC STRESS ANALYSIS
STRESS CARRYOVER FACTORS
IN-PLANE AXIAL
OUT-OF-PLANE AXIAL
IN-PLANE CIRCUMFERENTIAL
OUT-OF-PLANE CIRCUMFERENTIAL
OVALITY ANALYSIS FACTOR
LAMBDA KOFF
DAMAGE MODEL ACCURACY
U( 0.90000, i. I0000)
U( 0.80000, 1.20000)
U( 0.90000, i.i0000)
U( 0.40000, 0.60000)
U( 0.40000, 0.60000)
U( 0.40000, 0.60000)
U( 0.40000, 0.60000)
U( 0.85000, 1.15000)
U( 0.80000, 1.20000)
U(in 0.25000, in 2.59001)
LOADS INPUT
P LOADS
(LBS)
STATIC
2138.0000
XP
42.7440
YP
28.0675
ZP
16.2390
XT
0.0000
YT
0.0000
ZT
0.0000
XM2
0.0000
YM2
T LOADS
(IN.-LBS)
6820.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
145.4100
169.2600
152.2900
0.0000
M2 LOADS
(IN.-LBS)
16775.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
41.6750
M3 LOADS
(IN.-LBS)
16775.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
V2 LOADS
(LBS)
1080.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
V3 LOADS
(LBS)
1080.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
3 - 74
0.0000 0.0000 42.1870 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
ZM2
0.0000 0.0000 68.5355 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
XM3
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 202.6750 0.0000 0.0000
YM3
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 202.3050 0.0000 0.0000
ZM3
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 126.7550 0.0000 0.0000
XV2
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 57.6890 0.0000
YV2
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 42.7605 0.0000
SIN1
21.9144 43.9086 39.4836 60.5395 14.9129 12.8825
SIN2
78.5460 1.6093 0.9736 73.7664 4.5892 0.2649
SIN3
19.6242 3.3588 1.3393 32.9242 7.4977 0.7214
SIN4
166.3695 0.5481 4.2498 189.0855 22.3281 0.1000
SIN5
24.1558 1.0426 0.7533 18.5462 1.7687 0.2853
SIN6
14.8032 0.0835 0.2380 18.0463 3.7213 0.0566
SIN7
11.1594 1.6185 6.0606 8.0340 2.6335 0.5862
SIN12
6.7676 0.1371 0.3948 17.0024 1.5665 0.2004
GEOMETRIC AND OTHER INPUT
K GEOM (ID)
K HOOP (OD)
K HOOP (ID)
LIMIT PRESSURE, PSI
BEND RADIUS, IN.
WELD DISTANCE FROM ELBOW TANGENCY LINE,
DUCT INSIDE DIAMETER, IN.
IN.
1.00
1.00
1.00
5293.
6.00
0.700
2.00
3 - 75
MINIMUM WALL THICKNESS, IN.
WALL THICKNESS AT BEND (ID), IN.
ELASTIC MODULUS, PSI
ANALYSIS LOCATION
ANGLE PHI (DEG)
STRESS-TIME HISTORY PERIOD, SEC
STRESS-TIME HISTORY NOISE FILTER, PSI
NUMBER OF TIME-VARYING LOADS
NUMBER OF POINTS IN HISTORIES
0.1180
0.1660
0.270E+08
1
25.0
1.50
0.0
22
30001
MATERIAL INPUT
DESCRIPTION: 75 F, INCOLOY 903
YIELD STRENGTH
ULTIMATE STRENGTH
NUMBER OF POINTS
ORIGINAL S/N STRESS
STRESS LIFE RATIO
0.70000E+05 59900. -1.00
0.60000E+05 85300. -1.00
0.50000E+05 213100. -1.00
0.40000E+05 473900. -1.00
0.35000E+05 892100. -1.00
0.33000E+05 865100. -1.00
0.32000E+05 744100. -1.00
0.30000E+05 2799400. -1.00
0.29000E+05 5631800. -1.00
0.28000E+05 2121200. -1.00
0.70000E+05 29000. -1.00
0.60000E+05 53100. -1.00
0.50000E+05 142700. -1.00
0.40000E+05 170500. -1.00
0.15860E+06
0.18650E+06
20
REGION
TRANSFORMED S/N
STRESS LIFE
0.70000E+05
0 60000E+05
0 50000E+05
0 40000E+05
0 35000E+05
0 33000E+05
0 32000E+05
0 30000E+05
0 29000E+05
0.28000E+05
0.70000E+05
0.60000E+05
0.50000E+05
0.40000E+05
59900.
85300.
213100.
473900.
892100.
865100.
744100.
2799400.
5631800.
2121200.
29000.
53100.
142700.
170500.
3 - 76
0.35000E+05 385900. -i.00 1 0.35000E+05
0.30000E+05 1201600. -1.00 2 0.30000E+05
0.28000E+05 614800. -i.00 1 0.28000E+05
0.28000E+05 3796000. -i.00 2 0.28000E+05
0.27000E+05 1345600. -i.00 2 0.27000E+05
0.26000E+05 18940700. -i.00 2 0.26000E+05
385900.
1201600.
614800.
3796000.
1345600.
18940700.
THERE IS 2 REGION(S) WITH DATA
AND 0 REGION(S) TO THE RIGHT WITHOUT DATA
THE UPPER BOUND(S) OF THE REGION(S) ARE (CYCLES):
0.I00E+07
0.I00E+37
EXOGENOUS INFORMATION
CONSTRAINT ON COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION, C:
EXPLICIT CONSTRAINT ON m FOR EACH REGION:
REGION # OF POINTS LOWER BOUND
1 2 0.0000
2 2 0.0000
0.1500
UPPER BOUND
3.9873
12.5762
B LIVES: EMPIRICAL
0.00100 0.274755E+05
0.00200 0.383248E+05
0.00300 0.505642E+05
0.00400 0.643003E+05
0.00500 0.785574E+05
0.00600 0.884030E+05
0.00700 0.999464E+05
0.00800 0.II0974E+06
0.00900 0.122820E+06
0.01000 0.136070E+06
0.50000 0.713371E+09
Output File - LOWLIF
i, 5.E-5, 5603.765356757
2, I.E-4, 5686.285311492
3 - 77
3f
4,
5,
6,
7,
8,
9,
i0,
Ii,
12,
13,
14,
15,
16,
17,
18,
19,
20,
21,
22,
23,
24,
25,
26,
27,
28,
29,
30,
31,
32,
33,
34,
35,
36,
37,
38,
39,
40,
41,
42,
43,
44,
45,
46,
47,
48,
49,
50,
51,
52,
1.5E-4, 6433.169421466
2.E-4, 7077.980999079
2.5E-4, 7996.58950548
3.E-4, 10592.64629652
3.5E-4, 11409.4933516
4.E-4, 12283.72670257
4.5E-4, 13612.466679
5.E-4, 13864.93582738
5.5E-4, 15001.04129354
6.E-4, 17990.54681255
6.5E-4, 23196.74710228
7.E-4, 24591.82586467
7.5E-4, 26092.29722913
8.E-4, 26543.75670674
8.5E-4, 26745.60283963
9.E-4, 26802.3800698
9.5E-4, 26993.4418659
I.E-3, 27475.5326694
1.05E-3, 27823.33684902
I.IE-3, 29152.07648564
1.15E-3, 29171.93138802
1.2E-3, 29573.79403915
1.25E-3, 29983.66505427
1.3E-3, 30020.49929504
1.35E-3, 30730.58813945
1.4E-3, 31818.28147166
1.45E-3, 32078.43432697
1.5E-3, 32312.58705008
1.55E-3, 33443.5928183
1.6E-3, 33944.00211847
1.65E-3, 34073.0826797
1.7E-3, 34446.13242596
1.75E-3, 34628.64657622
1.8E-3, 34912.88128041
1.85E-3, 35636.18811894
1.9E-3, 37006.21294047
1.95E-3, 38092.36954628
2.E-3, 38324.78814331
2.05E-3, 39263.60630392
2.1E-3, 40174.96787758
2.15E-3, 40467.65864107
2.2E-3, 40572.75490531
2.25E-3, 40585.81106176
2.3E-3, 40799.03000649
2.35E-3, 41315.82068212
2.4E-3, 41657.95489419
2.45E-3, 41972.4804694
2.5E-3, 42114.67488451
2.55E-3, 42529.3518521
2.6E-3, 42581.81576417
3 - 78
53,
54,
55,
56,
57,
58,
59,
60,
61,
62,
63,
64,
65,
66,
67,
68,
69,
70,
71,
72,
73,
74,
75,
76,
77,
78,
79,
80,
81,
82,
83,
84,
85,
86,
87,
88,
89,
90,
91,
92,
93,
94,
95,
96,
97,
98,
99,
i00,
i01,
102,
2.65E-3, 44327.46170315
2.7E-3, 44817.43749491
2.75E-3, 46465.8858277
2.8E-3, 48511.14449324
2.85E-3, 49314.87507409
2.9E-3, 49613.19530952
2.95E-3, 50021.7885656
3.E-3, 50564.21599362
3.05E-3, 52221.61596956
3.1E-3, 52489.29502605
3.15E-3, 53484.15740996
3.2E-3, 53544.35435706
3.25E-3, 53772.27288086
3.3E-3, 54502.37085461
3.35E-3, 54778.57663731
3.4E-3, 55165.42363888
3.45E-3, 56459.15886717
3.5E-3, 56656.17288078
3.55E-3, 57372.66680184
3.6E-3, 59359.49645979
3.65E-3, 59501.69612314
3.7E-3, 60825.8373782
3.75E-3, 60952.32209879
3.8E-3, 61266.72189539
3.85E-3, 61541.91532104
3.9E-3, 62831.75816497
3.95E-3, 63547.40623241
4.E-3, 64300.33685851
4.05E-3, 64990.7651771
4.1E-3, 65693.61651306
4.15E-3, 67062.36182379
4.2E-3, 67952.65012623
4.25E-3, 67966.85507035
4.3E-3, 68414.1171338
4.35E-3, 68526.89219322
4.4E-3, 68860.78294691
4.45E-3, 70528.3458314
4.5E-3, 71379.60992727
4.55E-3, 71678.38306004
4.6E-3, 71695.41031714
4.65E-3, 73126.40512159
4.7E-3, 74014.94263623
4.75E-3, 74873.24701067
4.8E-3, 75093.57496214
4.85E-3, 75901.18488815
4.9E-3, 76837.83908576
4.95E-3, 76976.54838642
5.E-3, 78557.42795391
5.05E-3, 78992.00096167
5.1E-3, 79229.39570199
3 - 79
103,
104,
105,
106,
107,
108,
109,
110,
111,
112,
113,
114,
115,
116,
117,
118,
119,
120,
121,
122,
123,
124,
125,
126,
127,
128,
129,
130,
131,
132,
133,
134,
135,
136,
137,
138,
139,
140,
141,
142,
143,
144,
145,
146,
147,
148,
149,
150,
151,
152,
5.15E-3,
5.2E-3,
5.25E-3,
5.3E-3,
5.35E-3,
5.4E-3,
5.45E-3,
5.5E-3,
5.55E-3,
5.6E-3,
5.65E-3,
5.7E-3,
5.75E-3,
5.8E-3,
5.85E-3,
5.9E-3,
5.95E-3,
79655.87573819
79992.97567942
80408.01544155
81831.58969958
82089.75634541
82651.34975836
83872.60081398
85402.48252511
85451.73880384
85912.67397663
86041.16338772
86152.71655872
86959.73810709
87492.94913473
87686.02957545
88071.36981785
88282.07265443
6.E-3, 88403.03459386
6.05E-3, 89183.98322008
6.1E-3, 90536.43212354
6.15E-3, 91120.61809887
6.2E-3, 91948.27461359
6.25E-3, 92638.90366091
6.3E-3, 92853.75233303
6.35E-3, 93050.65487485
6.4E-3, 93524.76449977
6.45E-3, 94354.12555006
6.5E-3, 94792.44497588
6.55E-3, 95745.49949854
6.6E-3, 97765.41234892
6.65E-3, 98664.81561846
6.7E-3, 98769.64161344
6.75E-3, 98935.8769087
6.8E-3, 99079.62891364
6.85E-3, 99121.49305396
6.9E-3, 99839.57108528
6.95E-3, 99852.70559686
7.E-3, 99946.41616208
7.05E-3, 99962.75543066
7.1E-3, 100080.0446134
7.15E-3, 100218.3024798
7.2E-3, 101669.104322
7.25E-3, 101816.5907939
7.3E-3, 102081.8704252
7.35E-3, 102318.2447821
7.4E-3, 103613.7512834
7.45E-3, 104392.6824486
7.5E-3, 104418.6836832
7.55E-3, 104657.3606114
7.6E-3, 105911.0555323
3 - 80
153,
154,
155,
156,
157,
158,
159,
160,
161,
162,
163,
164,
165,
166,
167,
168,
169,
170,
171,
172,
173,
174,
175,
176,
177,
178,
179,
180,
181,
182,
183,
184,
185,
186,
187,
188,
189,
190,
191,
192,
193,
194,
195,
196,
197,
198,
199,
200,
7.65E-3, 106932.51511
7.7E-3, 107331.0389073
7.75E-3, 108021.7003811
7.8E-3, 108491.4387238
7.85E-3, 109627.7429307
7.9E-3, 109760.502436
7.95E-3, 110859.1263592
8.E-3, 110974.1482473
8.05E-3, 111745.2881768
8.1E-3, 112218.4228104
8.15E-3, 112682.0621298
8.2E-3, 114015.0054024
8.25E-3, 114196.7326355
8.3E-3, 115794.9572814
8.35E-3, 115807.1656825
8.4E-3, 115871.3692813
8.45E-3, 117110.3954834
8.5E-3, 117528.4808907
8.55E-3, 117735.2485667
8.6E-3, 117755.6719641
8.65E-3, 117984.5071406
8.7E-3, 118379.332936
8.75E-3, 119797.4205213
8.8E-3, 121633.2756584
8.85E-3, 122248.3354606
8.9E-3, 122588.7987535
8.95E-3, 122778.3892267
9.E-3, 122819.5130249
9.05E-3, 122951.1159032
9.1E-3, 123072.1599377
9.15E-3, 124205.9447018
9.2E-3, 124692.6470904
9.25E-3, 125857.7661101
9.3E-3, 125918.3411274
9.35E-3, 126313.9718308
9.4E-3, 126473.3023551
9.45E-3, 127291.2592762
9.5E-3, 128178.827365
9.55E-3, 128187.0790466
9.6E-3, 129780.1010373
9.65E-3, 130930.0785701
9.7E-3, 131940.5187697
9.75E-3, 132256.5441974
9.8E-3, 132812.2435942
9.85E-3, 133010.3251245
9.9E-3, 135402.23056
9.95E-3, 135721.5964869
I.E-2, 136070.0289122
3 -81
Output File - DUMP
Copyright (C) 1990, california Institute of Technology. U.S. Government
Sponsorship under NASA Contract NAS7-918 is acknowledged.
RESULTS OF INFORMATION AGGREGATION CALCULATIONS
95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS ON C AND m FOR EACH REGION
REGION: 1
REGION: 2
Io = ( 0.080228861, 0.192291881)
Jo = ( 2.637740759, 4.360046378)
Io = ( 0.031044615, 0.121979338)
Jo = (-8.169760025,26.791736399)
POINT ESTIMATES OF C AND m FOR EACH REGION
REGION E(C) E(m)
1 0.113254264 3.498894
2 0.049734403 9.310988
RANGE ON m FOR EACH REGION IMPLIED BY C CONSTRAINT
REGION LOWER BOUND UPPER BOUND
1 3.0105 5.8711
2 6.0459 INFINITY
POSTERIOR CREDIBILITY RANGE ON m FOR EACH REGION
REGION LOWER BOUND UPPER BOUND
1 3.0105 3.9873
2 6.0459 12.5762
PARAMETER VALUES FOR MEDIAN S/N CURVE
3 - 82
NUMBER OF REGIONS: 2 E(BETAo) = 10.9339 E(k) = 14.2524
REGION m K LIFE BOUND STRESS BOUND
1 3.49891 0.15780E+07 0.100E+07 0.30429E+05
2 9.31103 0.13418E+06 0.I00E+37 0.00000E+00
3.B.3 HPOTP Heat Exchanger Coil HCF Analysis Files
Selected input and output files for the HPOTP heat exchanger coil "all driver"
analysis are given here. The analysisprogram HEXHCF requires two input files,
HEXHCD and RELATD, along with the force history files. Annotated examples of the
data file format for HEXHCD are given in Figure 6-5. Related material data was not
used for this component and hence the RELATD file was empty. The input file
HEXHCD is given below. Section 6.1.10.1 contains a description of the input variables
and a user's guide for running HEXHCE
The output files from a HEXHCF run are HEXHCO, LOWLIF, DUMP, RELATO, and
IOUTPR. The HEXHCO, LOWLIF, and DUMP files from an "all drivers" analysis of the
HEX coil are given below. The HEXHCO file contains an echo of the input data, output
from the S/N material model, and the B lives. The LOWLIF file contains the lowest
200 (1% of total simulated) fatigue failure lives for the discharge duct, and are shown
plotted in Figure 3-21. The DUMP file contains the results of the materials charac-
terization calculations, including estimated values of the S/N curve parameters.
Input File - HEXHCD
675
0
1
20000
2
0
0
10
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
0.007
0.008
0.009
0.01
0.i0 0.i0 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0
3 - 83
0.00 0.00
1.00
1.00 1.00
1.20 3.50
0.1885 0.1915
0.0113 0.0157
2.00 2.00
2.00 2.00
486. 666.
799. 908.
3808. 4177.
0.50 1.50
0.80 1.20
0.80 1.20
0.90 1.10
0.80 1.20
0.60 1.40
-1.38629 0.95166
6
0.00 0.00 -0.07214
"XP' 1 0.856685 0.0
"YP" 1 0.62078
'XM3' 1 0.0
'YM3' 1 0.0
'SIN1' 2 0.269884
'AERO ' 3 0.0
1.0 1.0 1.0
3640.
2
85.
1.00
0.0
17801
29000000.
0.235 2
0.300 4
0.350 7
0.400 9
0.450 12
0.500 15
0.550 20
0.580 24
0.600 30
0.600 200
6
21.95 0.001
55.77 0.002
144.85 0.005
322.73 0.010
1945.90 0.050
0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0
0.00 0.00
0.1304 0.5652
0.50 0.50
0.27273 0.27273
0.15 1.00
0.20 1.00
29. 56.5
49.5 48.
69. 69.
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.003043
0.0
1.0
8.8E-06 0.30
.000000
.800000
.200001
.600001
.50000
.80000
.00000
.00000
.00000
.0000
0.0 0.0
i0. i0.
0.5 20.
0.5 20.
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.14102 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.355475 0.0 0.0
0.009638 0.20535 0.347965 0.051646
0.0 0.07179 0.0 0.0
3 - 84
50688.0 0.660
'70 F, 321 STAINLESS
27900. 76800. 1
13 -i.0 1
40000. i000.
40000. 2000.
40000. 3000.
40000. 4000.
40000. 5000.
40000. 6000.
30000. 23000.
30000. 66000.
25000. 72000.
25000. 190000.
20000. 789000.
20000. 1070000.
20000. 1450000.
0.00
1 0
1.0E+36
0.00
0 0.000 0.000
0.0 0.0 0.0
STEEL ALLOY - WELDED'
13
Output File - HEXHCO
Copyright (C) 1990, california Institute of Technology. U.S.
sponsorship under NASA Contract NAS7-918 is acknowledged.
Government
INPUT DATA
DRIVERS
WELD OFFSET (%)
K WELD (OD)
K WELD (ID)
INNER DIAMETER
WALL THICKNESS
Be(0.10, 0.i0)
Be(0.00, 0.00)
TEST = 1.00
Be(l.00, 1.00)
Be(l.20, 3.50)
Be(0.1885, 0.1915)
Be(0.0113, 0.0157)
PARAMETER DISTRIBUTIONS
RHO THETA
U(0.00000, 0.00000) U( 0.0, 0.0)
U(0.00000, 0.00000) U( 0.0, 0.0)
U(0.00000, 0.00000) u( 0.0, 0.0)
U(0.13040, 0.56520) u(10.0, i0.0)
U(0.50000, 0.50000) u( 0.5, 20.0)
u(0.27273, 0.27273) U( 0.5, 20.0)
3 - 85
LAMBDARANDOM
LAMBDA SINE
k: U(2.00000, 2.00000)
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION: 0.150
STRAIN GAGE FACTOR: 1.0000000
k: U(2.00000, 2.00000)
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION: 0.200
STRAIN GAGE FACTOR: 1.0000000
INNER TEMPERATURE
OUTER TEMPERATURE
INNER PRESSURE
MU
NORMAL: U( 486.0, 666.0)
NORMAL: U( 799.0, 908.0)
NORMAL: U(3808.0, 4177.0)
SIGMA
U( 29.0, 56.5)
U( 49.5, 48.0)
U( 69.0, 69.0)
DYNAMIC AERO LOAD FACTOR
STATIC AERO LOAD FACTOR
DYNAMIC STRESS ANALYSIS
AERO STRESS ANALYSIS
LAMBDA KOFF
NEUBERS RULE
DAMAGE MODEL ACCURACY
U( 0.50000,
U( 0.80000,
U( 0.80000,
U( 0.90000,
U( 0.80000,
U( 0.60000,
U(in 0.25000,
1.50000)
1.20000)
1.20000)
i.i0000)
1.20000)
1.40000)
in 2.59001)
LOADS INPUT
P LOADS T LOADS M2 LOADS M3 LOADS V2 LOADS V3 LOADS
(LBS) (IN.-LBS) (IN.-LBS) (IN.-LBS) (LBS) (LBS)
STATIC AERO
0.000000 0.000000 -0.072140 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
XP
0.856685 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
YP
0.620780 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
XM3
3 - 86
i
r
]"V
L
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.141020 0.000000 0.000000
YM3
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.355475 0.000000 0.000000
SIN1
0.269884 0.003043 0.009638 0.205350 0.347965 0.051646
AERO
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.071790 0.000000 0.000000
GEOMETRIC AND OTHER INPUT
K GEOM (OD)
K GEOM (ID)
K HOOP (OD)
K HOOP (ID)
EXTERNAL PRESSURE, PSI
ANALYSIS LOCATION
ANGLE THETA (DEGREES)
STRESS-TIME HISTORY PERIOD, SEC
STRESS-TIME HISTORY NOISE FILTER,
NUMBER OF TIME-VARYING LOADS
NUMBER OF POINTS IN HISTORIES
ANGLE THETA (RADIANS)
ELASTIC MODULUS, PSI
COEFF OF THERMAL EXPANSION
POISSONS RATIO
PSI
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
3640.
2
85.0
1.00
0.0
6
17801
1.48
0. 290E+08
0.88000000E-05
0.300
STRESS-STRAIN CURVE INPUT
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF SEGMENTS
3 - 87
STRESS-STRAIN PRODUCT
21.95
55.77
144.85
322.73
1945.90
50688.00
STRAIN VALUES
0.00100
0.00200
0.00500
0.01000
0.05000
0.66000
MATERIAL INPUT
DESCRIPTION: 70 F,
YIELD STRENGTH
ULTIMATE STRENGTH
NUMBER OF POINTS
321 STAINLESS STEEL ALLOY - WELDED
0.27900E+05
0.76800E+05
13
ORIGINAL S/N STRESS
STRESS LIFE RATIO REGION
0.40000E+05 1000. -1.00 i
0.40000E+05 2000. -1.00 1
0.40000E+05 3000. -1.00 1
0.40000E+05 4000. -1.00 1
0.40000E+05 5000. -1.00 1
0.40000E+05 6000. -1.00 1
0.30000E+05 23000. -1.00 1
0.30000E+05 66000. -1.00 1
0.25000E+05 72000. -1.00 1
0.25000E+05 190000. -1.00 1
0.20000E+05 789000. -1.00 1
0.20000E+05 1070000. -1.00 1
0.20000E+05 1450000. -1.00 1
TRANSFORMED S/N
STRESS LIFE
0.40000E+05 I000.
0.40000E+05 2000.
0.40000E+05 3000.
0.40000E+05 4000.
0.40000E+05 5000.
0.40000E+05 6000.
0.30000E+05 23000.
0.30000E+05 66000.
0.25000E+05 72000.
0.25000E+05 190000.
0.20000E+05 789000.
0.20000E+05 1070000.
0.20000E+05 1450000.
THERE IS 1 REGION(S) WITH DATA
3 - 88
AND 0 REGION(S) TO THE RIGHT WITHOUT DATA
THE UPPER BOUND(S) OF THE REGION(S) ARE (CYCLES):
0.100E+37
EXOGENOUS INFORMATION
CONSTRAINT ON COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION, C:
EXPLICIT CONSTRAINT ON m FOR EACH REGION:
REGION # OF POINTS LOWER BOUND
1 0 0.0000
0.0000
UPPER BOUND
0.0000
B LIVES : EMPIRICAL
0.00100 0.771838E+07
0.00200 0.110621E+08
0.00300 0.143306E+08
0.00400 0.181705E+08
0.00500 0.206006E+08
0.00600 0.245673E+08
0.00700 0.278451E+08
0.00800 0.301220E+08
0.00900 0.326067E+08
0.01000 0.359317E+08
0.50000 0.175421E+11
Output File - LOWLIF
i, 5.E-5, 1479781.289269
2, I.E-4, 3004876.487258
3, 1.5E-4, 3445826.573824
4, 2.E-4, 3963816.260295
5, 2.5E-4, 4037528.09434
6, 3.E-4, 4105125.884641
7, 3.5E-4, 4380491.704167
8, 4.E-4, 4589202.440686
9, 4.5E-4, 5285659.351945
i0, 5.E-4, 5348788.569105
ii, 5.5E-4, 5448780.289697
12, 6.E-4, 5673497.315382
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13,
14,
15,
16,
17,
18,
19,
20,
21,
22,
23,
24,
25,
26,
27,
28,
29,
30,
31,
32,
33,
34,
35,
36,
37,
38,
39,
40,
41,
42,
43,
44,
45,
46,
47,
48,
49,
50,
51,
52,
53,
54,
55,
56,
57,
58,
59,
60,
61,
62,
6.5E-4, 5756503.665433
7.E-4, 5901122.14788
7.5E-4, 5992467.420463
8.E-4, 6099130.254685
8.5E-4, 6236753.108872
9.E-4, 6693325.086817
9.5E-4, 7351647.786689
I.E-3, 7718383.958808
1.05E-3, 7868177.902472
I.IE-3, 8082424.391728
1.15E-3, 8130867.145248
1.2E-3, 8410800.150164
1.25E-3, 8490666.656294
1.3E-3, 8535148.060287
1.35E-3, 8979207.461742
1.4E-3, 9105088.568738
1.45E-3, 9364738.344999
1.5E-3, 9496224.625237
1.55E-3, 9598273.204801
1.6E-3, 9633790.742194
1.65E-3, 9807188.460706
1.7E-3, 9905755.103738
1.75E-3, 10192804.95354
1.8E-3, 10252395.14266
1.85E-3, 10705309.21556
1.9E-3, 10767912.69693
1.95E-3, 10867340.43723
2.E-3, 11062070.15081
2.05E-3, 11255641.20545
2.1E-3, 11751449.73611
2.15E-3, 12023472.49597
2.2E-3, 12085322.16353
2.25E-3, 12095466.70234
2.3E-3, 12097250.13585
2.35E-3, 12491067.59957
2.4E-3, 12758632.94092
2.45E-3, 13057469.48806
2.5E-3, 13173851.63135
2.55E-3, 13210510.88621
2.6E-3, 13427543.61267
2.65E-3, 13465648.7826
2.7E-3, 13523692.04964
2.75E-3, 13631616.97477
2.8E-3, 13846292.93406
2.85E-3, 13860630.26477
2.9E-3, 14109263.07464
2.95E-3, 14284922.59893
3.E-3, 14330636.2891
3.05E-3, 14728214.92948
3.1E-3, 14829870.78647
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63,
64,
65,
66,
67,
68,
69,
70,
71,
72,
73,
74,
75,
76,
77,
78,
79,
80,
81,
82,
83,
84,
85,
86,
87,
88,
89,
90,
91,
92,
93,
94,
95,
96,
97,
98,
99,
i00,
i01,
102,
103,
104,
105,
106,
107,
108,
109,
ii0,
iii,
112,
3.15E-3, 15091244.21511
3.2E-3, 15342974.0025
3.25E-3, 15420074.75321
3.3E-3, 15422893.78037
3.35E-3, 15638511.28351
3.4E-3, 15946114.93471
3.45E-3, 15980524.53372
3.5E-3, 16279868.83655
3.55E-3, 16375437.5627
3.6E-3, 16397943.39711
3.65E-3, 16635475.21379
3.7E-3, 16642019.32203
3.75E-3, 16819534.35861
3.8E-3, 16930107.7936
3.85E-3, 17897167.9116
3.9E-3, 18060883.97599
3.95E-3, 18141358.47696
4.E-3, 18170490.68634
4.05E-3, 18216391.60537
4.1E-3, 18301817.92482
4.15E-3, 18366179.92685
4.2E-3, 18377286.10277
4.25E-3, 18542064.30037
4.3E-3, 18703119.18224
4.35E-3, 18778146.2471
4.4E-3, 19025340.88236
4.45E-3, 19174037.51932
4.5E-3, 19188576.59917
4.55E-3, 19338320.0896
4.6E-3, 19421080.93617
4.65E-3, 19462969.41708
4.7E-3, 19818515.90651
4.75E-3, 19991339.85726
4.8E-3, 20154722.27965
4.85E-3, 20323197.58953
4.9E-3, 20424278.42021
4.95E-3, 20516960.82745
5.E-3, 20600581.27911
5.05E-3, 20982195.51449
5.1E-3, 21286602.62778
5.15E-3, 21536176.62897
5.2E-3, 21619105.61789
5.25E-3, 21692113.35097
5.3E-3, 21820982.22142
5.35E-3, 21979618.08444
5.4E-3, 22168836.80603
5.45E-3, 22259797.25835
5.5E-3, 22653175.10462
5.55E-3, 22925028.63644
5.6E-3, 22984253.71787
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113,
114,
115,
116,
117,
118,
119,
120,
121,
122,
123,
124,
125,
126,
127,
128,
129,
130,
131,
132,
133,
134,
135,
136,
137,
138,
139,
140,
141,
142,
143,
144,
145,
146,
147,
148,
149,
150,
151,
152,
153,
154,
155,
156,
157,
158,
159,
160,
161,
162,
5.65E-3, 23529643.37564
5.7E-3, 23556221.74841
5.75E-3, 23880065.2457
5.8E-3, 23992687.75068
5.85E-3, 24290331.47328
5.9E-3, 24330338.13695
5.95E-3, 24555370.69535
6.E-3, 24567304.15551
6.05E-3, 24694668.57759
6.1E-3, 24773379.48146
6.15E-3, 24903674.65428
6.2E-3, 24919553.96505
6.25E-3, 24951568.50234
6.3E-3, 25524327.86217
6.35E-3, 25919175.18897
6.4E-3, 26322117.84422
6.45E-3, 26352051.25391
6.5E-3, 26443563.88271
6.55E-3, 26592214.12503
6.6E-3, 26608410.70283
6.65E-3, 26828702.36412
6.7E-3, 26945248.00253
6.75E-3, 27026953.52151
6.8E-3, 27176462.20214
6.85E-3, 27246360.5481
6.9E-3, 27552759.52338
6.95E-3, 27717394.02058
7.E-3, 27845082.7874
7.05E-3, 28264566.81855
7.1E-3, 28267132.66918
7.15E-3, 28508301.58202
7.2E-3, 28517388.81253
7.25E-3, 28770684.86102
7.3E-3, 28808355.63171
7.35E-3, 28974339.47578
7.4E-3, 29130094.80862
7.45E-3, 29131258.76974
7.5E-3, 29194541.81925
7.55E-3, 29294352.46579
7.6E-3, 29388188.87586
7.65E-3, 29444240.4738
7.7E-3, 29541645.17309
7.75E-3, 29643428.16885
7.8E-3, 29693637.86088
7.85E-3, 29714548.96468
7.9E-3, 29801547.71799
7.95E-3, 29892136.60004
8.E-3, 30121980.7633
8.05E-3, 30190071.31036
8.1E-3, 30248124.40411
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163, 8.15E-3, 30325107.65089
164, 8.2E-3, 30436443.99758
165, 8.25E-3, 30489332.79314
166, 8.3E-3, 30675818.13157
167, 8.35E-3, 30869018.14745
168, 8.4E-3, 30871951.16941
169, 8.45E-3, 30978760.43506
170, 8.5E-3, 31077171.69862
171, 8.55E-3, 31085731.82913
172, 8.6E-3, 31159676.69033
173, 8.65E-3, 31218713.54831
174, 8.7E-3, 31273807.6537
175, 8.75E-3, 31547129.63778
176, 8.8E-3, 31605498.65852
177, 8.85E-3, 32024029.52725
178, 8.9E-3, 32138469.20102
179, 8.95E-3, 32282195.66175
180, 9.E-3, 32606701.98199
181, 9.05E-3, 32853094.97354
182, 9.1E-3, 32947818.33784
183, 9.15E-3, 33003821.70516
184, 9.2E-3, 33239335.65172
185, 9.25E-3, 33305328.50143
186, 9.3E-3, 33540405.78944
187, 9.35E-3, 33597649.86919
188, 9.4E-3, 33693346.1913
189, 9.45E-3, 33979652.59362
190, 9.5E-3, 33995480.32142
191, 9.55E-3, 34120349.04351
192, 9.6E-3, 34169209.30027
193, 9.65E-3, 34297569.66375
194, 9.7E-3, 34879640.79331
195, 9.75E-3, 34907666.94819
196, 9.8E-3, 34941274.0184
197, 9.85E-3, 35018956.23174
198, 9.9E-3, 35504039.43814
199, 9.95E-3, 35658398.83892
200, I.E-2, 35931735.01375
Output File - DUMP
Copyright (C) 1990, california Institute
Sponsorship under NASA Contract NAS7-918
of Technology. U.S. Government
is acknowledged.
RESULTS OF INFORMATION AGGREGATION CALCULATIONS
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95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS ON C AND m FOR EACH REGION
REGION: 1 Io = ( 0.047421026, 0.113658328)
Jo = ( 7.136664079, 9.595369882)
POINT ESTIMATES OF C AND m FOR EACH REGION
REGION E(C) E(m)
1 0.066941413 8.366017
POSTERIOR CREDIBILITY RANGE ON m FOR EACH REGION
REGION LOWER BOUND UPPER BOUND
1 7.1367 9.5954
PARAMETER VALUES FOR MEDIAN S/N CURVE
NUMBER OF REGIONS: 1 E(BETAo) = 19.5380 E(k) = 11.5536
REGION m K LIFE BOUND STRESS BOUND
1 8.36602 0.I0528E+06 0.I00E+37 0.00000E+00
3.B.4 ATD-HPFTP Second Stage Turbine Disk LCF Analysis Files
Selected input and output files for the ATD-HPFTP second stage turbine disk "all
driver" analysis are given here. The analysis program TRBPWA requires two input
files: TRBPWD and RELATD. Annotated examples of the data file format for TRBPWD
and RELATD input files are given in Figures 6-7 and 6-2. Related material data was
not used for this component and hence the RELATD file was empty. The input file
TRBPWD is given below. Section 6.2.3 contains a description of the input variables
and a user's guide for running TRBPWA.
The output files from a TRBPWA run are TRBPWO, LOWLIF, DUMP, RELATO, and
IOUTPR. The TRBPWO, LOWLIE and DUMP files are given below. The TRBPWO
3 - 94
file contains an echo of the input data, output from the S/N material model, and the
B-lives. The LOWLIFfile contains the lowest 200 (1%of total simulated) fatigue failure
livesfor the ATD Disk, and are shown plotted in Figure 3-27. The DUMP file contains
the results of the materials characterization calculations, including estimated values
of the S/N curve parameters.
Input File - TRBPWD
675
0
1
20000
5O
2
0
0
i0
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
0.007
0.008
0.009
0.010
-200. 200. 0.50
200. 500. 0.00
0.95
37592. 507.
0.80000 1.20000
0.95000 1.05000
1.41 2.18 159807. 38600.
1915. 0.91325 4.4435
14749. 0.04 0.07 i01.72
'PWA HPFTP 2ND TURBINE DISK'
00000. 198000. 1 9
9 -i.0 1
160000. 636.
160000. 677.
160000. 1019.
140000. 4743.
130000. 3824.
130000. 4163.
120000. 3749.
120000. 11349.
ii0000. 39600.
0.
0.50 0.0 0.0
0.00 i0.0 i0.0
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1 0
1.0E+36
0.00
0 0.000 0.000
Output File - TRBPWO
Copyright (C) 1990, california Institute of Technology. U.S. Government
Sponsorship under NASA Contract NAS7-918 is acknowledged.
DELTA Tf
SPEED (RPM)
LAMBDA Kd
LAMBDA Kt
INPUT DATA
DRIVERS
Be(-200.0, 200.0)
Be( 200.0, 500.0)
TEST = 0.95
NORMAL: MEAN = 37592.
U( 0.80000, 1.20000)
U( 0.95000, 1.05000)
PARAMETER DISTRIBUTIONS
RHO THETA
U(0.50000, 0.50000) U( 0.0, 0.0)
U(0.00000, 0.00000) U(10.0, i0.0)
STAND. DEV. = 507.
STRESS ADJUSTMENT, Kd
OTHER LOADS INPUT
STRESS CONCENTRATION, Kt
MECHANICAL STRESS (PSI)
ROTATIONAL SPEED (RPM)
STRESS DUE TO METAL TEMPERATURE (PSI)
SENSITIVITY OF METAL TEMPERATURE TO DELTA Tf
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1.410
2.180
159807.0
38600.
1915.0
0.91325
SENSITIVITY OF STRESS DUE TO Tmetal (PSI/F) 4.44
STRESS DUE TO THERMAL GRADIENT (PSI)
SENSITIVITY OF THERMAL GRADIENT TO DELTA Tf
FOR DELTA Tf < 0
FOR DELTA Tf >= 0
SENSITIVITY OF STRESS DUE TO THERM. GRAD. (PSI/F)
14749.0
0.040
0.070
101.72
MATERIAL INPUT
DESCRIPTION:
YIELD STRENGTH
ULTIMATE STRENGTH
NUMBER OF POINTS
PWA HPPTP 2ND TURBINE DISK
0.00000E+00
0.19800E+06
9
ORIGINAL S/N STRESS
STRESS LIFE RATIO REGION
0.16000E+06 636. -i.00 1
0.16000E+06 677. -i.00 1
0.16000E+06 1019. -i.00 1
0.14000E+06 4743. -i.00 1
0.13000E+06 3824. -i.00 1
0.13000E+06 4163. -i.00 1
0.12000E+06 3749. -i.00 1
0.12000E+06 11349. -I.00 1
0.11000E+06 39600. -i.00 1
TRANSFORMED S/N
STRESS LIFE
0.16000E+06 636.
0.16000E+06 677.
0.16000E+06 1019.
0.14000E+06 4743.
0.13000E+06 3824.
0.13000E+06 4163.
0.12000E+06 3749.
0.12000E+06 11349.
0.11000E+06 39600.
THERE IS 1 REGION(S) WITH DATA
AND 0 REGION(S) TO THE RIGHT WITHOUT DATA
THE UPPER BOUND(S) OF THE REGION(S) ARE (CYCLES):
0.I00E+37
EXOGENOUS INFORMATION
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CONSTRAINT ON COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION,
EXPLICIT CONSTRAINT ON m
REGION # OF POINTS
1 0
C:
FOR EACH REGION:
LOWER BOUND
0.0000
O.O000
UPPER BOUND
0.0000
B LIVES : EMPIRICAL
0.00100 0.121108E+03
0.00200 0.155309E+03
0.00300 0.180471E+03
0.00400 0.200357E+03
0.00500 0.214710E+03
0.00600 0.230961E+03
0.00700 0.251356E+03
0.00800 0.263503E+03
0.00900 0.281120E+03
0.01000 0.288462E+03
0.50000 0.411175E+04
Output File - LOWLIF
1 0.500000E-04 15.2292
2 0.100000E-03 30.8418
3 0.150000E-03 34.1021
4 0.200000E-03 39.0600
5 0.250000E-03 51.4226
6 0.300000E-03 53.2745
7 0.350000E-03 58.0043
8 0.400000E-03 65.5637
9 0.450000E-03 71.9857
i0 0.500000E-03 75.1110
ii 0.550000E-03 75.8070
12 0.600000E-03 89.4144
13 0.650000E-03 103.456
14 0.700000E-03 104.278
15 0.750000E-03 105.559
16 0.800000E-03 107.647
17 0.850000E-03 107.784
18 0.900000E-03 114.712
19 0.950000E-03 116.542
20 0.100000E-02 121.108
21 0.I05000E-02 124.069
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22 0.110000E-02
23 0.I15000E-02
24 0.120000E-02
25 0.125000E-02
26 0.130000E-02
27 0.135000E-02
28 0.140000E-02
29 0.145000E-02
30 0.150000E-02
31 0.155000E-02
32 0.160000E-02
33 0.165000E-02
34 0.170000E-02
35 0.175000E-02
36 0.180000E-02
37 0.185000E-02
38 0.190000E-02
39 0.195000E-02
40 0.200000E-02
41 0.205000E-02
42 0.210000E-02
43 0.215000E-02
44 0.220000E-02
45 0.225000E-02
46 0.230000E-02
47 0.235000E-02
48 0.240000E-02
49 0.245000E-02
50 0.250000E-02
51 0.255000E-02
52 0.260000E-02
53 0.265000E-02
54 0.270000E-02
55 0.275000E-02
56 0.280000E-02
57 0.285000E-02
58 0.290000E-02
59 0.295000E-02
60 0.300000E-02
61 0.305000E-02
62 0.310000E-02
63 0.315000E-02
64 0.320000E-02
65 0.325000E-02
66 0.330000E-02
67 0.335000E-02
68 0.340000E-02
69 0.345000E-02
70 0.350000E-02
71 0.355000E-02
124.429
124.546
129.185
131.056
132.799
133.245
133.803
134.375
136.029
136.142
146.670
149.321
149.350
149.919
152.232
152.349
152.559
152.949
155.309
155.585
156.888
157.319
158.105
158.928
159.245
160.929
161.168
163.429
164.862
166.070
168.230
169.043
169.055
174.029
175.739
176.429
176.966
178.398
180.471
180.738
181.203
181.368
182.887
184.505
184.510
184.919
185.591
185.607
186.154
191.204
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72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
12 0 
12 1 
0.3600003-02 
0.3650003-02 
0.3700003-02 
0.3750003-02 
0.3800003-02 
0.3850003-02 
0.3900003-02 
0.3950003-02 
0.4000003-02 
0.4050003-02 
0.4100003-02 
0.4150003-02 
0.420000E-02 
0.4250003-02 
0.4300003-02 
0.4350003-02 
0.4400003-02 
0.4450003-02 
0.4500003-02 
0.4550003-02 
0.460000E-02 
0.4650003-02 
0.4700003-02 
0.4750003-02 
0.4800003-02 
0.4850003-02 
0.4900003-02 
0.4950003-02 
0.5000003-02 
0.5050003-02 
0.5100003-02 
0.5150003-02 
0.520000E-02 
0.5250003-02 
0.5300003-02 
0.5350003-02 
0.5400003-02 
0.5450003-02 
0.5500003-02 
0.5550003-02 
0.56OOOOE-02 
0 - 5650003-02 
0 - 5700003-02 
0.5750003-02 
0.5800003-02 
0-5850003-02 
0.59OOOOE-02 
0.5950003-02 
0.6000003-02 
0.6050003-02 
191.649 
193.389 
195.028 
195.336 
197.925 
198.473 
199.333 
199.871 
200.357 
203.074 
206.303 
207.010 
207.449 
207.492 
207.952 
208.420 
209.027 
209.282 
209.696 
210.907 
211.559 
211.829 
212.364 
212.551 
213.054 
213.175 
214.526 
214.554 
214.710 
215.661 
215.751 
216.391 
216.600 
217.116 
217.569 
217.849 
219.640 
219.643 
220.485 
22 1.658 
222.904 
223.053 
224.775 
225.854 
227 -973 
228.482 
228.934 
230.314 
230.96 1 
231.353 
3 - 100 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
147 
148 
149 
150 
151 
152 
153 
154 
155 
156 
157 
158 
159 
160 
161 
162 
163 
164 
165 
166 
167 
168 
169 
170 
17 1 
0.6100003-02 
0.6150003-02 
0.6200003-02 
0.6250003-02 
0.6300003-02 
0.6350003-02 
0 -6400003-02 
0 -6450003-02 
0.6500003-02 
0.6550003-02 
0.6600003-02 
0.6650003-02 
0.6700003-02 
0.6750003-02 
0.6800003-02 
0.6850003-02 
0.6900003-02 
0.6950003-02 
0.7000003-02 
0.7050003-02 
0.7100003-02 
0.7 150003-02 
0.7200003-02 
0.7250003-02 
0.7300003-02 
0.7350003-02 
0.7400003-02 
0.7450003-02 
0.7500003-02 
0.7550003-02 
0.7600003-02 
0.7650003-02 
0.7700003-02 
0.7750003-02 
0.7800003-02 
0.7850003-02 
0.7900003-02 
0.7950003-02 
0.8000003-02 
0.8050003-02 
0.8100003-02 
0.8150003-02 
0.8200003-02 
0.8250003-02 
0.8300003-02 
0.8350003-02 
0.8400003-02 
0.8450003-02 
0.8500003-02 
0.8550003-02 
232.023 
232.187 
234.333 
234 .E20 
236.077 
236.604 
237.671 
238.349 
239.269 
239.967 
240.050 
242.428 
244.809 
245.703 
248.848 
250.122 
250.135 
251.327 
251.356 
251.544 
252.696 
252.731 
252.826 
254.045 
255.588 
255.936 
258.845 
259.559 
259.613 
260.046 
260.628 
261.008 
261.185 
261.531 
262.128 
262.237 
262.727 
263.178 
263.503 
264 -066 
264.301 
264.491 
264.728 
265.586 
269.652 
271.928 
272.150 
273.784 
274.667 
274.995 
3- 101 
172 0.860000E-02 275.158
173 0.865000E-02 278.007
174 0.870000E-02 279.032
175 0.875000E-02 280.049
176 0.880000E-02 280.089
177 0.885000E-02 280.380
178 0.890000E-02 280.779
179 0.895000E-02 280.885
180 0.900000E-02 281.120
181 0.905000E-02 281.155
182 0.910000E-02 281.284
183 0.915000E-02 281.394
184 0.920000E-02 281.707
185 0.925000E-02 283.283
186 0.930000E-02 283.324
187 0.935000E-02 283.371
188 0.940000E-02 283.556
189 0.945000E-02 284.575
190 0.950000E-02 284.579
191 0.955000E-02 284.692
192 0.960000E-02 284.880
193 0.965000E-02 285.136
194 0.970000E-02 285.480
195 0.975000E-02 285.854
196 0.980000E-02 285.907
197 0.985000E-02 286.616
198 0.990000E-02 287.837
199 0.995000E-02 288.408
200 0.I00000E-01 288.462
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RESULTS OF INFORMATION AGGREGATION CALCULATIONS
95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS ON C AND m FOR EACH REGION
REGION: 1 Io = ( 0.036692030, 0.112948100)
Jo = (5.734418000,11.972310000)
POINT ESTIMATES OF C AND m FOR EACH REGION
REGION E(C) E(m)
3 - 102
1 0.055495330 8.853366
POSTERIOR CREDIBILITY RANGE ON m FOR EACH REGION
REGION LOWER BOUND UPPER BOUND
1 5.7344 11.9723
PARAMETER VALUES FOR MEDIAN S/N CURVE
NUMBER OF REGIONS: 1 E(BETAo) = 22.9860 E(k) = 12.7338
REGION m K LIFE BOUND
1 8.85337 0.34214E+06 0.I00E+37
STRESS BOUND
0.00000E+00
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